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EDITORIAL

This number appears during a protracted crisis in the course of a war which will determine the future of every people in the world more radically than any previous event in history. We already see clearly the vital question which it will resolve, namely, the nature of the sovereign state. Shall only those states retain sovereignty, that is, finally, the right to determine the lives of their inhabitants, which are ruled despotically, or which, alternatively, are too formidable in themselves and their military alliances to be conquered? Shall sovereign states exist primarily to wage war? Shall all other states exist only as vassals or clients? In short, is the life of man to be merely an aspect of power politics?

Those individuals and cliques which have seized the sovereign authority in Germany, Japan, Italy and Russia have already begged these vital questions. They have said: "There are only two kinds of people, the strong and the weak. The strong peoples shall conquer the weak peoples and rule them as helots. The Germans and the Japanese are strong peoples, which agree to accept the Italians as their allies for this purpose. Only three other peoples have claims for consideration. Of these, the British are enemies who must be reduced to weakness, because they fight for the weak. The people of the United States of America are virtually enemies, because they sympathise with the British and the weak and help them, though they are not prepared openly to fight for them. The Russians despise the weak, but are themselves weak, though numerous. After we have conquered the British, who are irreconcilable to our doctrine, we strong peoples can later reduce these two peoples also to the status of clients, or of vassals, if they refuse to become our allies."

The British people inexorably oppose this doctrine and are determined to eradicate it, or alternatively to accept political annihilation; and the majority of the people of the United States of America are resolved to support the British, upon cash payment received and by every means short of war. (Written 1-11-1940).

This Miltonic issue has become steadily clearer during the past one hundred and fifty years, that is, since the epoch of the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution. The latter disseminated beyond the English-speaking world the conception that the state

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exists purely for the welfare of its inhabitants ; but in the later nineteenth century Bismarck and his accomplices, following the Prussian tradition, opposed to it the conception that the inhabitants exist primarily for the sake of the power of the state, which is to be exercised by an absolute ruler.

During this period, however, the issue has been complicated by the effects of the Industrial Revolution, which have extended the domination of the European system over the whole world ; have increased its population at least threefold ; and have greatly enhanced both the motives and the means of aggression. To-day a degenerate with a "Tommy gun" can compel a company of Olympic champions to do his will. The catastrophic danger that certain large, brave, skilful and well-organized peoples should bow to the absolute will of unscrupulous leaders and apply all their energies to the final extension of aggressive power politics—that danger has produced the greatest crisis of history.

Every small state of Europe has been humbled to a vassal or a client, serving an imposed purpose in which their welfare has no part. On the other hand, the two largest peoples in the world—the Chinese and the Indian—had not yet developed into the form of integrated states, when this horrid crisis arose. Their present experience is fantastically different, because the Chinese are exposed to the Bismarck-Hitler doctrine in naked clearness, as expounded by its copyists, the Japanese ; whereas Indians are developing political ideals, with which they have been inoculated by the British people, within the protection of the British Commonwealth of Nations. If the British people with American aid destroy this revolt against the intrinsic principle of civilization, Indians will be amongst the greatest gainers. For the intrinsic principle of civilization surely is that every man disciplined in the facts of life should possess his own soul. Indian and British, we are concerned that the French, Belgian, Dutch, Polish, Czech, Danish, Norwegian, Finnish, Rumanian, Greek, Egyptian, Turkish, Chinese, American, Indian and British peoples—to mention some of those most menaced by barbarism—shall retain the natural right to expand their own souls within the limits fixed by mutual obligation.

It must be plain to every student of history that the peoples of the world now stand at one of the most important crossroads of history.

Meanwhile this Society is preparing for an event of great local interest, the assembly at Lahore on December 16th to 18th next of the Fourth Session of the Indian History Congress. This organization is only about five years old, but has already developed rapidly and embraces within its fold most of the leading scholars and researchers in Indian History. Its membership is recruited from every Province and from many of the States of India and its sessions are attended by delegates from every University and most of the relevant learned societies of this country.

Its last session was held in December, 1939, at Calcutta and its eminent success was due not merely to the intrinsic value of its transactions, but also to the admirable organization arranged by the University of Calcutta and the generous hospitality of the Government and people of Bengal. We are confident that the University and citizens of the Panjab will emulate those of Calcutta and Bengal in ensuring the equal success of the forthcoming session. The Government and the University of the Panjab have already evinced their practical interest by providing the very necessary financial foundation of such success. His Excellency, the Governor, Sir Henry Craik, Bart., K.C.S.I., I.C.S., has taken the Congress under his patronage and a Reception Committee is being formed, which includes the most eminent citizens of this Province with the Honourable K. B. Major Sirdar Sikander Hyat Khan, K.B.E., as Chairman; and the Honourable Sir J. Douglas Young, Chief Justice, the Honourable Mr. C. P. Skrine, O.B.E., I.C.S., Resident, Panjab States, and Khan Bahadur Mian Afzal Husain, M.A., M.Sc., I.A.S., Vice-Chancellor, as Deputy Chairmen. It is expected that their Highnesses the Princes and other rulers of the Panjab States will also lend their patronage and help.

The following office-bearers have been elected for the session :—

PRESIDENT.

Dr. R. C. Majumdar, M.A., Ph.D., etc.

PRESIDENT ELECT.

Dewan Bahadur Dr. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, M.A., Ph.D.,
F.R.H.S.

SECTIONAL PRESIDENTS.

- (1) *Archæology*—M. Ghulam Yazdani, Esq., M.A., Director of
Archæology, Hyderabad (Deccan).

- (2) *Early Indian History*—Dr. Radha Kumud Mukerji, M.A., Ph.D., University Professor of History, Lucknow.
- (3) *Medieval Indian History*—K. B. Maulvi Zafar Hasan, Superintendent, Archaeological Survey, Northern Circle, Agra.
- (4) *Mughal Indian History*—To be nominated.
- (5) *Modern Indian History*—To be nominated.
- (6) *Sikh History*—Hon'ble Sir Jogendra Singh, Kt.

SECRETARIES FOR SECTIONS.

- (1) *Archæology*—Jagan Nath, Esq., M.A., Lecturer in Sanskrit, Oriental College, Lahore.
- (2) *Early Indian History*—Professor Gulshan Rai Bhatnagar, B.A., LL.B., Sanatana Dharma College, Lahore.
- (3) *Medieval Indian History*—Rev. Ross Wilson, M.A., Professor of History, Forman Christian College, Lahore.
- (4) *Mughal Indian History*—Professor Sri Ram Sharma, M.A., D. A. V. College, Lahore.
- (5) *Modern Indian History*—R. R. Sethi, Esq., M.A., University Lecturer in History, Lahore.
- (6) *Sikh History*—Dr. Hari Ram Gupta, M.A., Ph.D., Lecturer in History, Forman Christian College, Lahore.

LOCAL SECRETARIES.

General Secretary—Professor J. F. Bruce, M.A., University Professor of History.

Additional Local Secretary—R. P. Khosla, Esq., M.A., I.E.S. (Retd.), 80, The Mall, Lahore.

Assistant Local Secretary—R. R. Sethi, Esq., M.A., University Lecturer in History.

Chairman Exhibition Committee—Dr. G. L. Chopra, M.A., Ph.D.

Treasurer—S. R. Sharma, Esq., M.A.

Asstt. Treasurer.—V. S. Suri, Esq., M.A.

PROGRAMME.

MONDAY, 16TH DECEMBER.

- | | |
|--------------------|--|
| 10 a.m. | ... Photograph. |
| 10-30 to 12-0 noon | ... Inauguration. |
| 1-30 to 3-45 p.m. | ... Sectional Meetings. |
| 3-45 to 5-0 p.m. | ... Tea—(given by Panjab University Historical Society). (University Lawn) |

- 5-0 to 5-30 p.m. ... Opening of Exhibition by the Chief Justice.
 5-45 to 6-30 p.m. ... Concert of Indian Music (organized by the
 University Music Department).
 7-0 to 8-30 p.m. ... Evening Party (Residency).

TUESDAY, 17TH DECEMBER.

- 10-0 to 11-0 a. m. ... Business Meeting.
 11-0 to 1-0 p.m. ... Sectional Meetings.
 2-0 to 6-0 p.m. ... Local Excursions to Shalamar, Lahore
 Fort and Shahdara.
 3-45 p.m. ... Tea at Lahore Fort (given by organizers of
 the Session).
 8-30 p.m. ... Dinner (given by Reception Committee).

WEDNESDAY, 18TH DECEMBER.

- 10-0 to 12-30 p.m. ... Sectional Meetings.
 12-30 to 2-0 p.m. ... Lunch (given by organizers of the Session).
 2-0 to 3-45 p.m. ... Business Meeting.
 4-0 p.m. ... Garden Party (Government House).
 Evening ... Excursion Parties leave Lahore for Harappa
 and Taxila.

The organizers earnestly hope that every teacher and serious student of Indian History in this Province will enrol himself as a member of the History Congress for this session and, if possible, attend its meetings. The membership fee is five rupees (Rs. 5) which should be sent, together with a completed form of membership, to the Honorary Secretary as soon as possible.

It may seem unnecessary to emphasise that, owing to the generosity of many donors, both official, public and private, the member will be more than recompensed for his subscription. Not only will he be provided with an opportunity to meet and hear many distinguished scholars of Indian History, and later with a volume containing their contributed papers; but he will also participate in the social functions indicated in the programme shown above.

Further information in regard to the Indian History Congress can be obtained from the Office of the Honorary Secretary, Professor J. F. Bruce, M.A., University Hall, Lahore.

THE BRITISH ADVANCE FROM THE JUMNA TO THE SUTLEJ.

(September 1808—May 1809)

The opening years of the nineteenth century witnessed the rapid encirclement of the Cis-Sutlej States by three rising powers—the British, the Gurkhas, and the Sikhs. Lord Wellesley, having discarded the policy of non-intervention in the affairs of the native Princes, reverted to the policy of Warren Hastings and, within a few years, pushed the frontiers of the East India Company up to the banks of the River Jumna in the north. Equally rapid was the expansion of the Gurkha power, whose officers, having firmly established themselves in the Nepal Valley, were fast subduing, one after another, all the Hill Chiefs along the borders of the plains between the Rivers Jumna and Sutlej. No less phenomenal was the establishment of a strong Sikh monarchy in the Punjab. In this land of the five rivers, Ranjit Singh had been busy for some time past in carving out an empire for himself. Animated by an unbounded energy and sustained by an unfailing courage, he succeeded in a remarkably short time in asserting his supremacy over all the territories north-west of the Sutlej. His ambition, however, was far from satiated. He now contemplated the conquest of the Cis-Sutlej States, the unsettled condition of which seemed to promise the most fruitful soil for the realisation of his soaring ambition. Under such circumstances, the day when the vanguards of these three Powers were to meet in this cockpit of Hindostan could not have been postponed for long. In fact it came much sooner than could have reasonably been expected at the time of the recall of Lord Wellesley (1805), when his policy stood

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN FOOT-NOTES.

Example (Punjab Government Records) :—

Metcalf to Edmonstone, February 6, 1809, P. G. R. 5/53/G.
to be read as follows :—

Letter from Metcalf to Edmonstone, dated February 6, 1809 ; in the Punjab Government Records, Book No. 5, Serial letter No. 53, being a Copy of the original.

NOTE :— C at the end of a reference denotes a copy of a letter,
O signifies Original, T indicates Translation in English
from the Persian original, and (Enc) stands for an Enclosure
attached to the letter referred.

Example (Imperial Record Department) :—

Metcalf to Hewett, December 27, 1808, I.R.D. Sec. Cons. No. 59 of 23/1/1809.
to be read as follows :—

Letter from Metcalf to Hewett, dated December 27, 1808 ; in the Imperial Record Department, Secret Consultation No. 59 of 23rd January, 1809.

discredited in the eyes of the Court of Directors and when he was succeeded by Governor-Generals of the type of Lord Cornwallis, Sir George Barlow, and Lord Minto, all of whom held views and were enjoined to pursue a policy wholly contrary to that of Lord Wellesley.

The precipitating factor between the British and Ranjit Singh, however, was the dread of a threatened invasion of India by Napoleon, the Emperor of the French and an implacable foe of Great Britain. The air had been thick with such rumours for a long time, causing no small stir in the Council Chambers at Calcutta and in Leadenhall Street, London. But when the news of the Treaty of Tilsit (1807) between Napoleon and Alexander, the Czar of Russia, reached India, the distant possibility began to appear as an early probability, and precautions against such a contingency became necessary. Accordingly three embassies were launched by Lord Minto, the then Governor-General, to the Courts of Lahore, Kabul and Tehran respectively to coax these intervening States into a defensive alliance with the British Government against a probable Franco-Russian invasion of India through their territories. Mr. C. T. Metcalfe was the person chosen to accomplish this object at the Court of Maharaja Ranjit Singh at Lahore, for which place he was ordered to set out in the summer of 1808¹.

The frontiers of the East India Company and Maharaja Ranjit Singh, however, were not yet contiguous. There intervened between the two States a vast stretch of level plain between the Jumna and the Sutlej that was occupied in virtual sovereignty by a number of Sikh Sardars, notably, Sahib Singh of Patiala, Jaswant Singh of Nabha, Bhag Singh of Jind, Lal Singh of Kaithal, Bhanga Singh of Thanesar, Jodh Singh of Kalsia, Gurdit Singh of Ladwa, and many others. The ill-defined nature of their frontiers, coupled with their inordinate ambition to grab more and more land for themselves, excited bitter mutual jealousies, while the absence of a paramount controlling authority encouraged them to indulge in chronic warfare among themselves. But whereas the British Government was deterred from interference in their affairs because of the prevalent policy of non-intervention, Maharaja Ranjit Singh never missed an opportunity to fish in these troubled waters. As early as July, 1806, he crossed the Sutlej and seized Ludhiana, which he conferred on his maternal uncle, Raja Bhag Singh of Jind, on whose

1 Kaye : *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. I, p. 172.

invitation he had undertaken the expedition. The year 1807 witnessed a repetition of his military exploits, resulting in the seizure of the fort of Naraingarh and many other places in the vicinity of Ferozepore, together with the levy of large pecuniary contributions from both the Raja and Rani of Patiala and others.¹ These aggressions of Ranjit Singh alarmed the Sikh Chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej area, who waited in a deputation on Mr. Seton, then Resident at Delhi, asking for British protection and help. But the evasive answers² of the British Resident did little to satisfy their perturbed minds, and they went back disappointed, thinking how best to appease the aggressor now that they could not oppose him in any way.

The announcement of the despatch of Mr. Metcalfe as an envoy to the Court of Lahore alarmed these unfortunate Chiefs still further. They began to fear that their independence would be bartered away in the transaction with Maharaja Ranjit Singh, who, they knew, would not let slip this favourable opportunity to help himself to their dominions with the sanction and approval of the British Government.³

Nor did the Raja of Lahore belie their worst prognostications. He manifested a cheerful readiness to fall in with the proposals of Metcalfe for a defensive alliance against an invasion of India by France or her allies, but he demanded and insisted on a price for his alliance—namely, the recognition by the British Government of his undisputed sovereignty over all the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs.⁴ This claim the envoy had no authority to concede. At best he could do nothing more than agree to refer the proposition to his Government at Calcutta.⁵ Ranjit Singh, however, was nothing if not practical. He saw his chance and decided to face the British ambassador with a *fait accompli*. Crossing the Sutlej for the third time, he therefore immediately launched upon a fresh career of conquest and annexation. Metcalfe had no option but to follow. He saw Faridkote fall without even a show of resistance⁶; he saw Malerkotla submit to

1. For the aggressions of Ranjit Singh during these years, see Griffen: *Rajas of the Punjab*, pp. 87-91.

2. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, December 22, 1808, P.G.R. 5/43/C; and Cunningham: *History of the Sikhs* (edited by Garrett), p. 136.

3. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, August 19, 1808, P.G.R. 5/3/C.

4. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, September 24, 1808, P.G.R. 5/16/C.

5. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, September 25, 26 and 30, 1808, P.G.R. 5/17, 18 and 19/C.

6. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, October 5, 1808, P.G.R. 5/21/C.

monetary exactions which it had not even the capacity to meet¹; but he could do nothing to prevent the Maharaja from completing his grip on the country between the Sutlej and the Jumna.²

Events in Europe, however, helped the British Government to shake off its vacillation. Word came that the fortunes of Napoleon were at a low ebb and that the danger of a Franco-Russian invasion of India had largely disappeared for the time being. Accordingly, a defensive alliance with Ranjit Singh, as envisaged in the original instructions to Metcalfe, was no longer necessary. Now at last the British Government could meet Ranjit Singh on its own terms. Metcalfe was therefore instructed on the 31st October to demand the immediate withdrawal of Ranjit Singh's troops to the right bank of the Sutlej and the restitution to their former owners of all the places conquered by the Maharaja since the day of Metcalfe's appearance in his camp, for the British Government had now definitely decided to take all the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs under its protection.³

The British Government was now in earnest. It had satisfied itself that Ranjit Singh would never be its cordial friend and that he would never yield unless convinced of its determination to enforce its demands, if need be, by an appeal to arms.⁴ Accordingly it was decided on November 14, 1808, to move towards the frontiers of the Maharaja of Lahore's dominions a detachment of troops under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel David Ochterlony, then commanding the garrison in the fort of Allahabad. He was ordered to proceed immediately to Delhi, but was enjoined to observe the utmost secrecy respecting his movements.⁵

Meanwhile Ranjit Singh, who was absolutely ignorant of the change that had come over the attitude of the British Government, or the causes thereof, was busy with his triumphs. The conquest of Faridkote and the submission of Malerkotla had already pointed the way the wind was going to blow; the easy capture of Ambala⁶ and the ready submission of Shahabad⁷ further convinced the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs of the hopelessness of their cause and the uselessness of all

1. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, October 26, 1808, P.G.R. 5/26/C; also, Metcalfe to Edmonstone, December 7, 1808, P.G.R. 5/33/C.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Kaye: *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. I, p. 198.

4. Edmonstone to Metcalfe, November 7, 1808, quoted verbatim in Kaye: *Life of Metcalfe*, Vol. I, p. 200.

5. Edmonstone to Ochterlony, November 14, 1808, P.G.R. 6/1/O.

6. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, November 8, 1808, P.G.R. 5/31/C.

7. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, November 20, 1808, P.G.R. 5/32/C.

resistance. Accordingly one after another, almost all of them acknowledged his suzerainty and sought to avert their doom by agreeing to pay large pecuniary contributions.¹ Even Raja Sahib Singh of Patiala, who was considered to be the most powerful of all the Cis-Sutlej Sardars, thought it expedient to exchange turbans with Ranjit Singh.² In fact, when the Maharaja started his homeward march in the first week of December, 1808, little seemed wanting to complete his triumph and sovereignty over this area.

There is, however, many a slip between the cup and the lip. While Ranjit Singh was daily hoping to obtain from the British Government a *de jure* recognition of his sovereignty over the Cis-Sutlej area, which he had already established *de facto*, Metcalfe confounded him by a letter from the Governor-General which expressed the latter's "great surprise and concern" at the "pretensions" of the Maharaja, and informed him for the first time of the resolution of the British Government to assume the protection of the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs³. Metcalfe further called upon the Maharaja to restore all the places he had "usurped" during his last expedition and to withdraw all his troops to the right bank of the Sutlej.⁴

Ranjit Singh was completely taken aback at this somersault.⁵ But he was determined to play the game to the last. Adopting a policy of procrastination, he now sought to evade compliance with the British demands. The reports of Metcalfe to his Government are henceforth only a tedious recital of his ineffectual interviews with Ranjit Singh and his advisers, the Maharaja indicating no signs of his being tamed into acquiescence. These reports did not take long to convince the British Government that the residence of an envoy at Lahore was altogether unavailing. It was, therefore, decided to withdraw the Mission as soon as Lt.-Col. Ochterlony should have established the intended military post near the Sutlej.⁶ Of course the British Government was still desirous of maintaining relations of amity with the Maharaja of Lahore. But it had decided to forget the French peril and, far from seeking a treaty of alliance and friendship with Ranjit Singh, it was now anxious to avoid incurring any obligations

1. *Ibid.*

2. Seton to Edmonstone, December 7, 1808, P. G. R. 3/1/C.

3. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, December 11, 1808, P. G. R. 5/34/C.

4. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, December 12, 1808, P. G. R. 5/35/C.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Edmonstone to Ochterlony, December 29, 1808, P. G. R. 6/3/0

which might prove a stumbling-block in the pursuit of its policy in the unseen future.¹

The instructions² of Lt.-Col. Ochterlony enjoined him to acquire all useful information regarding the military strength and resources of the Punjab and the disposition of its Chiefs and inhabitants. If he received any propositions of a rebellious nature from the disaffected Sardars, he was asked "to decline any present acquiescence . . . without excluding, however, the possibility that future events may render them acceptable." Regarding the determination of the British to assume the protection of the Cis-Sutlej States, it was presumed that the Chiefs would not be unwilling to accept it, though it was feared that they might, out of distrust and jealousy, be averse to the passage of British troops through their territories. Accordingly, Ochterlony was requested so to regulate his conduct as to inspire confidence in the British Government and to invite their cheerful acquiescence and cordial co-operation in the pursuit of measures that were being adopted for their own benefit. Of course, no subsidy or pecuniary contribution was to be demanded of them for the impending operations, whose only object was the resumption of the conquests made by Ranjit Singh on the left bank of the Sutlej during his last expedition.

The problem of the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs was a very thorny one. By the Treaty of Peace, concluded in December 1803, Daulat Rao Scindhia had surrendered to the British Government all his "rights and interests" in Northern Hindostan. These "rights and interests" the British Government now sought to interpret into an acquisition by it of sovereignty over, among others, the Cis-Sutlej States.³ It is, however, difficult to admit the validity of this claim, for the occasional depredations of the Marathas in this territory can hardly be construed to mean anything like the exercise of sovereign authority by them in this territory. Moreover, the British Government itself had not exercised any control or interference in the Cis-Sutlej affairs at any time between 1803 and 1808, nor had it given any indication of doing so until the close of the year 1808. In fact, the Sikh Chiefs had been denied all protection and help against Ranjit Singh's aggressions, even when they had solicited it

1. *Ibid.*

2. *Ibid.*

3. Seton to Ochterlony, January 23, 1809, P.G.R. 16/5/O.

of their own accord as late as March 1808.¹ On the contrary, the Maharaja had been allowed during all these years to carry on his depredations and effect annexations in the Cis-Sutlej area, not only with impunity, but even without a formal protest from the British Government. Even the original instructions to Metcalfe, when he was ordered to set out in June, 1808, on his mission to the Court of Ranjit Singh, did not contain any such claim on the part of the British Government. In fact, when Sahib Singh of Patiala presented to Metcalfe (August 24, 1808) the keys of his citadel, wishing to receive them back as a protégé of the British Government, Metcalfe, true to the letter and spirit of his instructions, refused to be manoeuvred into any procedure which should savour of any such claim on the part of his Government.² But now that the French peril had receded into the mists of improbability, the British Government in India began to realise that it would be more politic to have as its immediate neighbour a number of friendly Chiefs, rendered grateful by its protection and ready to allow the use of their territories and resources if ever an emergency arose, than to allow the ambitious and militant Ranjit Singh to subjugate all these and run his frontiers contiguous to those of the British Government.³ And so, in spite of the obligations of allegiance that almost all the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs had sworn to Ranjit Singh during his last irruption,⁴ it was decided to push the red line of the British frontier right up to the banks of the Sutlej. If any Chief were to object to, or oppose the march of the British troops through his territory, either on the ground of any engagement that he might have contracted with Ranjit Singh, or on the plea of his desire to preserve appearances of fidelity to him, Lt.-Col. Ochterlony was instructed to state in most unambiguous terms that the British Government did not recognise any extension of Ranjit Singh's power on the left bank of the Sutlej, and that such conduct on the part of any Chief would be resented and considered even hostile by the British Government.⁵

Events seemed to be fast heading towards a crisis. Ranjit Singh, whose military career had upto then known no serious rebuff, was

1. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, December 22, 1808, P. G. R. 5/43/C.

2. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, August 24, 1808, P. G. R. 5/4/C.

3. Edmonstone to Residents at Hyderabad, Poona, Bombay and Nagpore, etc., January 27, 1809, I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 128 of 30-1-1809.

4. Bhangra Singh to Seton, December 4, 1808, I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 14, of 2-1-1809.

5. Edmonstone to Seton, December 26, 1808, P. G. R. 6/5/O.

not expected to take things lying down. He had already left behind him nearly 10,000 troops in the vicinity of Ambala,¹ and there was reason to believe that he would not hesitate going to the extremity of war, if only he could have a reasonable hope of winning it, rather than acquiesce quietly in the establishment of a British military post on the left bank of the Sutlej². It was, therefore, incumbent on the British military authorities to make such adequate arrangements as should leave no doubt in the mind of the ruler of Lahore regarding the issue of any contest which he might feel tempted to risk. Accordingly Ochterlony's original command was further increased by another battalion and a squadron of cavalry to comprise, in the last analysis, the following³ :—

4th Native Cavalry	500 rank and file
1st Battalion 9th Native Infantry	700 " " "
2nd Battalion 10th Native Infantry	800 " " "
1st Battalion 27th Native Infantry	800 " " "
Artillery and Guns	86 men
Pioneers	50 "

Total ... 2,936 rank and file.

Furthermore, as the attitude of the Sikh Chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej area regarding the advance of British troops through their territories was by no means dependable, or even defined, though assurances of friendship and goodwill were pouring in every day from almost all quarters⁴, it was considered necessary to strengthen all the frontier posts so as to be able to render prompt and effective assistance to the advance-guard under Lt.-Col. Ochterlony, should circumstances arise to require it either from threatened or actual hostilities of Ranjit Singh or such Sikh Chiefs as might be disposed to espouse his cause. This important object was sought to be achieved by manning the

1. Sahib Singh to Seton, received on December 15, 1808, I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 13 of 2-1-1809. Also, Bhanga Singh to Seton, received on the 15th December, 1808, I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 14 of 2-1-1809.

2. Metcalfe to Hewett, December 27, 1808, I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 59 of 23-1-1809.

3. Hewett to Minto, December 17, 1808, I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 55 and 56 of 23-1-1809.

4. Sahib Singh to Seton, received on December 15, 1808, I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 13 of 2-1-1809; Bhanga Singh to Seton, received on December 15, 1808, I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 14 of 2-1-1809; and Carey to Edmonstone, January 9, 1809, I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 79 of 30-1-1809,

following frontier stations with the number of rank and file noted against each¹ :—

Saharanpur	1,269	rank and file
Karnal	854	" " "
Meerut	2,600	" " "
Rewarée	2,480	" " "
Delhi	1,564	" " "
Total					8,726	rank and file.

It was the intention of the Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General Hewett, to have superintended personally any military operations that might have eventually become necessary in this quarter. An unfortunate accident, involving grave physical injury, however, incapacitated him from taking the field in person, and consequently Major General St. Leger, then commanding at Cawnpore, was ordered to Saharanpur to assume charge of the forces collecting in the vicinity of that station². With a view to further safeguard the frontiers from possible incursions by predatory hordes of all descriptions as also to effectively prevent the hostile troops of Holkar and Amir Khan from creating fresh disturbances for the British Government either by stirring up the peasantry to renewed acts of lawlessness or by attempting to join Ranjit Singh or his allies, another military officer, Lt.-Col. Ball, was placed in command of the Delhi forces with an additional regiment of Native Cavalry which was ordered to move from Muttra to Delhi and to encamp at some convenient situation for forage and supplies about five or six *koses* from Delhi on the road to Rewarée³. Captain Skinner, likewise, was ordered to collect together at Karnal for use in emergency all the horsemen that were lately employed under him in the districts of Panipat and Sonapat to quell disturbances and establish order there⁴.

Another important measure, which must have contributed not a little to the removal of much of the potential ground for friction

1. Hewett to Minto, December 17, 1808, I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 55 and 56 of 23-1-1809.

2. Carey to Metcalfe, January 3, 1809, I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 60 of 23-1-1809.

3. Worsley to Seton, January 16, 1809, I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 8 of 13-2-1809; and Worsley to Ball, January 19, 1809, I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 13 of 13-2-1809.

4. Worsley to Seton, January 16, 1809, I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 8 of 13-2-1809; and Worsley to Skinner, January 21, 1809, I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 13 of 13-2-1809.

between the British Government and the Sikh Chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej area, was the promulgation by the Commander-in-Chief of a general prohibition strictly forbidding the slaughter of bullocks and cows for use as food by British troops during the course of their march through and stay in the territories of these Sikh Chiefs.¹ With a view to secure further the cordial co-operation of the latter, each one of them was individually apprised of the motives and objects of the advance of British troops towards the Sutlej, and their *Vakils* (or agents) directed to accompany Lt.-Col. Ochterlony during his progress towards Patiala to enable him to keep up a friendly understanding with their masters.² The Chiefs were called upon to evince the "most unequivocal marks of zealous and unalterable attachment" towards the British Government, for Ochterlony was marching to assure nothing but their own security and prosperity.³

Preparations completed and precautions enforced, Lt.-Col. Ochterlony crossed the Jumna into the Cis-Sutlej territory, and January 16, 1809, saw him encamped at Dadoopore, four miles north of Buriya Ghat, where he halted for a few days⁴. Here he was visited by the Dewan of Sardar Bhagwan Singh of Buriya, accompanied by a minor nephew of that Chief, who delivered to Ochterlony a letter from his uncle, expressive of great satisfaction at the assumption of their protection by the British and assuring him his personal attendance on his arrival back from Phillaur, where he then was⁵. Gurdit Singh of Ladwa, too, wrote in friendly terms, announcing the despatch to the British Camp of a *Vakil* who arrived on the 18th January⁶. The next arrival, on the 20th of the same month, was that of Raja Bhag Singh of Jind, accompanied by a *Vakil* from Sardar Jodh Singh of Kalsia⁷. Jodh Singh, having been the recipient of large grants of land and numerous other favours from Ranjit Singh, was reported unwilling to join Ochterlony at such an early stage in the latter's progress, but he promised to do so at Patiala and expressed through his *Vakil* and Raja Bhag Singh his determination

1. Edmonstone to Carey, December 29, 1808, I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 97 of 2-1-1809; and Carey to Edmonstone, January 13, 1809, I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 3 of 13-2-1809.

2. Seton to Ochterlony, January 12, 1809, P. G. R. 16/3/O.

3. Seton to Sahib Singh and Bhag Singh, January 14 and 15, 1809, P. G. R. 16/4/T.

4. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, January 16, 1809, P. G. R. 10/1/C.

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.* and Ochterlony to Edmonstone, January 18, 1809, P. G. R. 10/3/C.

7. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, January 20, 1809, P. G. R. 10/4/C.

to join the British in case of actual hostilities¹. Lt.-Col. Ochterlony, however, made no secret of the determination of his Government to resume and restore to their original proprietors all the usurpations of Ranjit Singh effected by him during his last expedition, including those that had been conferred on Jodh Singh or obtained by force since that date by him or by other Chief². Questioned regarding the earlier usurpations of Ranjit Singh or others, Ochterlony could not commit himself one way or the other, as he had not received any final orders thereon³.

Of course, Ochterlony had expected such inconvenient questions.⁴ The Maharaja of Lahore had distributed, not infrequently, many of his usurpations among the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs, with the consequence that some of them had been benefited at the cost of others. Naturally, those who had been so enriched would have been averse to any interference which sought to deprive them of the lands so acquired; while those who had lost them would have been keen on re-acquiring their former rights and possessions. Prominent among the beneficiaries of such a distribution on the left bank of the Sutlej were the Rajas Sahib Singh of Patiala, Bhag Singh of Jind and Jaswant Singh of Nabha, and Sardars Jodh Singh of Kalsia, Gurdit Singh of Ladwa and Lal Singh of Kaithal. Apprehending inconvenient solicitations on the part of these Chiefs for the confirmation of the grants made to them by Ranjit Singh, Ochterlony had written as early as the 18th January to the Resident at Delhi asking for an authoritative interpretation of the resolution and intentions of his Government with regard to the exact extent of the usurpations which Ranjit Singh and his erstwhile adherents were to be called upon to restore to their original proprietors⁵.

Mr. Seton replied on the 23rd⁶. In his opinion the British Government would have been justified in demanding from Ranjit Singh, his adherents and all others, a complete restitution of all the acquisitions made by them since the conclusion of peace with Dault Rao Scindhia in December 1803, for had not the British then succeeded to the "whole of the territories, rights and interests of that Chief

1. *Ibid.*

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*

4. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, January 18, 1809, P. G. R. 10/3/C.

5. Ochterlony to Seton, January 18, 1809, P.G.R. 10/2/C.

6. Seton to Ochterlony, January 23, 1809, P.G.R. 16/5/O.

in the countries to the northward of those of the Rajas of Jeypore and Jodhpore?" What did it matter if the British had not so far exercised any protection, control or interference? "The mere non-exercise of a power, while unaccompanied by any declaration," argued he, "can never be considered as tantamount to the relinquishment of the *right* of exercise." But here, as elsewhere in politics, expediency was to be the guiding principle. It would have been highly vexatious to Ranjit Singh, which it was then the intention of the Government to avoid, to ask him and his favourites to surrender all their acquisitions in the Cis-Sutlej area since 1803. Accordingly, it was considered more politic to limit the extent of British demands to the effects of his last expedition only. To satisfy critics, a plausible argument could be advanced that the earlier usurpations took place long before the British declared their intention to interfere, and therefore the British did not feel warranted to demand their surrender. Such an explanation accorded well with the personal opinions of Ochterlony himself.¹ He was convinced that a permission to retain the earlier usurpations would, among other things, secure to the British the cordial co-operation of all the powerful Cis-Sutlej Chiefs who had thus been enriched by the bounty of Ranjit Singh.

These preliminaries settled, Ochterlony embarked upon his arduous task of forging ahead. By rapid marches he reached Jagadhari² on the 7th January, 1809. Earlier, on January 21, Raja Sahib Singh of Patiala had been ordered to restore the Talukas of Buriya and Udaweh, consisting of thirty villages, to Sardar Bhanga Singh of Thanesar, from whom they had been wrested by Ranjit Singh during his last expedition and conferred on Sahib Singh³. This was accomplished within less than a week and Bhanga Singh acknowledged the restoration of these districts to him on the 28th January⁴.

It is necessary here to take a little retrospective view of Mr. Metcalfe's negotiations with Ranjit Singh. Despairing of an early compliance with his demands, he at last informed the Maharaja on the 22nd December, 1808, of the resolution of the British Government to advance a detachment of troops towards the Sutlej⁵. For Ranjit

1. Ochterlony to Seton, January 27, 1809, P.G.R. 10 (2nd) /83/C.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Ochterlony to Sahib Singh, January 21, 1809, P.G.R. 11/1/T.

4. Bhanga Singh to Ochterlony, January 28, 1809, P.G.R. 11/7/T.

5. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, December 22, 1808, P.G.R. 5/43/C.

Singh this was a bolt from the blue. His pride was injured, his passions aroused. Intensely agitated, he quitted the room, mounted his favourite horse, and began rapidly to wheel round and round¹. Apparently, he was trying to subdue mental tension by physical exertion.² However, when his temper had subsided, he held secret consultations with his advisers and at last expressed his readiness to accept all the demands of Metcalfe.³ The British envoy seemed to have carried the day.

But delays followed as usual, and it was not till the 6th January, 1809 that orders could be issued for the withdrawal of Sikh troops then stationed at Ambala.⁴ This, thought the Maharaja, should be considered a sufficient indication of his desire to preserve peace, paving the way, as it were, for the conclusion of a treaty of friendship between the two States.⁵ Metcalfe, however, positively declined to enter into any such engagement until all his demands were fully complied with, *i.e.*, every soldier of the Maharaja on the left bank of the Sutlej must be recalled, and every place seized during his last expedition restored to its original proprietor.⁶ Such an attitude on the part of the envoy excited the suspicions of Ranjit Singh, and when the latter heard of the actual advance of the British troops, his suspicions deepened into a grave distrust of the intentions of the British Government. He became seriously alarmed for the safety of his dominions and began to make warlike preparations to resist any attempt of the British to subvert his rule.⁷ Troops were mobilized, stores and ammunition hastily gathered, and guns mounted on the forts.⁸ Dewan Mohkam Chand was recalled from Kangra and deputed to assume command of the large body of troops then stationed at Ludhiana Ghat.⁹ There was feverish activity everywhere and war seemed imminent, the Maharaja himself expressing an intention to leave for Phillaur, his frontier post on the Sutlej.¹⁰ Metcalfe, however, threatened to quit the Sikh Court immediately in case such a

1. Kaye : Life of Metcalfe. Vol. I, p. 209.

2. Thompson : Life of Metcalfe, p. 96.

3. Kaye: Life of Metcalfe. Vol. I, p. 210.

4. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, January 12, 1809, P.G.R. 5/47/C.

5. Ranjit Singh to Metcalfe, January 7, 1809, P.G.R. 5/47/C. (enc.)

6. Metcalfe to Ranjit Singh, January 8, 1809, P.G.R. 5/47/C. (enc.)

7. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, January 12, 1809, P.G.R. 5/47/C.

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*

10. Ranjit Singh to Metcalfe, January 13, 1809, P.G.R. 5/48/C. (enc.)

decision was taken,¹ whereupon the Maharaja gave up the idea.²

Metcalfe did his best to allay the fears of Ranjit Singh and to dispel his suspicions. He ridiculed the exaggerated nature of the reports regarding the military preparations of the British; he assured the Maharaja that the intentions of his Government were entirely peaceful³; but he would not give him the one thing he asked for—a treaty of peace—a thing which he was now most anxious, almost impatient, to secure.⁴ Driven to extremities, the Maharaja at last decided to yield one more step. This time Ambala was ordered to be restored to the Rani of Baghel Singh, its former owner.⁵ Ranjit Singh now expected a corresponding gesture of peaceful intentions from the British. He undertook to restore even Khur if a treaty of peace were concluded.⁶ But the British ambassador was adamant, as instructed. British demands, he persisted, must first be fully satisfied.⁷

If Ranjit Singh was suspicious about the intentions of the British Government, Metcalfe was no less so regarding those of the Maharaja, for the latter, though apparently anxious to preserve peace, had in no way slackened his military preparations. Metcalfe's reading convinced him that the Maharaja was bent upon trying the chance of war, and anticipating such an eventuality, he recommended even an actual invasion of the Punjab in case hostilities appeared inevitable.⁸ Lt.-Col. Ochterlony was, therefore, ordered to accelerate his march towards the Sutlej, which he promised.⁹ Ochterlony was, however, convinced that in spite of the manifestations of grave apprehensions by Ranjit Singh, the Maharaja would not provoke hostilities.¹⁰

Leaving Camp Malana on the 29th January, Ochterlony reached Patiala on the 2nd February, 1809. While yet 13 miles away from the town, he was received by the Dewan of Raja Sahib Singh, who had been deputed by his master to accord Ochterlony a warm reception and to assure him of Sahib Singh's fidelity to the British

1. Metcalfe to Ranjit Singh, January 14, 1809, P.G.R. 5/48/C. (enc.)
2. Ranjit Singh to Metcalfe, January 14, 1809, P.G.R. 5/48/C. (enc.)
3. Metcalfe to Ranjit Singh, January 15, 1809, P.G.R. 5/48/C. (enc.)
4. Ranjit Singh to Metcalfe, January 17, 1809, P.G.R. 5/49/C. (enc.) and Metcalfe to Ranjit Singh, January 17, 1809, P.G.R. 5/49/C. (enc.)
5. Ranjit Singh to Metcalfe, January 18, 1809, P.G.R. 5/49/C. (enc.)
6. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, January 21, 1809, P.G.R. 5/49/C.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, January 26, 1809, P.G.R. 5/50/C.
9. Ochterlony to Carey, January 29, 1809, P.G.R. 10 (2nd)/84/C.
10. *Ibid.*

Government.¹ As the British Commandant neared the town, the Raja himself came out on horseback to receive him and made profuse professions of his loyalty to the British.² To give a practical proof of the sincerity of his professions, he ordered Dewan Cheyn Singh to join the British detachment in command of "what is called a Thousand Horse³."

Ochterlony halted at Patiala for two days more, during which interval he was visited by Raja Bhag Singh of Jind, accompanied by a confidential agent from Ranjit Singh. The British Commandant utilised this opportunity to impress upon his visitors the pacific intentions of his Government towards the Maharaja of Lahore, and remarked that to secure the treaty of peace which the Maharaja was so anxious to obtain, he should withdraw all his troops into his own territory as a gesture of goodwill and peace⁴.

Another important visitor to the British Camp here was Rani Daya Kaur, the widow of the late Sardar Baghel Singh, who called in person to thank Ochterlony for the restoration to her of Ambala which had only lately been evacuated by the troops of Ranjit Singh⁵. After its seizure by Ranjit Singh, most of its villages had been conferred by the Maharaja on Raja Bhag Singh of Jind and Bhai Lal Singh of Kaithal, both of whom, on requisition from the British Commandant, had gladly withdrawn their agents and restored the places to the people of the Rani⁶.

Marching from Patiala Ochterlony reached Nabha on the 5th February, 1809. Here he was received by Raja Jaswant Singh with still greater marks of honour and enthusiasm⁷. This Chief was considered next in rank to that of Patiala, although he far excelled the latter in ambition, influence and information⁸. Ochterlony was obliged to halt here on the following day in deference to the earnest entreaties of this Chief. The latter was very keen on having a particular conversation with the British Commandant, which

1. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, February 4, 1809, P. G. R. 10/5/C.

2. *Ibid.* Also, Ochterlony to Worsley, February 2, 1809, P. G. R. 10 (2nd)/86/C.

3. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, February 9, 1809, P. G. R. 10/6/C.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*

7. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, February 9, 1809, P. G. R. 10/6/C.

8. *Ibid.* Also, Ochterlony to Worsley, February 5, 1809, P. G. R. 10 (2nd)/88/C.

Ochterlony was led to imagine was of great importance¹. It, however, proved merely to be a prayer for the grant of a *jagir* in consideration of his past services to the cause of the British Government and his present fidelity, for which he held out solemn assurances². Ochterlony pointed out in reply, as was meet, that he had been deputed not to conquer new lands or confer any *jagirs*, but only to enforce restitution of the late usurpations of Ranjit Singh and his adherents³. He further added that, as proof of his friendship, the Raja should join the British Detachment with his army⁴.

Leaving Nabha on the 7th February Ochterlony reached Amargarh on the 8th, where he next halted. Here he took opportunity to effect the reinstatement of Attaullah Khan, the Pathan Chief of Malerkotla, who had been a prominent victim of the aggressions and exactions of Ranjit Singh during his last expedition on the left bank of the Sutlej. The British Commandant ordered Raja Bhag Singh, Raja Jaswant Singh, Bhai Lal Singh and Dewan Cheyn Singh to withdraw their *thanas* (posts) and collectors from the Pathan's territory, where they had been stationed by the authority of Ranjit Singh. This done, Attaullah Khan was once again installed in undisputed authority over his possessions⁵. Naturally enough, this earned for the British the everlasting gratitude of this Mohammadan Chief.

These bloodless triumphs of Lt.-Col. Ochterlony were hard knocks for Ranjit Singh. His grandiose design of annexing the whole of the Cis-Sutlej area to his dominions had crumbled away. One after another he had seen all his Cis-Sutlej adherents embrace the cause of the British Government, acknowledge its sovereignty, and submit even to irksome interference with their cherished acquisitions. The ground under his feet had given way: he could not but yield, or face the dark alternative of war single-handed. Discretion, however, commended itself to him as the better part of valour, and he decided to make a virtue of necessity. Accordingly, on the 6th February, he despatched Sada Singh and Nizam-ud-din as his *Vakils* to the Camp of Lt.-Col. Ochterlony "to show the world that

1. Ochterlony to Worsley, February 5, 1809, P. G. R. 10 (2nd)/88/C.

2. Jaswant Singh to Ochterlony, February 6, 1809, P. G. R. 11/3/T.

3. Ochterlony to Jaswant Singh, February 6, 1809, P. G. R. 11/4/T.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, February 9, 1809, P. G. R. 10/6/C.

the establishment of the British military post takes place with the concurrence of Ranjit Singh¹."

But before these *Vakils* could reach the British Camp, Ochterlony had already caused to be broadcast (February 9, 1809) a Proclamation or *Illah-nama*², detailing the viewpoint of the British Government in regard to Ranjit Singh. The Maharaja was asked, if he meant peace and friendship, to relinquish all his usurpations, to recall to the other side of the Sutlej all his forces then stationed at Phillaur Ghat on the left bank of the Sutlej, and to demobilize. In case these conditions were not immediately fulfilled, the British, it declared, would prepare "for defence." "We are desirous of peace," it concluded, "though we would not shrink from war, if need be. . . ." This Proclamation was further supplemented by another³, which, among other things, laid stress on the determination of the British in future not to allow the troops of the Maharaja to recross the Sutlej into the Cis-Sutlej area under any excuse whatsoever, for the British Government had definitely assumed the protection of the Cis-Sutlej States.

The *Vakils* of Ranjit Singh reached the British Camp (near Gongrana) on the 10th February, 1809. Ochterlony took this opportunity to inform them of his resolve to march the following morning to Ludhiana, whence the Sikh troops had not yet been withdrawn. If they delayed, Ochterlony told them, their continuance at that post would be taken to mean the Maharaja's wish to engage in hostilities⁴. The *Vakils*, in reply, characterised the British demands as too hard and warned the British Commandant that if any untoward consequences followed his precipitate march towards Ludhiana, he would have only himself to thank for them⁵. Ochterlony might have marched straight, as indeed his orders were; but a circumstance happened which made his position one of extreme embarrassment. A British army, seven thousand strong, under the command of Major-General St. Leger, had all these days been marching behind Ochterlony to support him in the field in case of an open rupture with Ranjit Singh or his allies. On February 10, 1809, Ochterlony

1. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, February 6, 1809, P. G. R. 5/53/C.

2. Translation of the *Illah-nama*, P. G. R. 11/6/T.

3. This is undated. See P. G. R. 11/5/T.

4. Ochterlony to St. Leger, February 10, 1809. P. G. R. 10 (2nd)/89/C

5. *Ibid.*

received the unexpected news that this army had halted at a place called Banglah. Now, if Ochterlony had set out straight for Ludhiana, the distance between the advance-guard under him and the main force under St. Leger would have increased to more than two easy marches, which was contrary to his instructions¹. Ochterlony therefore decided not to hazard a straight march to his destination, but to detour through the country².

Striking, accordingly, a north-easterly direction, Ochterlony next encamped at Nathi (nine miles south-east of Ludhiana) on the 11th February. The *Vakils* of Ranjit Singh once again waited upon him and this time earnestly begged him to delay his march for five days to enable the Maharaja to fulfil the British demands before it was too late³. This was a good opportunity for Ochterlony to kill two birds with one stone. He promised a halt for five days, as requested⁴, apparently to oblige the *Vakils*, but in reality to tide over his difficulties caused by the unexpected halt of the main army under Major-General St. Leger.

The spirit of accommodation displayed by Ochterlony on this occasion by agreeing to the request of the *Vakils* soon bore fruit. The latter, on their own responsibility, immediately ordered the Sikh forces to recross the Sutlej, which was promptly done⁵. This step alone obviated the chances of an immediate rupture⁶.

Other promises, however, remained unfulfilled till the very last day of the respite that had been granted, and Ochterlony's promise of halt expired on the 16th February. He therefore resumed his march and reached Ludhiana on the 17th February, where he took up a strong position with his rear to the town⁷.

Metcalf was still at the Court of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, trying to secure the peaceful evacuation of Khur and Faridkote, the last two

1. Ochterlony to Worsley, February 11, 1809. P. G. R. 10 (2nd)/92/C.

2. Ochterlony to L'eger, February 10, 1809. P. G. R. 10 (2nd)/89/C.

3. Ochterlony to Leger, February 11, 1809. P. G. R. 10 (2nd)/92/C.

4. Ochterlony to Worsley, February 11, 1809. P. G. R. 10 (2nd)/92/C.

5. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, February 14, 1809. P. G. R. 10 (2nd)/93/C.

6. Ochterlony was, however, severely censured by his Government for

having consented to the proposition of the *Vakils* of Ranjit Singh to suspend the march of the detachment under his command for five days. The Governor-General-in-Council was of opinion that the Lieutenant-Colonel would have acted more prudently if he had refused to listen to any representation made by them and that the very reasons which the *Vakils* put forth should have induced him to advance with promptitude and firmness straight towards his destination. See Edmonstone to Ochterlony, March 13, 1809. P. G. R. 6/12/O.

7. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, February 18, 1809. P. G. R. 10/8/C; and Ochterlony to Worsley, February 1809. P. G. R. 10 (2nd)/95/C.

acquisitions of recent date which yet remained to be restored. The Maharaja, though convinced of the hopelessness of his efforts, was still extremely unwilling to part with them. He tried many shifts; sometimes he disputed the right of the British to demand the restitution of one or 'the other place'¹; at other times he posed as if he were in close alliance with the Maratha Chiefs²; but nothing availed. Metcalfe, whose hands had been considerably strengthened by the presence of British troops at Ludhiana, was inexorable, and the Maharaja had to comply with each of his demands. Khur was restored on the 22nd March³, and the restitution of Faridkote followed on the 2nd April⁴. Metcalfe's triumph was complete.

A brief Treaty, concluded on the 25th April, 1809, consummated the success of Metcalfe at the Court of Lahore. It laid down in simple terms the basis of friendship and peace between the two States. Ranjit Singh was assured a free hand to the north-west of the River Sutlej, which was henceforth to be considered the boundary of his dominions on this side; the Maharaja was not to maintain in his possessions on the left bank of the Sutlej more troops than were needed to police them, and he was not to commit or countenance any acts of aggression against the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs, who were declared under the protection of the British Government⁵.

The Cis-Sutlej States, as we have already seen, were taken under the protection of the British Government by a Proclamation issued on the 9th February, 1809, by Lt.-Col. Ochterlony. But what was to be the exact relationship between the British Government on the one hand and the Protected Chiefs on the other? In September, 1808, when Ranjit Singh, at the head of a powerful army, had threatened their entire subjugation, these Chiefs would have gladly accepted the protection of the British Government on the latter's own terms, however hard they might have been⁶. But by the time the British decided to advance a detachment of troops towards the Sutlej, Ranjit Singh had already retreated into his own dominions beyond that river. The protection offered by the British,

1. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, January 18, 1809. P. G. R. 5/48/C.

2. Seton to Edmonstone, February 15, 1809. I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 85 of 18-3-1809; and Seton to Edmonstone, April 3, 1809. I. R. D. Sec. Cons. No. 37 of 29-4-1809.

3. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, March 22, 1809. P. G. R. 5/59/C.

4. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, April 5, 1809. See Kaye: Life of Metcalfe, Vol. I, p. 219.

5. See Copy of Treaty, P. G. R. 16 (1st) 16/C.

6. Edmonstone to Seton, December 26, 1808, P. G. R. 6/5/O.

belated though it was, was not unwelcome even then; but these Chiefs could not have been expected to view with perfect equanimity the march of British troops through their territories at a time when they could not perceive any danger to themselves¹. However, they had bowed to the inevitable, and almost all the important Chiefs whose possessions lay on the route to Ludhiana had welcomed with marked joy and enthusiasm the approach of the detachment under Ochterlony. Not only that. They had gladly complied with all the British requisitions—even those that demanded the relinquishment of all their recent acquisitions, which were of no small value and importance to them. But when the British Government did not indicate any intention to withdraw into its own dominions the detachment that it had planted at Ludhiana, the apprehensions of these Chiefs as to the ultimate intentions of the British with regard to themselves and their territories began daily to be strengthened. Their suspicions were further confirmed when the British Government started repairing and improving the Fort of Ludhiana with a view to strengthen it for military purposes². These Chiefs were now convinced that the stationing of a British force at Ludhiana was going to be a measure of a more permanent nature than they had been led to imagine. The inquiries of Lt.-Col. Ochterlony into the nature and resources of their dominions further excited the most unfavourable surmises, and the atmosphere became thickly charged with a distrust of the aims and intentions of the British Government³. Nor were the agents of Ranjit Singh slow to exploit this unfortunate situation: they did their best to estrange the relations of these Chiefs with the British⁴. Jodh Singh of Kalsia had already crossed the Sutlej into the Punjab and even joined Ranjit Singh⁵. Raja Bhag Singh, who was the first to welcome the approach of the British detachment and who had hitherto shown unalloyed fidelity to the cause of the British despite his relationship with Ranjit Singh, was now reported to be manifesting great anxiety regarding the occupation of his Fort of Ludhiana by the British troops⁶. To prevent this alienation of the sympathy of these Chiefs, and to

1. *Ibid.*

2. Ochterlony to Worsley, March 11, 14, and 16, 1809, P. G. R. 10 (2nd)/111, 114 and 120/C.

3. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, March 17, 1809, P. G. R. 10/9/C.

4. Seton to Edmonstone, April 1, 1809, P. G. R. 16/14/C.

5. "Jodh Singh", 23, 1809, P. G. R. 10 (2nd)/96/C.

6. "Raja Bhag Singh", 1809, P. G. R. 16/14/C.

counteract the sinister intrigues of the ruler of Lahore's agents, it became necessary to state in the most explicit terms the exact relationship that was to subsist between the Paramount Power on the one hand and the Protected Chiefs on the other¹.

Accordingly, on March 17, 1809, Ochterlony submitted to his Government his observations and recommendations, which, in his opinion, were best designed to dispel the unfounded apprehensions of the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs and calculated to secure their cordial co-operation in the pursuit of all measures of common interest². Mr. Edmonstone, the Secretary to Government, replied on the 10th April, intimating to Ochterlony the Government's entire concurrence in almost all points recommended by him, and authorising him to issue a Proclamation to all the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs, embodying the precise nature of their relationship with the British Government on the lines of his recommendations as sanctioned by the Governor-General-in-Council³. It was, however, not till the 3rd May, 1809, that the proposed *Ilah-nama* could be issued, a true translation of which runs as follows⁴ :—

“ It is clearer than the sun and better proved than the existence of yesterday, that the march of a detachment of British troops to this side of the River Sutlej was entirely at the application and earnest entreaty of the several Chiefs, and originated solely from friendly considerations in the British Government to preserve them in their possessions and independence. A treaty having been concluded on the 25th of April, 1809, between Mr. Metcalfe on the part of the British Government and Maharaja Ranjit Singh, agreeably to the orders of the Rt. Hon'ble the Governor-General-in-Council, I have the pleasure of publishing for the satisfaction of the Chiefs of the country of Malwah and Sirhind, the pleasure and resolutions of the British Government as contained in the seven following articles :—

1st. The country of the Chiefs of Malwah and Sirhind having entered under British protection, they shall in future be secured from the authority and influence of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, conformably to the terms of the treaty.

2nd. All the country of the Chiefs thus taken under protection

1. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, March 17, 1809, P. G. R. 10/9/C.

2. *Ibid.* Also Ochterlony to Edmonstone, March 28, 1809, P. G. R. 10/10/C.

3. Edmonstone to Ochterlony, April 10, 1809, P. G. R. 6/14/O.

4. See translation, P. G. R. 11/9/T.

shall be exempted from all pecuniary tribute to the British Government.

3rd. The Chiefs shall remain in the full exercise of the same rights and authority in their own possessions which they enjoyed before they were received under British protection.

4th. Should a British force, on purposes of general welfare, be required to march through the country of the said Chiefs, it is necessary and incumbent that every Chief shall, within his own possessions, assist and furnish, to the full of his power, such forces with supplies of grain and other necessaries, which may be demanded.

5th. Should an enemy approach from any quarter for the purpose of conquering this country, friendship and mutual interests require that the Chiefs join the British army with all their forces and, exerting themselves in expelling the enemy, act under discipline and proper obedience.

6th. All European articles brought by merchants from the Eastern Districts for the use of the army shall be allowed to pass by the Thanadars and Sayerdars of the several Chiefs without molestation and the demand of duty.

7th. All horses purchased for the use of the Cavalry Regiments, whether in the districts of Sirhind or elsewhere, the bringers of which being provided with sealed *Rahdaries* from the Resident at Delhi or Officer Commanding at Sirhind, shall be allowed to pass through the country of the said Chiefs without molestation or the demand of duty."

Such were then the terms on which the Cis-Sutlej States were formally included in the Protectorate map of British India, and such the circumstances that culminated in the River Sutlej being fixed as the boundary of the Kingdom of Lahore on the south-east. For the first time effective limits were set to the aggressive career of Maharaja Ranjit Singh on this side, and the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs finally secured from the danger, both immediate and eventual, of being absorbed in the ever-growing dominion of this potentate. Ranjit Singh's territorial ambitions were henceforth directed towards the north-east and north-west where they were unimpeded by the British, and to the south-west, where they later became incompatible, for strategical reasons, with the policy of the British, and where once again he was forced to accept limitations imposed upon him by the determined stand of the British Government.

SUNDAR LAL BHALLA.

ADINA BEG KHAN

THE LAST MUGHAL VICEROY OF THE PUNJAB.

(Date of birth unknown—Died 15th September, 1758.)

By Hari Ram Gupta, M.A., Ph.D., Forman Christian College, Lahore.

INTRODUCTION.

During the 18th century in India many opportunities presented themselves to tact and ambition for carving out independent principalities. The great empire of the Mughals after a glorious career of nearly two centuries had fallen into a gradual process of decay. The Mughal Emperors were losing their power and prestige with headlong precipitation, while their unworthy ministers and supporters unscrupulously indulged in murder, emperor-blinding, treachery and rapine, and were always ready to sacrifice the interests of the empire for their own selfish ends.

The Mughal viceroys of provinces were generally sunk in sloth and sensuality. They had no fear of interference by the Central Government and were free from restraint. Hence there was no check on the progress of misrule. This confusion was further aggravated by a series of foreign invasions from the north-west, leaving nothing in their wake but the smoke of burning homes, ravished humanity and the reek of innocent blood.

Such a chaotic state offered a great prize to the able and ambitious. Men rose from obscurity into the full blaze of historical renown. Adina Beg Khan was one such a man of low birth, unlettered, but endowed with a masterful ambition and a persevering temper. He was first employed even before his teens as a servant in the households of Mughal officers, and rose to power by patient labour and force of character, until he ultimately became Governor of the Punjab and played an important part in the closing scenes of Muslim rule in the province.

Adina Beg Khan started his public life in the thirties. It was brought to a close in 1758. During that time he saw Nadir Shah's invasion, four campaigns of Ahmad Shah Abdali, the Maratha conquest of the Punjab and the rise of the Sikhs to political power. The Punjab had become in that period a cockpit of struggle between various powers and had almost been converted into no man's land. The first struggle lay between Ahmad Shah Abdali and the

Mughals, in which the former was victorious. Then ensued the conflict between Ahmad Shah and the Marathas, in which the latter were worsted. Now the Sikhs and Ahmad Shah began to fight between themselves for the possession of the plains of the Punjab and ultimately Ahmad Shah was expelled from this province. Adina Beg therefore witnessed four *gardis* or wild struggles for the Punjab by Nadir Shah, Ahmad Shah, the Marathas and the Sikhs. The last is known till the present day as *Sikha Shahi*. Adina Beg Khan took advantage of each *gardi* and greatly added to his power.

No work on this subject is known to exist, except a defective Persian manuscript of 12 small folios. Its dates and even some events are generally wrongly stated, but it supplies some useful material about the important stages in the life of this man. The writer has supplemented this with material gleaned from a number of Persian works, mostly unpublished, and Marathi, Gurmukhi, Urdu and English records, all of which are given in the bibliography at the end.



ADINA BEG KHAN.

(By courtesy of the Curator, Central Museum, Lahore).



CHAPTER I

ADINA BEG KHAN UNDER ZAKARIYA KHAN, TO JUNE, 1745.

Adina Beg Khan was an Arain by caste. His father's name was Chunnu. He was born at Sharaqpur, 18 miles below Lahore on the right bank of the Ravi. Extreme poverty compelled him very early in life to seek service in the homes of Mughal officers. He spent most of his time at Jalalabad, Khanpur and Bajwara, all situated in the Jullundur Doab.¹ This was the beginning of his life-long association with this part of the Punjab.

His sturdiness of character and love of enterprise made him discontented with his menial position. When he grew to manhood he sought a life of strenuous action. Constant association with the Mughal officers created in his mind a strong desire for military life, so he joined the army. He was, however, soon disillusioned of his new career by its poor prospects, left it for the more lucrative post of revenue collector of village of Kang in Sultanpur² District of the Jullundur Doab. He displayed great energy, courage and force of character in the performance of his new duties. His ability and tact won him many friends, one of whom was Lala Sri Niwas of Dhir caste, a rich banker of Sultanpur, a very influential man, who in a few years obtained for Adina Beg Khan the revenue contract of five or six villages in the territory of Kang. The following year all the villages of Kang circle passed to his charge.³

Adina Beg Khan was now becoming a man of mark. His foot was on the ladder of promotion. His appointment to this post stimulated his energies and rekindled his ambition. The circle of Kang was a unit of the Sultanpur District. Adina Beg Khan deposited his revenues in the treasury of Sultanpur. The district officer was so much struck by his honesty, loyalty and ability that he sometimes deputed him to Lahore in charge of the revenues of his district. It was an excellent opportunity for an ambitious person to obtain influence in the court of Lahore.

1. Ahwal-i-Adina Beg Khan, 50 b

2. *Ibid.* There are two villages of the same name, viz., Kang Kalan and Kang Khurd, situated 8 miles south of Sultanpur, and about 2 miles north of the Sutlej. cf. Survey map of the Punjab.

3. *Ibid.* 50 b; Imad-i-Saadat, 107 a-b.

The district officer of Sultanpur died. Adina Beg Khan at once went to Lahore and through the treasury officer sought an interview with the Viceroy, Khan Bahadur Zakariya Khan. The latter demanded security for his good behaviour, which was immediately provided by Lala Sri Niwas of Sultanpur, and Adina Beg was appointed to the post of the District Officer of Sultanpur.¹ He showed his gratitude by appointing Lala Sri Niwas his immediate assistant, while his elder brother Bhwani Das, who knew Persian, was given the post of superintendent of his office.²

Shortly afterwards Nadir Shah invaded India. At this time the country was thrown into great confusion, of which full advantage was taken by lawless people and particularly by the Sikhs. Knowing the country intimately, and being endowed with an astuteness and intrepidity which were equal to any emergency, they made the best use of these disturbances. On the retirement of the Persian invader the Sikhs continued their depredations and were the principal source of danger to the peace and prosperity of the province. The Governor therefore organised columns of light cavalry for the pursuit of the Sikhs, who were consequently expelled from the Bari Doab with heavy losses.

They then moved on to the Jullundur Doab. Zakariya Khan knew that the Jullundur Doab was mostly peopled by Jats who had sympathy with the Sikhs. He was, therefore, in search of a capable governor for this territory. It was brought to his notice that the district of Sultanpur, which was situated on the main road from Lahore to Delhi, had been ruined like many other places³ by Nadir Shah's troops, who had also taken captive a number of men and women of the place, and that Adina Beg Khan had succeeded in restoring order at this time, had given relief to the people and had secured the release of many prisoners by ransom. The Viceroy also knew that Adina Beg was active, energetic and had personal knowledge of the Doab. So he was promoted to the high rank of the

1. Ahwal-i-Adina Beg Khan, 51 a.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Anandram, 21.

” احوال پنجاب چہ نوشتہ شود کہ بر آن دیار و مملکت آن گلزار چہ قنات
 از پشت مثل وزیر آباد و ایمن آباد و مہجرات قصبہ جات کہ ہر یکے بغا بر کثرت
 آبادی نیمچہ شہری ہوئے است بخاک سیاہ برابر گشت برہمکن آن گلزمین
 بہ زار رنگ بودان رفت مالہانتا راج و ناموسہا برباد رفت“

Nazim¹ (Governor) of the Jullundur Doab and was ordered to punish the Sikhs.

Adina Beg succeeded in restoring peace and order in the Doab, but he did not adopt severe measures to crush the Sikhs and perhaps deliberately winked at some of their activities, permitting them to carry on so long as they refrained from creating serious disturbances within his jurisdiction. The reason seems to be that he wished to secure his position by keeping the Sikh menace alive; otherwise he feared that in case of perfect peace in the Doab this territory might be leased to somebody else for a larger sum of revenue. Diwan Bakhtmal testifies to this fact when he writes.

"Adina Beg was a greedy man. He did not crush the Sikhs. If he had intended to do so, it was not a difficult task. But he had this idea in mind, that if he quelled the Sikhs, some other tax farmer might be entrusted with the government of the Doab for a higher sum and he might be dismissed. He therefore treated the Sikhs well and settled terms with them. For this reason the Sikhs grew stronger and they gradually occupied many villages as Jagirs."²

The Khan Bahadur, however, would not rest content until he saw the Sikhs out of his province. He issued strict orders to Adina Beg Khan to drive them away. Though unwilling to do so, the Jullundur *faujdar* could not postpone this task for long. Consequently he asked the Sikhs to vacate his territory. On receiving these orders they deputed Jassa Singh Thoka (afterwards known as Ramgarhia) as their *Vakil* to settle terms with Adina Beg Khan. The latter, however, proved too clever for the Sikh *Vakil* and succeeded in persuading him to accept office under his government. The Sikhs, dismayed at the conduct of their envoy, found safety only in crossing the Sutlej and entering the Sirhind Division of Delhi Province,

1. Nazim was the Governor of a province. He was a military man who commanded the troops and administered the country. The Diwan, who was the superintendent of finances, was quite independent of him and was a check on him. But when both these offices were combined in his person, he was called Subahdar or Viceroy. (cf. Seir, i 274).

2. Khalsa Namah, 58-9. James Browne, writing in 1787 in his India Tracts, ii. 14, says:—"The force he had with him was fully equal to the execution of that service, but Adina Beg, considering that if he should entirely put an end to all disturbances in that district, there would remain no necessity for continuing him in so extensive a command, carried on intrigues with the chiefs of the *Sicks*, and secretly encouraged them to continue their depredations, at the same time pretending to be very desirous of subduing them. From this management the *Sicks* became daily more powerful and seized upon several places in distant parts of the Subah of Lahore. They also began to perform public pilgrimages to the Holy Tank at Amrutsur without molestation."

The Jullundur Distt. Gaz. 1904, page 29, supports this view,

where they created a serious situation for the Imperial Government.¹

Nadir Shah had denuded the treasury of Lahore and had laid heavy impositions on the Government officials and the people. The result was that the Khan Bahadur had nothing to pay his troops, who were constantly clamouring for their dues. The Viceroy ordered his Diwan, Lakhpat Rai, to make the payment to the soldiers and, on his failure to do so, imprisoned him. The Diwan's brother, Jaspat Rai, secured orders from Zakariya Khan to check the accounts of government officials and to call for arrears. This measure brought sufficient money to meet the demands of the troops. The Diwan was consequently set free, but the work of account-checking continued unabated.²

In course of time came the turn of Adina Beg Khan, who had also failed in paying his revenues to the Lahore Government. It seems likely that he could not realise revenue from the people on account of their having suffered during Nadir Shah's invasion. He might also have pursued the usual policy of keeping the people pleased with the new government under him. Adina Beg knew that the wrath of the Diwan was bound to fall upon him, so he immediately went to Lahore and visited Lakhpat Rai alone at night to apologise. The Diwan did not listen to his entreaties and Adina Beg and his two assistants, Bhwani Das and Nidhan Singh, were imprisoned and Shahnawaz Khan, the younger son of the Khan Bahadur, was given charge of the Jullundur Doab.

The delinquents remained in prison for a year. Then Bhwani Das was released on the security of his brother, Sri Niwas. Adina Beg one night escaped and retired to the hills to avoid capture. Bhwani Das was thereupon re-arrested and ordered to render account of the income and expenditure. He respectfully replied that he would disclose the accounts only in the presence of his master, Adina Beg Khan. He was at once put in to a large pot and half-boiled, but even then he did not yield³. Lakhpat Rai was so much

1. Chahar Gulzar Shujai, 373 a; Ali-ud-Din, 106 a, Raj Khalsa, 10; Itihas-i-Ramgarhian, 410-411; Sarkar, i. 422-23.

2. Ahwal-i-Adina Beg Khan, 51 b-52 a.

3. *Ibid*, 52.

و بھوانی داس ازین معنی بسیار مورد عتاب گرد (ید) بیک در
دیگ نشاندیده گرم کرد (زد) هر چند بدش از آتش آزار کشید، لیکن از راه
همک حلائی، هیچ نشان کاغذ آمدنی و خرج و امانت دینا بیک خان بر
زبان فیادارک همین عرض کرد که هر قدر به حضور فرمایند از مال و جان
حاضوم اما گزارش حساب سوابق بالمواجهه خواهند خود ضررت نه بندد“

impressed with the loyalty of Bhwani Das that he took him out of the boiling pot, ordered his physicians to treat him and asked him to beg for a favour. Bhwani Das requested the reinstatement of Adina Beg Khan, which was granted. After a warning Adina Beg Khan was awarded a robe of honour (*Khilat*)¹ and was appointed to the Deputy Governorship under Shahnawaz Khan.²

This incident taught Adina Beg Khan a terrible lesson not to fail in remitting the Government revenues regularly and punctually, and he was never found wanting in this respect during the rest of his life. Besides, he became so tactful that he could successfully commit acts of disloyalty towards his chief without giving him the least suspicion, thus retaining his confidence even long afterwards. This he cleverly managed by playing on one or other of his weaknesses. He kept the young Governor so pleased by his administrative ability and good behaviour that Shahnawaz Khan never interfered with him and Adina Beg Khan gained complete control over the government.

1. A *Khilat* was composed of a turban, a girdle and a piece of cloth for a gown. It was meant to dress the whole body from head to foot and was properly called *saropa*. For persons of importance was added a double piece for a gown and a short gown with short sleeves. It was then called a *saropa* of five or six pieces. One piece of light brocade was also added for long drawers. All these pieces were of muslin, embroidered in gold, silver and silk upon the most elegant pattern. (*cf.* Seir, i. 15).

2. *Ibid*, 53 a; Imad-i-Saadat, 107 b.

CHAPTER II

ADINA BEG KHAN AND SHAHNAWAZ KHAN, JULY, 1745 TO MARCH, 1748.

Zakariya Khan died on 1st July, 1745. He left behind him three sons, Yahiya Khan, Shahnawaz Khan and Mir Baqi. Zakariya Khan's wife was the sister of Nawab Qamr-ud-Din Khan, the Grand Wazir of Delhi, and all these three brothers were the sons from the same mother. Yahiya Khan, the eldest brother was married to the daughter of Qamr-ud-Din Khan and thus the Delhi Wazir was his maternal uncle as well as his father-in-law.

The Wazir was anxious that Yahiya Khan should succeed his father but the Emperor, Muhammad Shah, was against this proposal, as he did not want to make the Punjab a stronghold of the Turani party. The Wazir was, however, determined to keep the Punjab for his family and he secretly sent Yahiya Khan, who was at that time in Delhi, to take charge of his father's government. Shahnawaz also arrived at Lahore soon after and demanded a division of the patrimony. This settlement was delayed and the troops of both the brothers came to blows. In the end peace was patched up. Shahnawaz Khan was paid a certain amount of cash and jewels, whereupon he withdrew to his *faujdar*i in the Jullundur Doab. The Wazir then begged the viceroyalty of the Punjab for himself. After long hesitation and persuasion the Emperor agreed and appointed Yahiya Khan Deputy Viceroy on 3rd January, 1746¹.

Adina Beg Khan now found himself placed politically under Yahiya Khan. Yahiya Khan had no control over Shahnawaz Khan and, in order to maintain his sway over the Jullundur Doab, which was the most fertile part of the Punjab, he treated Adina Beg Khan with great consideration. Adina Beg Khan played his part so cautiously and consummately that he won the trust of Yahiya Khan, retaining at the same time the confidence of Shahnawaz Khan, though the brothers were openly hostile to each other. He gave positive proof of his loyalty to the Lahore Viceroy by persecuting the Sikhs, when the latter's minister, Diwan Lakhpat Rai, carried on a hard campaign against them from April to June, 1746².

1. Anandram, 289 ; Sarkar, i, 193.

2. Ratan Singh, 389-90 ; Gyan Singh, 678.

After some time Shahnawaz Khan rose in insurrection against his brother. He came to Lahore on the 21st November, 1746, encamped near Shalamar Garden and, through Diwan Surat Singh, called upon Yahiya Khan to make a complete division of his father's property. Adina Beg Khan, Kauramal and Hashmatullah ranged themselves on the side of Shahnawaz Khan. Yahiya Khan was unwilling to pay him anything, while at the same time he avoided fighting. The discussion was prolonged and no decision was arrived at. The soldiers of both the brothers often came to blows. At last Yahiya Khan, with all his old and new chiefs, such as, Mumin Khan, Lakhpat Rai, Mir Nemat Khan and Mir Amin Beg, came out of Lahore and a sharp engagement took place. Yahiya Khan then ended the dispute by paying Shahnawaz Khan Rs. 600,000 from his father's treasure.

Shahnawaz Khan thereupon retired towards Batala, where he seized many districts belonging to Yahiya Khan and brought a number of neighbouring chiefs under his jurisdiction. This annoyed the Lahore Viceroy, who prepared for another fight. Shahnawaz, on hearing it, came to Lahore and encamped near the tomb of Hazrat Ishan. The battle began on the 17th March, 1747. Adina Beg led the attack and succeeded in forcing Mumin Khan out of his trenches. Next day Shahnawaz delivered the assault in person. Mir Mumin was defeated and captured. Yahiya's soldiers, whose salaries had been in arrears for the past four or five months since the commencement of hostilities, flocked into the city and clamoured for the payment of their dues. They were easily seduced by Shahnawaz Khan. He entered Lahore quite unopposed on the 21st March, seized the property of Yahiya and took him captive. He appointed Kauramal as his Diwan in lieu of Lakhpat Rai and confirmed Adina Beg Khan in the civil and military charge of the Jullundur Doab¹.

The usurpation of the Punjab government could not be brooked by the Delhi court, but no drastic action was taken against Shahnawaz Khan, because the Wazir, Qamr-ud-Din Khan, first wanted to secure the release of his son-in-law, Yahiya Khan, who in case of the despatch of a force from Delhi might be put to death. Nawab Qamr-ud-Din-Khan wrote several conciliatory and then threatening

¹, Anandram, 289-95 and 304; Ashub, ii. 451-52; Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, 73 a-b; Khushwaqt Rai, 70; Ibrat Miqal, ii. 55 a; Sohan Lal, i. 113-14; Ali-ud-Din, 106 b.

letters to Shahnawaz Khan demanding the liberation of Yahiya Khan, but he always replied that Yahiya Khan's freedom from captivity depended on his own confirmation in the viceroyalty of the Punjab under a royal rescript¹.

Yahiya Khan, however, found means four months later by the contrivance of his aunt, Dardana Begam, who was a sister of Zakariya Khan and wife of Jani Khan, to get himself conveyed in a Khwan, a vessel three feet in length and two feet in breadth, railed in and covered with a cupola of lattice work, over which a piece of broad cloth was thrown to shelter the whole. He was safely carried out of his prison house, through the guards to the city gate, where mounting on an excellent horse already awaiting him, he set out at a gallop and was soon out of his brother's reach. In a few days he arrived at Shahjahanabad to remove a great anxiety from his father-in-law's mind².

Shahnawaz Khan knew that he had hopelessly broken with the Delhi Emperor by ousting his lawful nominee, but he had hoped for reconciliation so long as his elder brother was in captivity. But with his escape at the end of July this ray of hope was also gone. He, however, made one more effort. He despatched his agent to the imperial capital with the request that his misdeed be forgiven and that he should be appointed as deputy viceroy under the Wazir. The envoy reached Delhi on the 3rd September, 1747, but nothing came of this embassy³.

Shahnawaz now felt sure that the retribution of the Emperor and his Wazir must fall upon him. Consequently he turned his mind in all directions to secure support. At this juncture the political horizon of India was suddenly overcast with clouds. Nadir Shah was murdered on the 9th June, 1747, and his generalship passed on to Ahmad Shah Abdali, who conquered Kandhar and Kabul and became master of Afghanistan as far as Peshawar. Though it was a big kingdom, it was not sufficient for his ambition. He determined to try his luck further. With Peshawar as a suitable

1. Ashub, ii. 452; Bayan, 161; Ibrat Miqal, ii. 55 a.

2. Anandram, 304-5; Bayan, 161; Ashub, 462-3; Siyar, iii. 12; Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, 73 b. Ibrat Miqal, ii. 55 a; Ali-ud-din, 106 b. (When Shahnawaz Khan got angry with his aunt, she silenced him with a single sentence. "If by chance Yahiya Khan had imprisoned you, I would have secured your release also by any means in my power". (Ibrat Miqal, ii. 55 a; Bayan, 161).

3. Anandram, 300; Sarkar, i. 195.

base, the man-power of Afghanistan behind him and no hindrance in front, India, the *Eldorado* of western people, became his object.

Shahnawaz Khan was now advised by Adina Beg Khan to open communications with Ahmad Shah Abdali¹. Consequently, Shahnawaz Khan despatched his envoy to Ahmad Shah with the message, "Crown to Ahmad Shah and Wazirship to Shahnawaz²". He also declared himself a convert to the Shia religion and in his official seal replaced the names of the Mughal Emperors by the twelve Imams with a view to win the favour of the Persian soldiery of Ahmad Shah³.

Adina Beg Khan then, probably to secure the confidence of the Delhi Government, informed the Delhi Wazir that Shahnawaz Khan was turning rebel against the authority of the Mughal Emperor and that he had invited help of Ahmad Shah Abdali. The Wazir was very much perturbed at this news, and he at once wrote to Shahnawaz Khan a conciliatory and affectionate letter saying that "their family, at all times attached to the Emperors of India, had never been defiled by the crime of ingratitude and treason. Beware of such a crime; beware of thinking that a traitor can thrive. It is a pity that a man like you should wish for the honour of obeying Ahmad Abdali, the Yasawal, rather than that of driving such a fellow from the frontiers of Hindustan. Would not the five provinces of Kabul, Kashmir, Thatta, Multan and Lahore fall into your hands in such a case, and would not your good uncle exert himself in supporting you with all the power of the Empire⁴?" This letter had the desired effect. The reproach for treason and the hope of a bright future touched the young man's heart. He prepared to oppose the invader, whom a little while before he had invited.

Ahmad Shah Abdali was so much astonished at the proposal of

1. Siyar, iii. 16.

Sayyid Ghulam Hussain says that "the adviser of the young Viceroy at this time was Adina Beg Khan, who was a devil under the appearance of man. He was resolved to upset his master's power and to raise his own on its ruins. He addressed him in these words: "You are no more than a nephew to Wazir Qamr-ud-Din Khan, but your elder brother, Yahiya Khan, is his son-in-law besides. He has gone to make complaints against you in the court. Rest assured that neither the Emperor nor the Wazir would leave you undisturbed in the full enjoyment of two governments. You have only one recourse, of joining Ahmad Shah Abdali's party. He is a powerful and successful man and openly aspires to the Crown. He will look upon your joining him as the most unexpected favour which heaven could confer upon him."

2. Miskin, 40; Siyar, iii. 17; Ali-ud-din, 106 b.

3. Bayan, 160; Tarikh-i-Sayyid, ii. 145; Ibrat Miqal, ii. 55 a.

4. Siyar, iii. 17; cf. Siyar, iii. 145-47.

Shahnawaz Khan of making him a present of the two provinces of Lahore and Multan, that he acknowledged the divine interposition on his undertaking. He immediately ordered the agreement to be drawn up, got it witnessed and guaranteed by the principal officers of his army and then sent it to Lahore by a person of distinction. He had no fear of the Delhi Government, because, while in attendance with Nadir Shah, he had fully observed the weakness of the Empire, the imbecility of the Emperor, the inattention of his ministers, and that spirit of independence which had crept in among the court grandees.¹

Ahmad Shah summoned all the Afghans of the Khyber Pass to join him. He then matured a plan of invasion, left Peshawar by the middle of December, 1747, crossed the rivers by bridges of boats, his track being marked by rapine, plunder and devastation, and encamped at Shahdara near Lahore on the 8th January, 1748. He had a force of nearly 18,000, but was absolutely without artillery.²

He had sent his ambassador, Harun Khan Sadozai, from Peshawar to Lahore to settle the plan of campaign with Shahnawaz Khan. The Viceroy proudly asked the messenger in a careless manner, "How is brother Ahmad Khan?" Harun Khan replied, "I do not know brother Ahmad Khan, I come from the Durrani Emperor." Thereupon hot words passed between the two. The Khan's proud and haughty bearing offended the youthful viceroy, and the envoy was immediately dismissed. On hearing this Ahmad Shah was upset, but his spiritual guide, Sayyid Muhammad Sabir Shah, pressed Ahmad Shah to allow him to proceed in advance to bring Shahnawaz back to allegiance. Consequently, he left the Durrani army at Rohtas and advanced towards Lahore by rapid marches.

Sabir Shah's fame as a magician had preceded him, and people said that he had come to Lahore in order to render the Mughal artillery powerless by his charms. On hearing of this extraordinary man's arrival, Shahnawaz Khan sent Adina Beg Khan and his Diwan Kauramal to know his purpose. The holy man replied: "I have no business with any of you, nor do I intend you any harm. I have come only because I cannot help remembering that I was born in this city, had connections with some of its citizens, and am under obligation to some of its former rulers. I cannot help feeling

1. Siyar, iii. 9, 17, 18.

2. Anandram, 325; Bayan, 162; Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, 74 a; Tarikh-i-Ahmad, 7.

for them all. I may tell you that faithlessness had never proved successful, neither is it an object of approbation with God or man, nor is your sabre equal to Ahmad Shah Abdali's sabre." He was yet speaking, when a voice from behind broke out in this exclamation, "Is his sabre of iron and ours of wood?" "No," was the reply, "your sabre, as well as his, is of iron, but your fortune is not equal to his. His star is now in ascension and I do not see that yours keeps pace with it." He then saw Shahnawaz Khan and tried to persuade him in soft and sweet words, saying that he himself had invited the invader and that to break his word afterwards was not proper. When these words failed to have their desired effect, Sabir Shah indignantly rebuked the young Viceroy. Shahnawaz was enraged, and put Sabir Shah to death by pouring molten silver into his throat.¹

On hearing of this outrage Ahmad Shah thought no more of negotiation and on the 10th January ordered his troops to ford the river one by one. They took up their position at the Shalamar Garden, four miles east of Lahore. Shahnawaz also, at the head of 70,000 horse and foot, with good artillery, occupied an entrenched position at the fort of Hazrat Ishan (Mianmir) and near Shah Balaval in the Parvizabad suburb. These two divisions met the enemy on the 11th January. A fierce contest took place, but neither side made any marked impression. Shahnawaz's notable chief, Hashmatullah Khan, lost his life on that day.

The battle raged in this manner till evening. At dusk the Indian soldiers, thinking the fighting over, began to retire to their camps in complete disorder, as was usual with them. They were then attacked by the Afghans, who showered on them such sharp volleys of musket fire that they were hopelessly routed. No Indian commander came forward to rally the fleeing soldiers, except Adina Beg Khan who, finding the cause of Shahnawaz Khan hopeless, wished to retain his confidence by a determined action only for a short time. He took shelter under the walled city and continued the fight, keeping the Afghans from proceeding farther than the tomb of Hazrat Ishan. Shahnawaz Khan had guarded all

1. Bayan, 163-64; Siyar, iii. 17; Husain Shahi, 20; Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, 74 a; Tarikh-i-Salatin-i-Afghanan, 146; Ibrat Miqal, ii. 56 a; Tarikh-i-Ahmad, 6; Tarikh-i-Ali, 123.

the gates and streets and had sent a force under Jumla Khan,¹ an Afghan of Kasur, who, instead of fighting, immediately went over to the enemy with his whole force.

Shah Nawaz Khan had asked the Emperor and the Wazir for assistance, but no reinforcements were forthcoming. Finding Lahore untenable he decamped for Delhi, leaving Lahore at dead of night the same day, with all the jewellery and gold he could carry. His example was followed by his officers and soldiers, and Lahore fell into the hands of the conqueror without any further opposition. The outer portions of the city, especially Mughalpura, were completely laid waste; but the city was spared at the request of Mir Mumin Khan, Sayyid Jamil-ud-Din Khan, Mir Amin Khan, Mir Nemat Khan, Lakhpatri Rai, Surat Singh and others, who had now escaped from prison, on the promise of a ransom of 30 lakhs, 22 lakhs of which was paid the same day².

Shah Nawaz Khan had left the whole of his camp equipage, artillery, elephants, camels and horses, in the possession of Ahmad Shah Durrani. These contributed greatly to augment his military resources, as well as to add to his pomp and glory. Abdali stayed in Lahore for a month and a quarter and compelled all the chiefs of the Punjab, including Ranjit Dev of Jammu to render him allegiance and pay homage. With a view to exercise the prerogative of royalty and following the Indian custom, he also struck his own coins in Lahore³. Thus when he felt quite confident of meeting the imperial army on an equal footing, he left Lahore for Delhi on the 19th February leaving Jumla Khan of Kasur as his governor in the provincial capital⁴.

The flight of Shah Nawaz Khan to Delhi had stirred that indolent court, and the Emperor despatched a huge army of two lakhs under Wazir Qamr-ud-Din Khan to check the progress of Ahmad Shah Abdali, who continued his success until he met the Mughal army at Manupur on 11th March, 1748. In this battle the

1. Zilla Khan of Elliot, viii. 106 and Jali Khan of Sohan Lal, i. 123, is Jumla Khan, an Afghan chief of Kasur.

2. Anandram, 328; Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, 74 a; Ali-ud-Din, 108; Sohan Lal i. 123.

3. For details cf. J. A. S. B., Vol. LIV., 1885, p. 69.

4. Tarikh-i-Ahmad Shahi, 6-7; Anandram, 325-32; Bayan, 164; Zafar Namah, 3 a-4 b; Siyar, iii. 17-18; Khazan-i-Amira, 97; Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, 74 a; Irshad-ul-Mustqim, 204 b; Tarikh-i-Ahmad, 7; Tarikh-i-Ali, 125-6; Tarikh-i-Salatin-i-Afghanan, 147-8; Ibrat Miqal, ii. 56 b-57 a; Gulzar-i-Shahi, 523-24; Ali-ud-Din, 107 b-108 a; Husain Shahi, 25.

Wazir Qamr-ud-Din Khan was slain ; but his son, Muin-ul-Mulk, defeated Ahmad Shah's army, which fled back to Afghanistan. Adina Beg Khan, in close attendance on Muin-ul-Mulk, was twice wounded in this action¹.

1. About Adina Beg *cf.* Anandram, 358 ; Zafar Namah, 9 b ; Sarkar, i. 228-29.

CHAPTER III

ADINA BEG KHAN UNDER MUIN-UL-MULK APRIL, 1748 TO NOVEMBER, 1753.

After the battle of Manupur, the imperial army rested on the Sutlej till the 12th April, when under Prince Ahmad Shah it left for Delhi, and Muin-ul-Mulk went to Lahore to take over his new post as Viceroy of the Punjab, to which he had been appointed by the Emperor Muhammad Shah. Muin-ul-Mulk appointed Kauramal as his Diwan and confirmed Adina Beg Khan in the *Faujdari* of the Jullundur Doab. Muin found absolute anarchy prevailing in the country, for which the Sikhs were chiefly responsible. Haro Singh and Karora Singh in the Sirhind territory, Jassa Singh Ahluwalia in the Jullundur Doab, Lajja Singh and Hari Singh in the Bari Doab and Charat Singh in the Rachna Doab were audaciously creating disturbances everywhere.

Muin was not the man to allow such a state of affairs to exist. Having established himself in Lahore by June, 1748, he despatched punitive expeditions in pursuit of the Sikhs. The laurels which Muin had won at the battle of Manupur inspired awe in the minds of the Sikhs, who retreated before his contingents. In the meantime Adina Beg Khan was given strict instructions to curb the power of the Sikhs, who had become supreme in the northern hilly portions of the Doab. He "began as formerly to intrigue with the Sicks, and took no effectual means to suppress them."¹ He, however, led an expedition against them and in the engagement which followed both the parties lost heavily, the Sikhs alone leaving about 600 dead on the battlefield. Adina Beg Khan, in view of the superior number of the Sikh forces, had to give up the struggle. He returned to Jullundur, his seat of government, and sought help from Muin³. In the meantime the rains had set in and all further operations were suspended.

After the rainy season the Sikhs again began to stir out in search of fresh adventures, and in October they decided to celebrate the Diwali festival at Harimandir. They bathed in the tank, said prayers at the temple, illuminated the whole place and made

1. Sohan Lal, i. 127-128.

2. Browne, ii. 16.

3. Sohan Lal, i. 128 ; Browne, ii. 16 ; Bakhtmal, 67.

offerings to the Holy Granth. All this they did, but they were not indifferent to the impending danger from the government of Muin-ul-Mulk. Accordingly five hundred of them took shelter within the fort of Ram Rauni, while the rest hid themselves in the neighbouring jungle with a view to render help to the garrison in case of an emergency.

Khuswaqt Rai, the author of *Kitab-i-Tarikh-i-Punjab* (folios 83-84) continues the story in the following words: "Nawab Mir Mannu, on hearing this news, marched with troops to chastise them. Under his orders Adina Beg Khan also joined him: Having arrived at Amritsar they laid siege to the fort of Ram Rauni, which is now known as Ramgarh. The siege continued for four months and daily skirmishes took place¹. During this period two hundred Sikhs of the garrison were killed. The rest wrote to Jassa Singh Thoka (carpenter), who was in the service of Adina Beg Khan, that he, being on the side of the Muslims, was the cause of their ruin, and if he did not come that day to their help and rescue, he would never be re-admitted into the fold of their church².

"Jassa Singh, in consideration of his co-religionists, deserting Adina Beg Khan entered the fort in the night³. It strengthened the perseverance of the besieged. At this time Kauramal was the Diwan, who was a believer in the religion of Nanak Shah. Jassa Singh Thoka sent a message to the Diwan to this effect, 'The garrison can secure relief only through your efforts. If you try, three hundred lives can be saved'. Kauramal made a request to the Nawab, saying, 'The Sikhs always cause confusion and disorder. It will be advisable, if you settle something (عاقبت) for these people. They will not create disturbances afterwards, and I will be responsible for it.' Adina Beg Khan, however, dissented (apparently out of jealousy for Kauramal). Muin said, 'Whatever Kauramal does, is always to the advantage of the government.' Adina Beg Khan remarked, 'Goodness to evil-doers is doing evil to good people.' The Nawab replied, 'It is better to stitch the mouth

1. Ratan Singh (401) says that Muin's troops were very much harassed by the night attacks of the Sikhs who came in large numbers to succour their brethren in the fort.

2. Jassa Singh had been excommunicated from the Khalsa brotherhood for killing his daughter (Ratan Singh, 402; Gyan Singh, 687), and probably for deserting them when deputed to Adina Beg Khan.

3. Jassa Singh headed a contingent of 100 Sikhs and 60 Hindus on this occasion. Ratan Singh, 402; Gyan Singh, 687.

of a dog with morsels.' He approved of Kauramal's suggestion, granted them one-fourth of the revenue of the parganah of Patti and came back to Lahore. Kauramal took a number of Sikhs in his pay and showed them all indulgence. Being a believer of the Guru he paid the Sikhs a fine of Rs. 5 per day for smoking¹."

Diwan Kauramal was the most trusted and the most capable officer of Muin-ul-Mulk. The Viceroy was so pleased with his valour, diplomacy and loyalty that he appointed him Governor of Multan province after conferring upon him the title of Maharajah. Muin always sought his advice on all important matters. Adina Beg's unbounded ambition could not tolerate the existence of such a formidable personality and he was always on the lookout to ruin him. This opportunity was afforded to him during the third invasion of Ahmad Shah Durrani.

The Durrani entered the Punjab in December, 1751, and besieged Lahore for four months. Neither Abdali for want of artillery nor Muin for lack of reinforcements from Delhi could make short work of this long affair. The whole country around Lahore within a radius of 50 miles was entirely laid waste by the Afghans with the result that "no lamp was lighted in any house for a distance of three marches and an extreme scarcity of grain prevailed in the camps of both the armies²." In the city of Lahore flour was sold at two seers to the rupee and in place of grass the horses were fed on old and rotten bags and chopped straw of huts even of ten years' standing³.

When starvation stared them in the face, Muin wanted to precipitate an action, and accordingly he called a council of war on the 4th March, 1752. Some desired peace, whereas others were fighting for a decisive action. It was pointed out by Kauramal that the Nawab's troops were mostly raw levies and were no match in the open for the hardy warriors of the north-west, that the country for miles around had been foraged and ruined and therefore Abdali's camp was also short of provisions, and that shortly afterwards hot

1. cf. Ratan Singh, 400-404 and Gyan Singh, 684-87. ("It is supposed," says Forster, i. 314, "that their force would then have been annihilated; had not this people found a strenuous advocate in his minister Kauramal, who was himself of the Khulasah sect and diverted Meer Munnoo from reaping the full fruits of the superiority he had gained." cf. Malcolm, 91-92.)

2. Miskin, 75.

3. Khushwaqt Rai, 85-86; *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, 85 a.

weather would set in and Abdali's troops, finding the sun intolerable, would either return or attack them at disadvantage¹.

This was the wisest plan, but Adina Beg, who was always opposed to Kauramal from policy, declared in favour of an immediate action². The Viceroy, prompted by his own ardour and courage, listened to the importunities of Adina Beg Khan, who was actuated by the aim of bringing ruin on Muin and Kauramal and securing his own appointment to the Viceroyalty of the Punjab. Issuing from his entrenchments Muin advanced towards Abdali's camp³, and engaged him in actions on 6th March, 1752, but was driven back with loss. Kauramal, coming to his aid, was slain⁴. Adina Beg Khan treacherously withdrew his troops and Muin was forced to surrender.

Muin went fearlessly to Abdali's camp, attended only by three persons. Shah Wali Khan and Jahan Khan, the highest Afghan nobles, received him and presented him before Ahmad Shah Durrani. The Durrani was struck with the noble bearing, boldness of address and frankness of manners of this young man of parts, the victor of Manupur, at whose hands he had sustained a defeat in 1748. The following interesting conversation took place between them:—

DURRANI ... Why didn't you submit earlier?

MUIN ... I had then another master to serve.

DURRANI ... Why didn't that master come to your help?

MUIN ... He thought his servant could take care of himself.

DURRANI ... What would you have done if you had captured me?

MUIN ... I would have cut off your head and sent it to my master at Delhi.

DURRANI ... Now that you are at my mercy, what should I do to you?

1. Siyar, iii. 44.

2. Khazan-i-Amira, 98; Farhat-un-Nazirin in Elliot, viii. 168; Siyar, iii. 44; Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, 85 b; Ahwal-i-Adina Beg, 54 a; Bakhtmal, 70; Khushwaqt Rai, 87; Irshad-ul-Mustqim, 294 b; Tarikh-i-Ahmad, 8; Tarikh-i-Salatin-i-Afghanistan, 154; Shah Yusuf, 58 b.

3. Siyar, iii. 44; Sarkar, i. 431.

4. Farhat-un-Nazirin in Elliot, viii. 168, charges Adina Beg with shooting Kauramal from behind, while Ahwal-i-Adina Beg Khan accuses Bazid Khan of Kasur of this crime. Ali-ud-Din, 111 b, says that Kauramal was shot by some person at the instigation of Adina Beg Khan. All other authorities hold that Kauramal was killed by some person from amongst Muin's troops, and it seems probable that Adina Beg, if not directly, was responsible for his death in an indirect manner. Adina Beg's connection with Kauramal is admitted by Khazan-i-Amira, 98; Maasir, i. 360; Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, 85 b; Irshad-ul-Mustqim, 294 b; and Shah Yusuf, 58 b.

MUIN ... If you are a shopkeeper sell me (for a ransom), if you are a butcher kill me, but if you are a king, then grant me your grace and pardon.

DURRANI ... May God bless you, I pardon you¹.

Ahmad Shah embraced him, conferred upon him the title of "Farzand Khan Bahadur, Rustam-i-Hind," granted him a robe of honour, an aigrette for the crest and the very turban he was wearing, and installed him in the Subahdari of the Punjab on his behalf.

After the war, when matters returned to normal, reports of Sikh ravages began to pour into Lahore from all parts of the country. Muin-ul-Mulk immediately despatched Sadiq Beg Khan in conjunction with Adina Beg Khan to punish the Sikhs in the Jullundur Doab. Adina Beg Khan hailed this opportunity to wash away the suspicions attached to his treachery at Lahore during the recent campaign of the Durrani.²

Both the commanders marched from Lahore with a strong force and entered the Jullundur Doab in pursuit of the Sikhs. They received intelligence that the Sikhs had assembled near Makhawal probably to celebrate the Baisakhi festival.³ The Sikhs were taken quite unawares, because they had received news of the Durrani siege of Lahore and were sure that neither Muin nor his officers would be free to turn their attention to them. They were deep in the midst of their festivities when Adina Beg Khan and Sadiq Beg Khan suddenly fell upon them and put a large number of them to the sword, while the rest were forced to escape for their life. But such was their hardihood and doggedness that soon after they began to plunder again in small parties⁴. Malcolm⁵ blames Adina Beg Khan for the Sikh plunders. He says: "That able but artful chief considered this turbulent tribe in no other light than as the means of his personal advancement. He was careful not to reduce them altogether, but, after defeating them in an action which was fought near Makhawal, he entered into a secret understanding with them,

1. Miskin, 79; Hussain Shahi, 32-33; Khushwaqt Rai, 88; Ahwal-i-Adina Beg Khan, 54 b; Sohan Lal, i. 134-35; Tarikh-i-Ahmad, 8; Tarikh-i-Salatin-i-Afghanan, 164; Ali-ud-Din, 112 a-b.

2. Browne, ii. 17.

3. *Ibid.*, ii. 17 calls it Holi, which is apparently wrong, as it fell on the 18th February, when Muin was shut up in trenches at Lahore, hard pressed by the Abdali.

4. Browne, ii. 17.

5. Malcolm: Sketch of the Sikhs, 92.

by which, though their excursions were limited, they enjoyed a security to which they had been unaccustomed, and from which they gathered strength and resources for future efforts." Adina Beg always tried and with almost uniform success to keep the confidence of the Viceroy of the Punjab, under whom he was serving. He found Muin following a ruthless policy towards the Sikhs and he kept him in humour by sending him from time to time 40 or 50 Sikh captives from the Jullundur Doab, who were as a rule killed with wooden hammers¹.

In the course of his travels in the Upper Bari Doab, either upon official duty or upon hunting expeditions, Adina Beg was much attracted by the fertile district of Riyarki, now called Gurdaspur and in 1752 he established a town, named after him Adinanagar, at a place eight miles north of Gurdaspur, on the Hasli Canal or Shah Nahar².

1. Miskin, 84.

"گاہ بگاہی آویند بیگ خان از ضلع دوآبہ چہل پنجاہ سکھان را گرفتہ میفرستادند بدستور بضرر پنجپانی میکشتند"

2. Ahwal-i-Adina Beg, 61 a-b. Gurdaspur Gazetteer, 1891, p. 26, says that it was founded in 1730 A. D. (1143 A. H.) as shown by the Abjed Chronogram, "Khujista Bina". But according to the value of the letters of this chronogram we get 1121 A. H. or 1709 A. D. which is absolutely wrong.

ن	ج	س	ت	ه
600	3	60	400	5
ب	ن	ا		1121 =
2	50	1		

مجموعہ بنا =

CHAPTER IV

ADINA BEG KHAN ACHIEVES THE VICEROYALTY OF THE PUNJAB, NOVEMBER, 1753 TO OCTOBER, 1756.

Muin-ul-Mulk died suddenly, probably from the effects of poison, on the 3rd November, 1753. His death was a signal for the forces of disruption and disorder to make headway. Muin had left a two-year-old son, who was now proclaimed Viceroy, but the real power lay in the hands of the masterful widow of Muin, Surayya Begam (by some called Murad Begam, known as the Mughlani Begam) a lady of remarkable address and unbounded ambition.

Bhikari Khan, surnamed Roshan-ud-Daulah, Rustam-i-Jang, a Turki General and courtier of Lahore, who was "the dearest friend and most trusted factotum of Muin," and the "centre of all affairs in the province in his time,"¹ revolted against the Begam. She, however, cleverly won over the other Turki nobles and succeeded in removing the threat of civil war. But another catastrophe soon fell upon her, which cut off her hopes and left her in the lurch for some time. The Baby-Governor died early in May, 1754, displaying the same symptoms of poisoning as his father.²

The domineering Begam now openly placed herself at the head of the Government of the Punjab and despatched her agents to Kandahar as well as to Delhi to secure approval. The new Emperor, Alamgir II, appointed Mumin Khan as Governor of the Punjab on the 25th October, 1754, but his authority was negatived by the Begam, in whose hands lay the real control of government³. The Mughlani Begam established herself securely in the seat of the provincial government. But she soon fell into a course of pleasure and abandoned modesty⁴. Eunuchs were the only medium through whom the Mughlani Begam conducted the State affairs⁵. The Diwan, Bakhshi and other government officials waited in the

1. Siyar, iii. 51; Sarkar, i. 439.

2. "Many people believed that Bhikari Khan poisoned the innocent (child) through the eunuch Zamurrad who had access to him". Miskin, 97-98.

3. Delhi Chronicle, 115-116.

4. Miskin, 99, 122, 159-60, 230-31; Ghulam Ali, 26; Shiv Parshad, 33 b; Khazan-i-Amira, 98-99. (All contemporary authorities.)

5. About the influence of eunuchs, Miskin on folio 93, says:

"ہمچون نواب رفت دکار بازن افتاد۔ قدر مردان چہ میبایستند این نسوان نہاد گفتہ خواجہ سرا بیان ہر کجی۔
شد پیش رفت۔ کی ہر آید کام مردان زان فریق نامراد"

deorhi of the Begam and received her orders through three eunuchs named Khushfaham, Mian Arjmand and Mian Mahabat. These eunuchs took part in all the discussions and became her chief confidants, but they never agreed among themselves and constantly quarrelled¹.

The eunuchs' rule and the Begam's profligacy disappointed the Turkish nobles who came from the same stock in Central Asia as the Begam's father and husband and now they were resolved to defy such a degraded authority. Bhikari Khan was the first to rebel in January, 1754. He was, however, confined by her in her palace and was beaten to death in April, 1755². In December, 1754, the Mughalia courtiers decided that, "as a fissure had appeared in the family honour of the late Nawab³," the best course for them was to entrust Khwaja Mirza Khan with the administration of the province. Khwaja Mirza came to Lahore, confined the Begam in a house and assumed the viceroyalty of the Punjab⁴. But she cleverly managed to depute Khwaja Abdullah Khan, her mother's brother, to Ahmad Shah Abdali, whose troops restored her to authority⁵ in April, 1755. In July, 1755, Khwaja Abdullah confined the Begam to her mother's house and became undisputed master of Lahore⁶.

In the face of such confusion and chaos, Adina Beg Khan became independent of both the Delhi Emperor and the Lahore Viceroy. He increased his resources and strengthened his position, with the result that he was the only man who succeeded in maintaining peace and order in the country under his charge. But he did not have smooth sailing for long, as he was soon called upon to deal with a serious menace which arose from the east—the invasion of Qutb Khan Rohilla.

Qutb Khan had with Najib-ud-Daulah joined the Emperor's troops in the battle between Prince Ahmad Shah and Safdar Jang. He was not a Rohilla by caste, but as he was in the service of the Rohillas, he came to be known as a Rohilla himself. He was given

1. *Ibid*, 98.

2. The eunuchs striking him blow after blow cried out, "The blood of the two (Muin and Amin) is on you. This is your due recompense for it", (Miskin, 107).

3. Miskin, 99.

4. *Ibid*, 104.

5. *Ibid*, 106-107.

6. *Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani*, 112.

"در نور نواب مغفور رشتہ پدید آمد"

the parganahs of Keranah, Barot, Sardhana and Kandhela by way of pay. These territories were afterwards given to the Marathas by Wazir Imad-ul-Mulk. Qutb Khan felt exasperated at the loss of his jagir, so made up his mind to defy Delhi Emperor. He consequently entered the Sirhind territory on the 11th March, 1755, and took to plunder and rapine. He ravaged Sonipat, Panipat, Karnal, Azimabad (Taravari) and Thanesar and marched upon Sirhind after defeating the imperial troops at Karnal. Sadiq Beg was the Governor of the Sirhind province. His Afghan troops, finding a tribesman coming against the Governor, clamoured for pay and threatened to join the enemy. Sadiq Beg had to evacuate Sirhind and fled towards the Punjab.

The Wazir pressed the Emperor to pursue Qutb Khan but he declined; so the Wazir himself procrastinated. Ultimately he left Delhi on 13th April, 1755, and at Sonipat on 15th April he learnt that Qutb Khan had seized Sirhind. Sadiq Beg now approached Adina Beg Khan, the Governor of the Jullundur Doab, for help.

Adina Beg Khan could not tolerate the existence of such a formidable foe in his close neighbourhood and he made up his mind to try his strength with the invader. Thus says the contemporary Delhi diarist: "Adina Beg, who had been the ruler of the place for years and whom all the zamindars of that country obeyed on account of his strictness and ability, gathered together all the zamindars and an army of the Sikhs, the followers of Nanak and thus had about 50,000 horse and nearly the same number of foot, along with cannons, light artillery (Rahkala), long firelocks (Jizails), matchlocks and rockets."¹ He marched to the ghat of Ropar. On hearing this Qutb Khan with great spirit and bravery (کمال شجاعت و جرات) left Sirhind and crossed the river to oppose Adina Beg Khan. Jamal Khan of Malerkotla with his brothers and sons had joined Qutb Khan at the head of a large army. An engagement between the parties took place on 11th April, 1755. Qutb Khan, Jamal Khan and other chiefs of the army lost their lives and Adina Beg Khan was victorious.

He now took over the administration of Sirhind and its dependencies and brought the country up to Shahabad, Thanesar, Ghuram, Mansurpur and Mustafabad into his possession. He then wrote to

1. Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani, 85-86.

the Delhi Wazir: "The zamindars of this country are refractory and require force to keep them in order. If you intend to come here bring with you a large army and abundant war material, otherwise your coming here would be inadvisable. Leave this territory to me." The Wazir, knowing his own military impotence and poverty, gave up the idea of advancing and by the advice of Najib decided on crossing over to the eastern bank of the Jumna. This victory brought not only one more province to Adina Beg Khan, but added new lustre to his glory. The Delhi Emperor conferred upon him the coveted title of "Zafar Jang Bahadur," and all the hill chiefs, including Saif Ali Khan of Kangra, submitted to him and paid tribute.¹

Having secured his position in two important divisions, Jullundur and Sirhind, Adina Beg Khan turned his attention towards Lahore, where a favourable situation was arising for him. On account of his cruel deeds Khwaja Abdullah became very unpopular; his troops deserted him and people hated him. Adina Beg Khan took advantage of the unrest prevailing in the provincial capital and marched upon Lahore, drove Abdullah towards Sind, and appointed Sadiq Beg Khan as his deputy to manage State affairs.²

The Begam conveyed news of this to Ahmad Shah Abdali at Kandahar and sought help from him. He despatched Jahan Khan with two special contingents. Sadiq Beg fled to Sirhind about December, 1755, and the Begam was restored to the Subahdari with Khwaja Abdullah as her deputy.³

By this time the Sikhs had become very powerful. They harassed Adina Beg Khan, because he was not prepared to allow them to

1. *Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani*, 76-88; *Delhi Chronicle*, 122, *cf.* *Chahar Gulzar Shujai*, 461 a; *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, 98 b-99 a; *Ahwal-i-Adina Beg Khan*, 56 b-57 a; *Ahmad Shah*, 880-81. The author of *Ahwal-i-Adina Beg Khan* describes an interesting incident in this connection. He says that in the engagement Adina Beg had been defeated first and his Commander-in-Chief, Aziz Beg, along with other officers had taken to flight. Adina Beg Khan was also about to flee, when his Diwan, Lala Bishamber Das, who was close by him on horseback, said: "It is a matter of regret if you run away at this time. You will lose all respect. If we die fighting in this battle, we will leave a name behind us; otherwise we will be put to shame in both the worlds." Adina Beg at once made up his mind to offer further resistance. He organised his troops and delivered a sally. A bullet hit Qutb Khan Rohilla and he died instantaneously. His troops lost heart and were routed by Adina Beg Khan, who acquired immense booty.

2. *Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani*, 124.

3. *Ibid.*, 151; *Tarikh-i-Ahmad*, 9.

create disturbances in his territory. Jassa Singh Ahluwalia, the celebrated leader of the Dal Khalsa, "was engaged in perpetual contests with Adina Beg Khan with varying success; but in November, 1755, he gained a decided advantage at Kaddur, and compelled the Khan to cede to him Fatahabad on the Bias."¹

The Mughlani Begam was kept under the surveillance of Abdullah at Lahore, which she resented. She resolved to regain full power through the Delhi Government, which was under the supreme control of Wazir Imad-ul-Mulk, who was betrothed to her daughter. Consequently she wrote secret letters to him repeatedly asking for help, saying:—

"Ahmad Shah Durrani had helped me, when oppressed, from Kandahar. I have again fallen into misfortune. You come and help me. Otherwise, at least send a force in any way that you can, and summon my daughter, who is betrothed to you."²

The Wazir had received constant reports of the misgovernment of the Begam from the discontented nobility.³ He was in financial difficulties, so decided to seek at Lahore wealth⁴ and a bride for himself and two provinces—Lahore and Multan—for the Empire⁵. In order to deceive Adina Beg Khan and the Durrani he pretended to go on a hunting expedition with the Imperial Prince Ali Gauhar and left Shahjahanabad on the 15th January, 1755, and reached Sirhind on the 7th February, 1756⁶, where his further progress was stopped by Adina Beg Khan, who wrote to him, "Please stay at Sirhind. Send me one eunuch with two or three thousand troops. I will add my own contingent to them and will secure you possession of Lahore easily by a ruse⁷." The Wazir agreed to this proposal and sent Nasim Khan with nearly three thousand troops to Adina Beg.

"Adina Beg Khan despatched Sadiq Beg Khan with 10,000 troops of his own to help the Wazir, and all these soldiers arrived at Lahore in a few days, and encamped at Shah Ganj. From here they rode out in full glory and pomp to the Begam's residence to offer their salams. On returning from there they paid a visit of courtesy

1. *Rajas of the Punjab*, 458.

2. *Miskin*, 113-114.

3. *Ali-ud-Din*, 113 a.

4. *Ghulam Ali*, 25.

5. *Khair-ud-Din's Ibrat Namah*, in *Elliot*, viii, 240.

6. *Delhi Chronicle*, 130; *Miskin*, 114.

7. *Miskin*, 114.

to Khwaja Abdullah Khan, brother of the Khan Bahadur and son of Abdul Samad Khan. The Khwaja, in accordance with court etiquette, conferred upon him (Sadiq Beg Khan, the leader of the expedition) a *khilaat* and afterwards came to the camp. Nawab Abdullah Khan guessed that in a day or two he would be captured and being frightened left the city the same night and fled away to the Jammu hills¹."

On the following day the Mughlani Begam triumphantly occupied her official residence and took the reins of government in her hands once more. She spent a month in preparations for the departure of her daughter, Umda Begam, "the pearl of unrivalled beauty and accomplishments²", and sent her with a suitable dowry in jewels and cash, accompanied by a full household of eunuchs, tents and other necessary requisites, at the head of an escort of 3,000 troops. The bride arrived at the camp of the Wazir on 4th March, 1756³.

The next step of the Wazir was to despatch Sayyid Jamil-ud-Din Khan, Nisar Muhammad Khan Sher-i-Jang, Hakim Ibadullah Khan and Khwaja Saadat Yab Khan to Adina Beg in order to fetch the Begam also to his camp. She was his mother's brother's wife and his prospective mother-in-law, and he was of opinion that her loss of character was due to her unbridled freedom at Lahore. Above all he coveted her wealth. These officers, strengthened by Adina's troops, covered the distance of 120 miles in one day and night, hardly stopping, and reached Lahore at daybreak, when the Mughlani Begam was fast asleep, unsuspecting of what lay in store for her. They sent eunuchs to wake her and putting her in a close chair they carried her to their camp outside Lahore and confiscated all her treasure and property. She reached the Wazir's camp on the 28th March, 1756. The Wazir came to receive her. Hurt by the treatment she had received, she reviled the Wazir, saying, "This conduct of yours will bring distress upon the realm, destruction to Shahjahanabad and disgrace to the nobles and the State. Ahmad Shah Durrani will soon avenge this disgraceful act and punish you."

1. Miskin, 114; cf. Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani, 151.

2. Sohan Lal, i. 140.

3. Miskin, 114-116 and 119; Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani, 130-31; Shakir, 79-80; Siyar, iii. 63; Delhi Chronicle, 131; Sarkar, ii. 60.

The Wazir then gave the government of Lahore and Multan to Adina Beg Khan on a tribute of thirty lakhs a year, appointed Sayyid Jamil-ud-Din Khan to Lahore, as Adina's assistant, and afterwards returned to the imperial capital on 9th May, 1756.¹

Though provided with an inadequate force and an empty treasury, Sayyid Jamil-ud-Din restored order and governed Lahore well.² But his rule was short. Khwaja Abdullah Khan went to Kandahar and brought back a strong Afghan force,³ before which the Sayyid retired from Lahore and joined Adina Beg in the Jullundur Doab.⁴ The invaders captured and completely sacked the city on 4th October, 1756.⁵ Khwaja Abdullah Khan was appointed Governor of the Province for the Durrani, but his administration was harassed by the Sikhs, whose power was now growing formidable.⁶

1. Miskin, 120-24; Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani, 131; Delhi Chronicle, 131 and 132; Khazan-i-Amira, 52; Maasir, iii. 890-91; Siyar, iii. 53; Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, 98 b; Ghulam Ali, 26-27; Shiv Parshad 33 b; Shakir, 79-80; Ibrat Miqal, ii. 71 a-b; Tarikh-i-Salatan-i-Afghanan, 156; Bakhtmal, 76; Sohan Lal, i. 139-40; Gulistan-i-Rahmat, 51; Ali-ud-Din, 113 a-114 a; Sarkar, ii. 60-61.

2. *cf.* Bakhtmal, 76; Khushwaqt Rai, 90; Sohan Lal, i. 140; Miskin, 124.

3. Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani, 151-52.

4. Miskin, 125.

5. Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani, 152.

6. Miskin, 126.

CHAPTER V

ADINA BEG KHAN AND THE AFGHANS, NOVEMBER, 1756 TO FEBRUARY, 1758.

The Mughlani Begam, chafing under the high-handedness of Wazir Imad-ul-Mulk, had addressed secret letters to Ahmad Shah Abdali, saying: "Goods and Cash worth crores of rupees lie buried to my knowledge in the palace of my late father-in-law, besides heaps of gold and silver stored inside the ceilings. A perfect disagreement exists among the Emperor Alamgir II, his Wazirs and nobles. If you invade India this time, the Indian Empire with all its riches of crores will fall into your hands without incurring any expenditure."¹ He was also invited by Najib-ud-Daulah² and the Delhi Emperor.³

Ahmad Shah Abdali readily embraced an occasion that promised him such evident advantages. He sent his envoy, Qalander Beg Khan, in advance to the court of Delhi demanding satisfaction for the Wazir's conduct in encroaching upon his province of Lahore. This envoy was granted audience on the 31st October and the 23rd November and he ultimately left Delhi on the 9th December without achieving anything.⁴

Ahmad Shah advanced with a large army to Peshawar in November, 1756. An advanced guard, under his son, Timur Shah, and Commander-in-Chief, Jahan Khan, pursued Adina Beg Khan, who lay with his force at Jalalabad, some 25 miles south-east of Amritsar. Adina Beg accompanied by Sadiq Beg and Jamal-ud-Din abandoned his camp to the Afghans and fled first to Hansi⁵ and then to Khali Balwan in the Siwalik Hills.⁶

1. Ali-ud-Din, 114 b.

2. Najib-ud-Daulah wrote:—"In this country I have gathered round myself 25,000 Afghans. I have prepared the other Afghans of Gangapar (Trans-Ganges), who number 40,000 to enter your service. You may come here without any suspicion. Imad-ul-Mulk has not the strength to oppose you. I am his greatest ally. As I have become obedient to you, there is none other left here to help him." Nur-ud-Din, 14 b.

3. For Emperor's invitation, cf. Francklin's Shah Aulam.

4. Delhi Chronicle, 135; Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani, 152.

5. Khazan-i-Amira, 99.

"آدینہ بیگ خان چوں طفل کہ از کتنب رزم کند از لاهور بصحرای ہانسی دھواں فرار نمود"

6. cf. Forster, i, 317.

The year 1757 saw the Mughlani Begam's fortunes at their zenith and at their nadir. During Abdali's campaign she had attained the invader's highest favour. Her services to him were indeed invaluable. It was she who secured him the virgin tributes from the imperial harem. She was responsible for procuring for him the hoarded treasures of all the court nobles of Delhi by telling him the exact amount of wealth in their possession. One day she presented him several trays full of gems and jewels. Ahmad Shah Abdali at once exclaimed: "Hitherto I had styled you my daughter, but from to-day I shall call you my son and give you the title of Sultan Mirza." He immediately conferred upon her his own *tiara* (*kulah*) with its ornament of gold and jewels (*jigha*) and cloak (*pairahan*) and other vestments that he was then wearing¹.

He grew more kind and generous to the Begam when she accompanied him in his campaign south of Delhi and granted her Jullundur Doab, Jammu and Kashmir as a fief. She appointed one of her relations, Khwaja Ibrahim Khan, to the Government of Kashmir, confirmed the Raja of Jammu in the administration on her behalf and invited Adina Beg Khan to take over the charge of the Jullundur Doab².

Miskin took the *khilaat* for Adina Beg Khan.

In the meanwhile Adina Beg received a *farman* from Timur Shah and a letter from Jahan Khan to this effect: "Ahmad Shah Durrani had intended to go to the Deccan first, but afterwards he gave up this idea and conferred this country as far as the boundary of Sirhind on us (May, 1757). It falls upon you now to present yourself at our service. In case of non-compliance with this order the whole country of the Doab will be laid waste and you will be pursued in the hills³."

Adina Beg Khan was in a predicament. He preferred the Begam's suzerainty to the overlordship of Timur and Jahan Khan. He consulted Miskin, who advised him to postpone replying to the Prince till he had received a definite communication from the Begam. He despatched Miskin on this mission, who set out for Kandahar, where the Begam was believed to have gone in the invader's train. On his journey he learned that she had returned to Lahore, whither he followed her⁴.

1. Miskin, 138; Sarkar, ii. 67.

3. Miskin, 145.

2. Miskin, 140.

4. *Ibid*, 145-46.

There he came to know that the Abdali had cancelled his grant of a jagir to the Begam. He had, however, offered her an annual allowance of Rs. 30,000 with residence in Lahore. She refused the allowance and insisted on the jagir already given to her. The Durrani said, "Now your brother Timur Shah is the Viceroy there, what will you do with the provinces?" He asked Shah Wali Khan and Jahan Khan to persuade her but she did not agree and implored him in vain to fulfil his promise. She returned to Lahore disappointed and lived in Sarai Hakim which had only two rooms, the rest being in ruins¹.

Receiving no answer from Adina Beg Khan, Jahan Khan marched into the Doab and gave over many towns to pillage². Adina Beg Khan then informed him that he was ready to undertake the administration of the Doab under Timur Shah provided that he was exempted from attending his court at Lahore. Timur Shah, sensible of his own inexperience and Adina Beg's skill in government and revenue matters, resolved to obtain his services and wrote him several civil letters. Finally he sent him the patent as well as the *khilaat* of the Doab on a definite undertaking of 36 lakhs of rupees to be remitted to him annually at Lahore, and exempted him from personally attending the Lahore court³. For a surety of his conduct and the punctual payment of the tribute, his agent Dilaram was kept at Lahore in constant attendance at the court⁴.

After a time a quarrel arose between Jahan Khan and Adina Beg Khan about the payment of the tribute, and Jahan Khan imprisoned Dilaram. The Mughlani Begam intervened on his behalf and contrived his escape. But she was seized and beaten by Jahan Khan, whose troopers ransacked her house of all it contained and placed her in oppressive confinement⁵.

Jahan Khan then summoned Adina Beg Khan to Lahore ostensibly to seek his advice as to measures to subdue the Sikhs⁶.

1. *Ibid*, 147-48.

2. Miskin, 146.

3. *Ibid*, 147.

4. Miskin, 165; Khazan-i-Amira, 100; Siyar, iii. 63; Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, 102 a; Ahmad Shah, 872; Irshad-ul-Mustqim, 295 a and 317 a.

5. Miskin, 168-71.

6. Ali-ud-Din, 177 a, states that it was reported to Timur Shah that Adina Beg Khan possessed lakhs of rupees and the best way of securing it was to summon him to Lahore, and in case of non-compliance to attack him and dispossess him of all his riches.

Miskin, 166; Khazan-i-Amira, 100; Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, 102 a-b.

”لیکن لازمیت و مجرائی خان مذکور موقوف ماند“

But Adina Beg Khan flatly refused to come. When threatened with the consequences of his disobedience, "he despatched agents with presents to the Prince to secure his pardon for not attending in person¹." Timur Shah granted pardon, but insisted upon his presence at Lahore and, detaining his agents, again summoned him to his court. Adina Beg evaded compliance on the ground that his presence was badly required in his own territory to check the Sikhs, who were lying encamped in the neighbourhood and that his absence from his province would result in its occupation by them. The Prince now sent a detachment of his troops to seize Adina Beg Khan. But the Khan retired with his troops to the foot-hills and secured the help of the Sikhs², taking a large number of them into his pay and granting them the right to plunder. He also won over Sadiq Beg Khan and Raja Bhup Singh, who commanded an army of 25,000³ strong.

Murad Khan with the Afghan troops crossed the Beas and prepared to attack Adina Beg Khan. The Sikhs, intoxicated with opium and *bhang*, under the leadership of Sodhi Barbhag Singh and Jassa Singh Ahluwalia, fell upon the Afghans with indescribable fury inspiring the other troops with them. The Afghans were routed and their luggage looted⁴. Murad Khan fled in panic to Lahore. Adina Beg knew that he had now completely committed himself, so gave the Sikhs leave to pillage the whole Doab, including the city of Jullundur.⁵

The Sikhs were quick to seize the chance, as they expected Jahan Khan at any moment to invade the Doab. After ravaging all the districts of the Doab⁶, they entered Jullundur city, the home of Nasir Ali, who was responsible for the atrocities committed on the Sikhs at Kartarpur. Here they gave loose rein to their passion of revenge⁷, indulging in the general plunder and massacre of their enemies. Children were put to the sword, women were dragged out and

1. Ahwal-i-Adina Beg Khan, 55 a; cf. Irshad-ul-Mustqim, 317 a.

2. Siyar, iii. 64.

3. Ghulam Ali, i. 55-56; Ahmad Shah, 871-72; Ganesh Das, 156.

4. Ghulam Ali, i. 56.

5. Khazan-i-Amira, 100; Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, 102 a; Siyar, iii. 64; Irshad-ul-Mustqim, 295 a and 317 a.

”قوم سیکھ تمام پرگنت دواہرہ خصوص جالندھرا باشارہ آدینہ بیگ خان بشدت تاراج نمودند“

6. Tarikh-i-Ibrahim Khan, in Elliot, viii. 263.

7. "Jullundur town was burnt by the Sikhs in 1757". Imperial Gazetteer, 1908, Punjab, i. 421.

forcibly converted to Sikhism. Many of them carried off Muslim women of Jullundur as wives. The mosques of the town were defiled by pig's blood. Nasir Ali's dead body was dug out of the grave and pigs' flesh was thrust into his mouth. This was done at the orders of Sodhi Barbhag Singh¹.

When informed of the disastrous defeat and retreat of the Afghan troops, Jahan Khan marched hurriedly from Lahore and met the vanquished army at Batala and "out of extremity of rage he ordered Murad Khan to be caned²."

Adina Beg Khan was not prepared for an open engagement with Jahan Khan because his own troops had been weakened by the previous battle and his allies the Sikhs had dispersed to plunder the Doab. Moreover, he had not abandoned the last hope of a reconciliation with the Prince or his guardian. He therefore retired to his old resort in the Khali Balwan hills, which were extremely difficult of access. Jahan Khan left Sarfaraz Khan in charge of the Jullundur Doab and himself returned to Lahore³. But Sarfaraz Khan could not cope with the situation. The ever vigilant Sikhs were determined not to allow any rest to the Afghans and came down from the hills in all directions aggravating the chaos in the Doab. In the course of a month the armies that had gone to the Doab and Kashmir came back defeated, without having achieved anything. All order had vanished. Khwaja Mirza Khan succeeded in approaching the fastness of Adina Beg Khan, but was won over by the refugee with the offer of his daughter in marriage. Even the environs of Lahore were not safe. Every night thousands of Sikhs used to fall upon the city and plunder the suburbs lying outside the walls, but no force was sent out to repel them and the city gates were closed one hour after nightfall. The government of the province was rendered impotent⁴. This state of anarchy continued from

1. Ratan Singh, 420-421 ; Gyan Singh, 727-28.

2. Ahmad Shahi, 872.

3. Miskin, 166 ; Tarikh-i-Muzaffari, 102 a ; Khushwaqt Rai, 90 ; Ali-ud-Din, 117b.

”ازین امر فساد کلی در تمام ملک پنجاب روداد“
 ”نظم و نسق که کم و بیش بود آن هم رو بخرابی گشتند“

4. Miskin, 166.

”هزار بار مردم (سکھ) هجوم آورده ازین مرتزبان مبرا لاهور را
 بزمیرسم اسپ گرفتند و احدیرانی گذاشتند که سالم برود“

Bakhtmal, 81.

November, 1757 to February, 1758. A Marathi despatch says : "The Sikhs gathering together by our advice began to upset Abdali's rule; from some places they expelled his outposts. They defeated Sadat Khan Afridi, plundered all the Jullundur Doab, and forced him to flee to the hills. By order of the Subahdar, Khwaja Abed Khan came from Lahore with 20,000 horse and foot to fight the Sikhs. In the end he was defeated, many of his captains were slain, all his camp and baggage was plundered all the artillery left behind by Abdali was captured¹."

1. S. P. D., ii. 83 ; Sarkar, ii. 69-70.

CHAPTER VI

ADINA BEG KHAN WITH MARATHA AND SIKH HELP EXPELS THE AFGHANS—MARCH-APRIL, 1758.

The Maratha army under their eminent leaders Raghunath Rao, the Peshwa's brother, and Malhar Rao Holkar and many other generals of note, had come to Delhi at the request of Imad-ul-Mulk, the Delhi Wazir. They had driven Najib-ud-Daulah, the Durrani plenipotentiary, out of Delhi on the 6th September, 1757, and thenceforth roamed at large in the neighbourhood of the imperial capital. They also seized on Najib's province of Saharanpur and came as far as the bank of the Jumna. This caused fear in the mind of Abdul Samad Khan, the Durrani Governor of Sirhind, the eastern boundary of whose province touched the Jumna on the other side. He prepared to meet the danger, but the Marathas refrained from crossing the Jumna.

Adina Beg was not content to remain idle in safety, but was anxious to secure a strong ally who could reinstate him in his position and help him drive the Afghans from the Punjab. He therefore sent repeated requests to Raghunath Rao, then in Delhi, to extend the Maratha dominions as far as the Indus, pointing out the rich harvest of spoil within their easy reach and also promising on his own part to pay them one lakh of rupees for every day of marching and Rs. 50,000 for halting.¹

The Marathas readily accepted the promise and an advance division under Malhar Rao crossed the Jumna at the end of December and laid siege to the Afghan fort of Kunjpura. Abdul Samad Khan, the Governor of Sirhind, was busy fighting Alha Singh of Patiala, but on hearing of the close approach of the Marathas, he at once settled terms with Alha Singh and hurried to Sirhind on the 12th January, 1758, and entrenched there. Malhar Rao, however, recrossed the Jumna after exacting a tribute of five lakhs and thus gave temporary relief to Abdul Samad Khan.² The real Maratha invasion of the Punjab began about the end of February, 1758. Raghunath Rao, at

1. Miskin, 67-68; Khazan-i-Amira, 100; Chahar Gulzar Shujai, 463; Hussain Shahi, 43; Siyar, iii. 64; Ghulam Ali, i. 56; Ahwal-i-Adina Beg Khan, 55 b.

2. Malhar's women came to Kurukshetra for a religious bath on the 9th attacked at Shahabad by a contingent of Abdul Samad Khan, well, slew many Afghans and seized their horses. (Rajwade,

the head of his vast Maratha forces, was at Mughal-ki-Sarai near Ambala on the 5th March, at Rajpura on the 6th, at Aluenki Sarai Banjara on the 7th, and in the neighbourhood of Sirhind on the 8th.¹

Adina Beg Khan cleverly concealed his intrigue with the Marathas, upon whom he felt that he could not entirely rely to attack the main Durrani army. So he kept open the door for negotiation with Abdali's government. When the Marathas reached Ambala, he wrote to Prince Timur Shah and Jahan Khan Wazir that they had come from the Deccan quite unexpectedly like a bolt from the blue and that he was joining them out of policy (زمانه سازى). As the servant of the Durrannies he was writing to them to show that he was true to his salt. They should not delay even for an hour, but should advance at once against the Marathas.²

A contemporary historian of Delhi has given the following account of the Maratha siege and capture of Sirhind in March, 1758:—

"The Maratha troops beyond number (said to be two lakhs of men) from this side, and Adina Beg Khan collecting an army of the Sikhs, the worshippers of Nanak, who practised highway robbery in the province of the Punjab, from the other side of the Sutlej, came to Sirhind. Abdul Samad Khan, Abdali's governor, finding himself unable to fight, shut himself up in the fort. The Maratha army and Adina Beg Khan laid siege to the place. After a few days Abdul Samad Khan and Jangbaz Khan fled away. The Marathas overtook and captured them.³ As the Marathas and the Sikhs thought of nothing but plunder they so thoroughly looted the inhabitants of Sirhind, high and low, that none, either male or female, had a cloth on his or her person left. They pulled down the houses and carried off the timber. They dug up floors for buried treasure and seized every thing they could lay their hands on."⁴

When news of the Maratha siege of Sirhind reached Jahan Khan, he at once collected all his troops outside Lahore in order to march to the assistance of Abdul Samad Khan. Fearing intrigue by the Mughlani Begam, whom he had mercilessly beaten, he imprisoned

1. Karam Singh, *Adina Beg Khan*, 295-297.

2. *Adina Beg Khan*, 55 b.

3. *cf.* S. P. D. xxvii. 220; *Ahwal-i-Adina Beg Khan*, 56 a; *Tarikh-i-Ahmad*, 10; *Tarikh-i-Ali*, 133-34.

4. *Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani*, 311; *cf.* Ratan Singh, 422-23.

her in Timur's palace inside the fort and appointed four bailiffs (Sazawal) to guard Miskin, who was forcibly taken in his train.¹ In eight days the army reached Batala. From there Jahan Khan despatched an advance guard (Qarawal) of 2,000 soldiers under Yusaf Khan, Darogha of Timur's Diwan Khana, to scout for intelligence of the enemy in the Jullundur Doab. Miskin also was included in this force. They reconnoitred the Doab for forty days and then, learning of the fall of Sirhind and capture of Abdul Samad Khan, they withdrew to the Beas and joined Jahan Khan who had marched from Batala to that place. The Durrani Commander-in-Chief halted there for eight days, but, being informed that the Marathas had crossed the Sutlej and were advancing through the Doab, he ordered the camp to be raised and retreated to Lahore.²

Jahan Khan informed Timur Shah of the danger of their position and advised him to retire to Afghanistan. Miskin, who was an eyewitness of the events at Lahore, gives a graphic picture of its evacuation. He says that Jahan Khan decided to leave the town about 9th April and set up his camp at Shahdara across the Ravi. He first conveyed there Timur's mother and his own women and relations. The other Durrani chiefs and the troops carried their baggage and property in cart-loads by repeated trips day and night. Meanwhile news was received that the invaders had crossed the Beas and that their advance guard under Adina Beg Khan and Manaji Paygude lay encamped five or six *kos* from Lahore. That very day at noon Timur Shah crossed the river, followed by the Wazir. Their troops set fire to the goods which they could not carry. The eunuchs then mounted the women of Timur and Jahan Khan in litters on camels and horses, and the whole Afghan camp moved towards Kabul; while Miskin quietly brought the Mughlani Begam and her maiden daughter in a covered bullock-cart (رٲٲ) to Lahore and installed them into their residential quarters (حویلی). The masterless city was in utter confusion and terror and marauders of the town and its neighbourhood were busy plundering the defenceless people. Miskin did something to check this lawlessness by shutting all the gates at nightfall and patrolling the streets all night.³

At about nine o'clock, the following morning, 10th April, 1758 (Baisakhi day) 500 Maratha horse and 100 of Khwaja Mirza's

1. Miskin, 171.

2. Miskin, 171-174.

3. *Ibid*, 174-77; cf. Tarikh-i-Alan-gir Sani, 312; Ratan Singh, 424.

The Marathas abandoned the pursuit at the Chenab¹. Raghunath Rao and Adina Beg returned to Lahore on 11th April. Here the Marathas demanded the sums promised by Adina Beg Khan, who pleaded his inability to pay and begged to be excused. The Marathas were enraged and looted his camp. He quietly submitted and on the next day erected in the Shalamar Garden, at the cost of one lakh of rupees, a magnificent platform, on which Raghunath Rao was seated and given a public reception. The fountains of the garden were made to play with rose water and the whole city was illuminated².

Raghunath Rao did not wish to remain in the Punjab. It was far from the home of the Marathas and communication was difficult. The climate was unsuitable to them; the rivers were not easily fordable in the rainy season; they were isolated amidst a hostile population. As a frontier province the Punjab was also exposed to foreign attacks, the brunt of which would be borne by them, if they continued to occupy it. Moreover they were failing in making war pay for war³. They were harassed by Sikh depredations and thus they were not sure of a steady revenue. Their presence was also required in the Deccan to attack the Nizam. In view of all these circumstances they decided to place the Punjab in charge of Adina Beg Khan, who was an experienced administrator and could handle the Sikhs. Raghunath Rao therefore conferred the title of Nawab on Adina Beg Khan and leased the province to him for 75 lakhs of rupees a year. The Marathas then retired to Delhi⁴.

Adina Beg did not wish to stay in Lahore and fixed his headquarters at Batala. He appointed Khwaja Mirza Khan, his son-in-law, to the government of Lahore, with Khwaja Said Khan, the brother of the former, as his deputy; while his old ally Sadiq Beg Khan was given the administration of Sirhind. Khwaja Mirza wished to be rid of the presence of the Mughlani Begam in Lahore, so Adina Beg took her with him to Batala⁵.

1. The famous Maratha Historians, Kincaid and Parasnis in Vol. ii., p. 184, hold that the Marathas planted their banner on the walls of Attock, a statement which is not borne out by facts. The Marathas remained only on this side of the Chenab. *cf.* S. P. D. xxviii. 218.

2. Khushwaqt Rai, 91; Ali-ud-Din, 118 a.

3. The Maratha Government owed a heavy debt of 88 lakhs to their army. *cf.* Sinha's Rise of the Sikh Power, 51.

4. Delhi Chronicle, 156; S. P. D. xxviii. 218; Nur-ud-Din, 21 b; Khazan-i-Amira, 101; Siyar, iii. 64; Ahwal-i-Adina Beg Khan, 56 a; Khushwaqt Rai, 91; Tarikh-i-Ahmad, 10; Tarikh-i-Ali, 184; Irshad-ul-Mustqim, 295 b; Hugel, 265-66.

5. Miskir. 179-80.

CHAPTER VII

ADINA BEG KHAN AS PUNJAB VICEROY UNDER MARATHA SUZERAINTY—APRIL, 1758 TO SEPTEMBER, 1758.

By April, 1758, Adina Beg Khan had attained to his zenith, having brought all the Punjab from the Jumna to the Indus into subjection. He now set about the task of the consolidation which was a paramount necessity at the time. He had been known in the Punjab for nearly twenty years. During this time he had impressed his personality not only on those territories which were directly governed by him, but also on other parts of the province. He had made a name for himself by his vigour, discipline and good government. Consequently the masses, who had been ground down under oppression, received him with relief. He took about a month and a half in organising the government and then turned his attention to the disturbing elements.

The Sikhs had had the satisfaction of taking revenge on the Afghans for Jahan Khan's slaughter of their co-religionists and desecration of their holy buildings at Amritsar. But they knew that they would not have things their own way during the régime of Adina Beg Khan, who was too clever for them. Adina Beg Khan was now well placed. The Delhi Government was too weak and distracted to challenge his supremacy, while the danger from the Durrani was for the time removed. The main consideration for him was the collection of 75 lakhs of rupees, which he had to pay to the Marathas; and this huge sum could not be collected till the Sikh disturbances were quelled and there was peace in the country, so that the peasants and the merchants could follow their avocations without any molestation. He therefore advised the Sikhs to cease their lawless activities. But they defied him, so he decided to subdue them.

The Viceroy had an army of 10,000 horse and foot. In order to suppress the Sikhs he enlisted a large number of additional troops and called upon the leading zamindars and chiefs in every part of the province to join him in eradicating the Sikh menace and restoring peace and order in the country.¹ The Gakhar, the Jhanjhua and the Gheba zamindars of the Sind Sagar Doab; Chaudhari Rahmat Khan Waraich in the Chaj Doab; Raja Ranjit Dev of Jammu, Chaudhari Pir Muhammad Chatha, Izzat Bakhsh, Murad Bakhsh

1. Ahmad Shah, 882-83.

Bhatti and other zamindars in the Rechna Doab. Raja Ghamand Chand, Nidhan Singh Randhawa, Mirza Muhammad Anwar of Qadian, the Afghans of Kasur and Daulpur in the Bari Doab; the Afghans of Jullundur and Alwalpur, Rai Ibrahim of Kapurthala, the Rais of Bankala, Dasuha, Khardunbala and Phagwara and the Rajputs of Rahon in the Jullundur Doab were all persuaded to join him in his campaign.¹

With these forces he steadily harried the Sikhs. On one occasion a strong body of Sikhs, in order to overawe Adina Beg, appeared in the neighbourhood of Adinanagar. He despatched Diwan Hira Mal and Guru Aqil Das of Jandiala against them. The battle, which was fiercely contested, took place near Qadian. The Diwan was slain, his troops dispersed and the whole of his baggage fell into the hands of the Sikhs. Adina Beg was chagrined at this and determined to take more stringent measures against them.² He issued strict orders to the lambardars, zamindars and other chiefs to join his forces and made them take an oath that they would attack the Sikhs and drive them away and that, wherever a Sikh was found, he was to be immediately put to death or captured. He also knew that the best hiding places of the Sikhs were the Plas jungles in the Manjha so he aimed at destroying them.

That Adina Beg Khan succeeded in his design is shown by the testimony of Ahmad Shah of Batala, who wrote: "All the Punjab zamindars submitted to him and started devising plans for rooting out the Sikhs. Of all the zamindars of the Punjab the Randhawas showed the greatest readiness in destroying the Sikhs. Adina Beg ordered that in no district or parganah should Sikhs be allowed to live, they should either be captured or killed. Mirza Aziz Bakhsh was one of his most trusted nobles. Adina Beg appointed him to this duty at the head of several thousand horse. He also entrusted him with one³ thousand carpenters with steel hatchets and axes for the purpose of cutting down and clearing away the jungles and forests where Sikhs used to seek shelter, so that no hiding place might exist for the people of this sect. The Sikhs were very much perturbed and relaxed their activities. Some fled away and hid themselves, but a body of them, bolder than the rest, showed the greatest gallantry and courage in going to Amritsar, quite ready to

1. Ali-ud-Din, 118 b-119 a.

2. *Ibid*, 119 a. (Strangely enough the author says that both the Jassa Singhs fought on the side of Adina Beg Khan, which seems improbable.)

3. 4,000 carpenters according to MacGregor, i, 131.

lay down their lives at the place of their Gurus. They took shelter in their mud fort near Amritsar called Ram Rauni. Nand Singh Sanghania was the leader of this body. Jassa Singh (Ramgarhia) with two of his brothers and other companions was also among the number, while Jai Singh Kanhya and Amar Singh Kingra with their followers were likewise concealed in the fort. Mir Aziz, on hearing this, laid siege to the fort. The Sikhs, becoming desperate, fought with great bravery. Jai Singh Kanhya and Jassa Singh made a sally and killed great numbers of their assailants with matchlocks and arrows. They then returned to the fort and shut the gates. Jai Singh, mounted on a swift and spirited mare, displayed remarkable gallantry by piercing into the midst of the enemy. Though matchlocks were aimed at him and he was attacked on all sides, yet none dared to come near him and he escaped within the fort. At last Mir Aziz succeeded one night in making a hole in the wall of the fort. The Sikhs then sallied out and many were killed or taken prisoners."¹

The Sikhs now fled towards Malwa. This territory was in the Sirhind Division, where Sadiq Beg Khan was the Governor. No sooner had the Sikhs crossed the Sutlej than Sadiq Beg, under strict injunctions from Adina Beg Khan, engaged them in an action near the village Sanghulan. The Governor's swivels opened a heavy fire on them and created havoc in their ranks. They were forced to flee, leaving their camp and baggage to be looted by the enemy. Hotly pursued by Sadiq's troops, they suddenly turned and, as the enemy had left their heavy guns behind, they fell an easy prey to the wrath of the Khalsa. But Sadiq Beg reformed his troops, who again opened fire, and the Sikhs again fled with their wounded comrades.²

At this time when the whole country was ruined by the constant fight with the Sikhs, the rains in July and August entirely failed and as a consequence a severe famine broke out in the Punjab. "In the country of Manjha wheat was not available even at the rate of two seers to the rupee. Adina Beg Khan prevented the import of corn from Malwa, in order to starve out the Sikhs. This made grain still dearer. This measure hit the poor extremely hard and they left their homes, migrating in all directions and with the will of God the Sikhs grew daily."³

1. Ahmad Shah, 981-82; cf. Sohan Lal, Appendix to Vol. i. 18-19; MacGregor, i. 131-32.

2. Ratan Singh, 425-27; Gyan Singh, 734-35; Shamshir Khalsa, 97,

3. Ali-ud-Din, 119 b.

CHAPTER VIII

ADINA BEG KHAN'S DEATH, CHARACTER AND ACHIEVEMENTS.

Fortune favoured the Sikhs. After Muin, the only capable governor of the Punjab, was Adina Beg Khan. But luckily for the Sikhs, he held office only for five months. In the beginning of September he fell suddenly ill with colic and after suffering for a few days died at Batala on the 15th September, 1758. In accordance with his will his remains were interred by the members of his family at Khanpur in the Jullundur Doab near Hoshiarpur.¹ Adina Beg Khan was not destined to see the autumn of life, but he was lucky even in his death, because the overwhelming forces of Ahmad Shah Abdali, which invaded India one year later and which shattered the Maratha power at the battle of Panipat, would have been first directed against him to punish him for driving Timur Shah from the Punjab.

Adina Beg Khan was bold, determined, cool, clever, prudent and quick in observation—an opportunist who in those chaotic times showed himself equal to any emergency. The greater part of his life was spent in toil, danger and anxiety, yet the ambitious spirit of this wary adventurer could not be crushed.² Sometimes he was cruel. The author of *Ahwal-i-Adina Beg Khan* narrates that one day during a meal he expressed a desire for jam. A servant immediately went to a grocer at Jullundur to procure it. The shopkeeper pretended not to possess it. Adina Beg Khan then handed two rupees to another person for jam to be bought from the same man. He got it and brought it to Adina Beg, who felt so much enraged that he

1. Miskin (182) present in Batala at the time of Adina Beg's death does not give the date of this event. A Marathi letter in S. P. D. ii. 96, dated 7th October, 1758, places it on the 12th Muharram (the 15th September, 1758): Farhat-un-Nazirin in Elliot, viii. 169, assigns 11th Muharram (the 14th September). This does not make much difference, as Adina Beg died about midnight between 11th and 12th Muharram. Khazan-i-Amira, 101, mentions only Muharram, the name of the month. A contemporary Delhi Chronicler in Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani, 359, followed by Sarkar, ii. 77, says that his death took place on the 10th Safar (the 13th October).

The date of the last mentioned authority, however, seems to be wrong. If Adina Beg had died on the 13th October, how could the Marathi letter, dated 7th October, 1758, have stated this event? It appears probable that the news of Adina's death reached the author of Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani, on the 13th October, when the event was recorded by him in his diary.

2. Ghulam Ali, 34, 54, 56; Husain Shah, 41,

condemned the grocer to be boiled alive, as he boiled his own jam. The man was only saved by the intercession of Adina's guests.¹

Nobody can doubt his administrative ability. He governed well at a time when anarchy and confusion were prevailing not only in the Punjab, but also in the whole of the Mughal Empire.² His attention was mainly directed to revenue collection. He did not tolerate any default in this respect. Recalcitrance on the part of landholders was severely punished in order to teach a lesson to others. The villages of defaulters were often plundered and sometimes reduced to ashes. There was then no such thing as land settlement. The *Amil*, or revenue collector, took what he could from the cultivators.

In the department of justice his procedure was no less summary. There were no rules of procedure. Muslim law was applied as a rule, though it could be easily dispensed with and the matter could be decided according to the whim of the Khan. An interesting incident illustrates his methods. One day in Jullundur city, he was passing before the house of a Qazi (Judge of Muslim Law), when he saw a quantity of ground poppy lying outside. He imposed a fine of Rs. 30,000 on the Qazi for breaking the law of the Holy Qur'an.³

In diplomacy and statesmanship he was much above the average. He successfully held the balance between the Delhi Emperor, Ahmad Shah Durrani, the Sikhs and the Marathas. He was always ready to intrigue with any power that appeared likely to prove useful to him. While the fortunes of the other officials rose and fell with the change of government either at Delhi or Lahore, Adina Beg Khan enjoyed an almost permanent position. He played a cautious part

1. Ahwal-i-Adina Beg Khan, 58 b-59 a.

2. Miskin, 157.

“آدینه بیگ خان نویدار دوا به که بصفت عدالت موصوف بود محالات دوا به را از تدبیر بطریق استمرار بعهد
تهدیه بر زمین خود میداشت و پیوسته صوبه دار را از حسن سلوک و نیکو خدمتی و ادای زر سال بسال از خود
راضی میساخت و در تمامی ملک دوا به آنچنان طرح نظم و نسق انداخته بود که احدی در عمل او نایشی و متغی
بر نمی آمد و نشانی از فطاع الطریقان در سرحد او ظاهر نمی گشت و دیگر از اوصاف فراست و فهمیدار و ناکامی بر نگا
که در امور عدالت کسی نظیر و عدیل او نبود“

3. Ahwal-i-Adina Beg Khan, 59 a.

throughout, particularly in his relations with the Lahore Viceroys. He remained obedient so long as the strong and just hand of Zakariya Khan was there. It was after his death that Adina Beg Khan began to display himself in his true colours. He owed allegiance to Yahiya Khan, but turned against him when Shahnawaz Khan invaded Lahore. Similarly, he persuaded Shahnawaz Khan to seek shelter with Ahmad Shah Durrani, and then informed the Delhi Wazir. When the Abdali invaded Lahore, Adina Beg brought about the fall of the young Governor. Having seen the weak resources of the invader with his own eyes, he readily yielded whatever support he could to the Delhi Wazir against Ahmad Shah Abdali in the battle of Manupur. He soon won the confidence of Muin-ul-Mulk, the new Viceroy of the Punjab, but played a tortuous part in the suppression of the Sikhs under his orders, and again during the third Durrani campaign. He openly showed consideration and regard to Muin's widow, the famous Mughlani Begam, but proved the chief instrument in her fall. Afterwards he outwardly submitted to Timur Shah, but privately opposed him and with the help of the Marathas and Sikhs drove him out of the Punjab.

He cleverly used gifts, arms, and favours and often employed a mixture of threat and promise, gratification and persecution, as it suited the circumstances, in order to amuse and subdue the Sikhs. He purchased their favour and service when too weak to coerce them, sought their help by conceding all their demands when he wished to regain the government; and persecuted them when he found himself well established and strong enough to do so.

Adina Beg Khan was clever also in keeping the powerful chiefs of the country under him always in good humour. Chaudhri Johri Mal of Phagwara, the hill rajas, Guru Barbhag Singh of Kartarpur, Raja Ghamand Chand Katoch, Rai Ibrahim Khan of Kapurthala and Raja Ranjit Dev were his great allies¹.

The first thing for an able and resolute man situated like Adina Beg Khan was evidently to maintain and augment his military strength, if he wished successfully to fish in those troubled waters. He possessed a good army, which was quite sufficient to meet the needs of his own government. In cases of emergency he recruited fresh troops temporarily and often hired the services of the Sikhs.

1. *Ibid*, 57 b.

His standing army consisted of 5,000 horse, 9,000 foot, 10,000 horse and foot of levies of the hill jagirdars, 400 messengers, and news writers, 5,000 grass cutters and 5,000 attendants¹.

His income when he was the governor of the Jullundur Doab was 35 lakhs of rupees a year, excluding the gifts and tribute of the hill rajas. His expenditure was greater than his income. To overcome this difficulty he adopted a peculiar plan. He divided his army into two divisions. The services of one-half were retained and the other half was disbanded. After the expiry of six months, the first half was allowed to go home and the second half was kept on active service. In this way he managed to cut down his military expenditure by half².

In spite of this device, he was sometimes faced with a deficit. Once he was in great financial difficulty. He knew that there was a rich Gosain physician in the hills under his jurisdiction. Adina Beg Khan made a tour in that district and encamped near the village of the Gosain. He summoned him to his camp, pretended indisposition and offered him his hand to feel the pulse. The physician found the pulse beating soundly, which indicated no disease. The Gosain told him that he could have any prescription to his taste. Adina Beg informed the physician that he was suffering from inability to pay his troops, that the medicine for his illness was available in the physician's dispensary, and asked him to give it immediately. The Gosain, finding himself in confinement, offered him two dishes full of gold coins and thus secured his release³.

The author of *Ahwal-i-Adina Beg Khan* states that Adina Beg Khan did not marry and hence he had no issue. He further says that about the end of his life he married a beautiful lady who turned out to be of Sayyid caste. Adina Beg divorced her, though he provided her with handsome means to support her⁴. This statement seems to be wrong. The contemporary author of *Tarikh-i-Alamgir Sani*, on p. 260, says that Adina Beg Khan married his daughter to Khwaja Mirza Khan. That Adina Beg Khan had a son is testified by a Marathi letter, which says that the Peshwa, on hearing the death of Adina Beg Khan, and in view of the anarchy

1. *Ibid*, 56 b. (Miskin 167, places the strength of Adina Beg's army at 10,000 horse and foot. But this number was always varying).

2. *Ahwal-i-Adina Beg Khan*, 58 a.

3. *Ibid*, 58 a-b.

4. *Ibid*, 61 b-62 a.

prevailing in the Punjab, sent Dattaji Sindhia from Poona with a strong force to restore order and settle the government. He reached the Sutlej early in April, 1759, and lay encamped at Machhiwara for about three weeks. Adina Beg's son paid him a visit at this place, rendered submission, and paid him some of the arrears of the tribute of his father. He also advised Dattaji Sindhia to take over the administration of the Punjab directly into Maratha hands¹.

Another contemporary writer, the author of *Khazan-i-Amira*, on p. 101, states that on Adina Beg's death the Marathas appointed Adina Beg's widow to the governorship of the Jullundur Doab. Sayyid Ghulam Husain says that Adina Beg Khan left behind him a widow and a son, who fled to Delhi in October, 1759, on the occasion of Ahmad Shah Abdali's invasion².

1. S. P. D., ii. 100; Sarkar, ii. 78.

2. Siyar, iii. 64; Tarikh i-Muzallari, 101 b.

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2. SIYAR.—Siyar-ul-Mutakhirin, Sayyid Ghulam Hussain—1782—Calcutta edition of 1827 cited.—P.P.L. Rieu, i. 280; Ethe, i. 416; E. D. viii. 194 to 198. The author, a Lucknow court noble, was employed by Warren Hastings to compile this work. It is a comprehensive history of India from 1707 to 1782. The work supplies us a detailed account of the Punjab affairs, most of which seems to have been taken from Khazan-i-Amira. Its translations by Mustafa, a French renegade and by Hoey, are not reliable, being replete with numerous mistakes.

3. CHAHAR GULZAR.—Chahar Gulzar Shujai-Harcharandas—1784—P. U. L. Ms.—Rieu, iii. 912; E. D. viii. 204 to 231. The author in service of Shuja-ud-Daulah of Oudh, dedicated this work to his master. In it we find only brief references to the Punjab affairs.

4. TARIKH-I-MUZAFFARI—Muhammad Ali Khan Ansari (nephew of Shakir *cf.* Tazkira-i-Shakir Khan) belonged to a famous literary family of Panipat.—1787—P. U. L. Ms.; Rieu, i. 282; Ethe, i. 423; E. D. viii. 316 to 330. The author deals at length with the gradual decline of the Mughal Empire, giving a detailed account of the rise of the English, Marathas, Sikhs, Afghans and Rohillas. He, however, seems to have made free use of either Khazan-i-Amira or Siyar-ul-Mutakhirin.

5. HUSAIN SHAHI.—Tarikh-i-Husain Shahi—Sayyid Imam-ud-Din Husaini—1798—O. P. L. B. Ms., J. N. S. copy cited—Rieu, iii. 905; Ethe, i. 588. The work is a biography of Ahmad Shah Abdali, but it is not absolutely trustworthy.

6. AHWAL-I-ADINA BEG KHAN.—Anonymous, probably by a Punjabi Hindu—1806—Br. M. Ms., P. U. L. Rotograph cited, also published as an appendix to the Oriental College Magazine, Lahore,

for February, 1938. Rieu, iii. 1044. It is a biography of Adina Beg Khan, consisting of 12 folios of small size. Its language is poor, many words are misspelt, many dates and some details are wrong. It is the only work available on the subject.

7. IMAD-I-SAADAT.—Sayyid Ghulam Ali Rizwi—1807—P.U.S. Ms., lithographed at Lucknow.—Rieu, i. 308; E. D. viii. 394 to 395. The author was in the service of Nawab Saadat Ali Khan. The work is a regular history of the Nawabs of Oudh, but gives a good account of the Punjab events.

8. BAKHTMAL.—Khalsa Namah—Diwan Bakhtmal—1807—Professor Sri Ram of the D. A. V. College, Lahore, kindly lent his copy to me. Rieu, i. 294. It is a detailed history of the Sikhs. Sir John Malcolm used it as one of his authorities in the compilation of "Sketch of the Sikhs."

9. KHUSHWAQT RAI.—Kitab-i-Tarikh-i-Punjab—Khushwaqt Rai—1812—P. P. L. Ms; Rieu, i. 294. The author was the agent and intelligencer of the British Government at Amritsar and compiled this valuable work at the desire of Sir Charles Metcalfe. The narrative comes down to 1811. It is an extremely valuable work on the Sikh history during the 18th century. It was freely consulted by Prinsep for his "Origin of the Sikh Power in the Punjab," by Murray for "Memorial of Captain Murray" and by the anonymous writer of "History of the Punjab and the Rise, Progress, and present condition of the Sect and Nation of the Sikhs, 2 vols., London, Wm. H. Allen & Co., 1846."

10. SOHAN LAL.—Umdat-ut-Twarikh—Sohan Lal Suri—1812—printed at the Arya Press, Lahore, in 1885. The author was the Court chronicler of Maharajah Ranjit Singh, but his early account is based on the records kept by his father Ganpat Rai who had served Ranjit Singh's father and grandfather. It also seems probable that Sohan Lal made a free use of Bakhtmal's Khalsa Namah. It is strange that Appendix to Sohan Lal's vol. i. is an exact copy of Ahmad Shah's Tarikh-i-Punjab, pp. 901 to 1014. *cf.* No. 131, *infra*.

11. IBRAT MIQAL.—Abdul Karim Kashmiri—1816—P. P. L. Ms. The work is a general history of Shah Alam and gives some useful information about the Punjab.

12. IRSHAD-UL-MUSTQIM.—Aman-ul-Haq—1818—P. P. L. Ms. The work is a general history of Islam, India and Nizam of Hyderabad, but many useful details are also available about the Punjab.

13. AHMAD SHAH.—*Tarikh-i-Punjab*—Ahmad Shah of Batala—1820—Dyal Singh Library, Lahore, Ms. It is a detailed history of the Punjab, particularly that of the 18th century. About its pages 901 to 1014 see No. 10, *supra*.

14. TARIKH-I-SALATIN-I-AFGHANAN.—Ahmad Yadgar—1835—P. P. L. Ms.—E. D. v. No. xxxiv. gives a different description of the work. This voluminous work deals with the Afghan families in India and gives a good account of the invasions of Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah.

15. TARIKH-I-AHMAD alias Muharbat-i-Salatin-i-Durrani—Abdul Karim 'Ulwi—1847—printed at the Mustfai Press, Cawnpore in 1847. The author was in the service of the British Government at Ludhiana and was sent on diplomatic mission to Khorasan. The work gives a good account of Abdali's wars with the Sikhs.

16. ALI-UD-DIN.—*Ibrat Namah*—Mufti Ali-ud-Din of Lahore—1854—I. O. L. Ms. No. 3241 (E. 504). P. U. L. Rotograph. The author was in the service of the British Government. The work is a geographical, statistical and historical description of the Punjab, with a detailed account of the 18th century.

17. SHAH YUSAF.—*Halat-i-Multan*—Shah Yusuf—1861—P.O.L. Ms. The author, a resident of Multan, compiled this work, at the desire of Colonel George William Hamilton, Commissioner of Multan Division. It is a history of the Multan province from early times to the date of its composition.

(ii). URDU.

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|------------------------|-----|---------------|
| 1. Shamshir Khalsa | ... | } Gyan Singh. |
| 2. Raj Khalsa, 2 vols. | ... | |

The first gives the history of the Sikhs from 1707 to 1768; while the second treats of individual Sikh chiefs of the 18th century, 1900 edition of *Raj Khalsa* and 1913 edition of *Shamshir Khalsa* are cited.

(iii). GURMUKHI.

1. RATAN SINGH.—*Prachin Panth Parkash*—Ratan Singh Bhangu—about 1830—printed at the Wazir-i-Hind Press, Amritsar in 1914. The author wrote this work at the suggestion of Captain Murray, the British Resident at Ludhiana. It is chiefly a history of the author's family, but all the important events of the Sikh history and the Punjab are woven round his family anecdotes. Ratan Singh is very accurate in dates. Gyani Hira Singh, Editor of the *Phulwari* kindly lent his copy to me.

2. GYAN SINGH.—Panth Parkash—Gyani Gyan Singh—first printed in 1880 at the Murtazwi Press, Delhi. 1923 edition published by Ratan Singh and Jiwan Singh of Amritsar cited. The voluminous work, written in Punjabi poetry, is a complete Sikh history full of minute details about the 18th century events.

3. ITIHAS-I-RAMGARHIYAN.—vol. i, Surat Singh and Darbara Singh—printed at the Empire Press, Lahore, in 1915. The book gives useful information about Jassa Singh Ramgarhia, who was in the service of Adina Beg Khan.

4. KARAM SINGH.—Maharajah Alha Singh—Karam Singh—1918—published by the Chief Khalsa Diwan, Amritsar. The author was a famous Sikh historian and research scholar. The book is based on original sources and is very valuable.

(iv) ENGLISH.

1. FRANCKLIN :—The history of the reign of Shah Aulum, by W. Francklin, London, 1798.

2. M'GREGOR :—History of the Sikhs by W. L. M'Gregor, 2 vols. James Madden, London, 1846.

3. RAJAS of the Punjab, by Lepel. H. Griffin, London, Trubner & Co., 1873.

4. MUHAMMAD LATIF :—A History of the Punjab—by M. Latif, Calcutta, 1891.

5. IMPERIAL GAZETTEER of India, 1908, Punjab, 2 vols.

6. SARKAR.—Fall of the Mughal Empire, 2 vols. by Dr. Sir Jadu Nath Sarkar, published by M. C. Sarkar & Sons, Calcutta, 1932-34.

7. DISTRICT GAZETTEERS of the Gurdaspur, Jullundur and Hoshiarpur Districts. All original editions, unless year is definitely cited.

8. Through the courtesy of Principal Muhammad Shafi of the Oriental College, Lahore, an article on Adina Beg Khan, by Mr. Muhammad Baqir Malik in the Proceedings of the Idara-i-Maarif-i-Islamia, second session, Lahore, 1938, has been brought to my notice. The article in itself is a good attempt on the part of the learned writer, but in its compilation none of the original sources in Persian and Marathi, and few secondary sources in Persian and Urdu, and none of the Gurmukhi works, as referred to by me in the Bibliography, have been consulted by him. Besides, in a short article, he probably could not be expected to sift the evidence and give his own interpretation of the material.

BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS SINDH.

(SEE ANTE, VOL. III, PP. 42—53 AND PP. 131—138; AND VOL. IV, PP. 115—125.)

The London East India Company received its Charter from Queen Elizabeth on the last day of the year 1600. Its early efforts were directed towards the Spice Islands of the Malay Archipelago, where the Dutch had already established a strong foothold. But the mainland of India was not neglected, and as early as 1608 Captain Hawkins landed at Surat on the western coast and visited the Court of Jahangir at Agra. By 1612 an English factory was established at Surat. Connections were established through this factory with Agra and a few other inland centres of trade, whence goods were brought by merchants moving in *kafilas*. It was intended to establish factories among other places, in Sindh and Sir Thomas Roe was sent to the Court of Jahangir in 1615 to secure concessions from the Mughal Emperor. The Portuguese were already doing some trade with Tatta in Sindh and Prince Khurram (later Shah Jahan) under their influence was not in favour of allowing any extension of English trade in that province. Roe therefore had to content himself with whatever concessions he could obtain in Gujerat.¹ The idea of opening trade with Sindh was thus given up for the time being, the Portuguese being left without any European rivals in that part of the country.

In the late twenties of the 17th century a severe famine broke out in Gujerat and provided the English Council at Surat with a serious problem. Although Northern India had not been affected, and supplies of goods might be procured from Agra, it was necessary to look for fresh sources of supply, and these were found in the region of Sindh where indigo and coarse calicoes were manufactured in large quantities and at reasonable prices.²

In 1630, within barely a generation of the institution of the Company, a *firman* was obtained from the Mughal Emperor for trade in Sindh. Asaf Khan, the minister, also gave them a *Parwana*. In 1635 the latter of his own accord sent them another *Parwana*, investing them with such privileges in ports of Sindh "as they enjoyed

1. Sir Thomas Roe was forced to admit that Prince Khurram was all-powerful in the Court at that time and he thought it necessary to conciliate him. Foster, *England's Quest of Eastern Trade*, p. 285.

2. Foster, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

in other ports." Although Gujerat was now beginning to recover, a couple of ships were sent from Surat to Lahribunder,¹ the port of Tatta, situated in the Indus delta.² Hitherto that district had in point of foreign trade been largely a preserve of the Portuguese, yet a convention had been concluded at Goa a little earlier providing for a cessation of hostilities and the admission of the English to the Portuguese harbours.³ This removed all fear of interruption from that quarter. The newcomers went from Lahribunder to Tatta⁴ where they were cordially received by Daulat Khan, the governor of the place, and other officials in view of the *Parwanas* of Asaf Khan, and were allowed to extend their operations throughout the province.⁵

The commerce thus inaugurated continued until 1622, when the factories in Sindh were withdrawn in pursuance of the Company's policy of contracting its trade in Western and Northern India to Surat—a policy that was partly the result of the constant turmoil and insecurity that marked the close of the reign of Shah Jahan and the early years of Aurangzeb⁶. The Daud-potras and Kalhora families began their contest for supremacy in Sindh about the year 1658. This resulted in constant disorders in the country. It was not before 1711 that the Kalhoras were finally established as the rulers of Sindh, but they were soon (1739) subjugated by Nadir Shah, who forced tribute from them. His supremacy over Sindh was passed on to Ahmad Shah and to Shah Zaman, the Durrani rulers of Afghanistan. Locally, however, the Kalhoras continued to rule and were ultimately able to evolve conditions favourable to trade. The idea of establishing a British Factory was again revived, and on the 22nd of September, 1758, Ghulam Shah the Kalhora prince granted a *Parwana* to Mr. Sumption of the Company's service for the establishment of a factory in Sindh. To that permission were added certain immunities and exemptions and the Sindhian officers

1. Or Lahribunder was for long the port of Sindh in general and of Tatta in particular. It was situated on the right bank of the Piti branch of the River Indus, though its exact position is doubtful. The place was then ruled by Rana Jecah, son of Rana Umar. See Foster, *English Factories in India 1634-36*, p. 213.

2. *Ibid.* p. 243, 244.

3. The convention was concluded between President Methwold of the Surat factory and the Portuguese Viceroy at Goa.

4. The City of Tatta is of great antiquity. The "Pattala" of Alexander's time is sometimes identified with this place. It was a prosperous place in the 17th and 18th centuries, but the civil disorders of Sindh affected it adversely. When Burnes saw it in 1831, the city was decaying. See Burnes' "Travels to Bokhara, etc."

5. Foster, *Factories*, p. 127.

6. Foster, *England's Quest of Eastern Trade*, p. 316.

and subjects were generally ordered to allow the English gentleman to carry on trade unmolested. But it was added that "no other Englishman is to have a house or any encouragement." A factory was consequently built at Tatta on the Indus and a commerce, confined to the export of saltpetre and import of woollen clothes, was started. Three years later the same prince issued a further order on the occasion of the arrival at his court of Mr. Erskine as Resident in Sindh for the affairs of the Company. This document ratified previous advantages and excluded all Europeans but the English from trading with Sindh. On the whole Ghulam Shah showed a very friendly disposition towards the servants of the East India Company.

Trade connections thus established continued till 1775, when, owing to the political excitements of Sindh and the discouraging attitude of the new ruler—Sarfaraz Khan—the factory was withdrawn. The struggle between the Talpuras and Kalhoras, which was to end in the final overthrow of the latter in 1783, was going on and the country was rent by civil disorders and revolution.¹

All relations with Sindh thus came to an end, to be revived only after two decades owing to European political developments.

During the last years of the 18th century, Napoleon Bonaparte was supposed to be intriguing with Tippu Sultan of Mysore for an invasion of Hindustan. In August, 1798, there was published in London by one John Fairburn, of 146, The Minories, a coloured map styled as follows :—

*"Fairburn's New Chart exhibiting
The Route of General Bonaparte in the Mediterranean Sea
With the countries through which the French Army
must pass, viz.
Egypt and the Red Sea and the Gulph of Persia
To Mangalore
In the territory of Tippu Sahib in the East Indies."*

(1) After a struggle lasting for about ten years, Mir Fateh Ali Khan of the Talpur family made himself the ruler of Sindh in 1783, and obtained a *firman* from Zaman Shah. But his nephew Mir Sohrab Khan settled at Rohri and his son Mir Tharo Khan removed himself to Shahbandar, where they each possessed themselves of the adjacent country, renouncing the authority of Fateh Ali. Thus the Talpurs were divided into three distinct branches :—

(1) Hyderabad family, descendants of Fateh Ali, ruling in Central Sindh.

(2) Mirpur family, descendants of Mir Tharo, ruling Mirpur.

(3) Khairpur branch governing at Khairpur.

Mir Fateh Ali Khan, head of the Hyderabad family also called the Shahdadpur family, associated with himself, in the government of his part of the province, his three younger brothers. Hence these four Hyderabad princes, who began to rule jointly were called the "*char yar*" or the "four friends."

The British
Renew Relations,
1799.

The rumours about such a campaign were believed to be true and in 1799, Lord Wellesley made an effort (through the Bombay Government) to revive commercial relations with Sindh "with the ostensible object of furthering trade, but in reality to counteract the then highly dangerous and spreading influence of Tippu and the French, and to interrupt the growing ambitions of Zaman Shah, the Cabul monarch¹." Negotiations were, therefore, opened with Fateh Ali Khan, the founder of the Talpur house, through Abdul Hassan, a native agent deputed for the purpose. Fateh Ali and other Amirs gave every assurance of help and encouragement, and consequently Mr. Nathan Crow of the Bombay Civil Service arrived in Sindh with full powers to further the Company's commercial and political interests in Sindh. But the influence of Tippu Sultan and the jealousy of local traders, aided by the anti-British party at Hyderabad (Sindh), overcame the favourable inclination of the ruling Talpur Prince and in 1800 Mr. Crow was peremptorily ordered to quit the country within ten days. The reason given by the Amir for this proceeding was an order from Zaman Shah, which may also be true.² Mr. Crow left Sindh and the British Government quietly pocketed the insult.³

Mr. Crow expelled by the Talpuras in 1800.

In June, 1807, Napoleon concluded the alliance of Tilsit with Alexander I of Russia, one of the details of which was a combined invasion of India by the land route. From that year may be dated the bogey of Russian advance which kept exercising the minds of British statesmen throughout the nineteenth century.

The First Treaty.

To provide against this fresh danger, it was thought necessary to have a barrier between British India and Russia. The conception of such a barrier took the form of an outer and an inner layer of states. The inner layer were to be Lahore, Bahawalpur and Sindh, the outer layer, Kabul, Herat and Persia. Accordingly, three missions, namely those of Metcalfe to Lahore, Elphinstone to Kabul and Malcolm to Tehran were sent by Lord Minto to arrange alliances. Sindh also was not forgotten and a certain Mr. Hankey Smith was sent to arrange a defensive agreement with the Amirs.

1. Postans, *Personal Observations on Sindh*, p. 286.

2. Shah Zaman, who considered the Sindh Amirs as his tributaries, was suspicious of English designs.

3. Napier, p. 38, also Postans, p. 290.

Mr. Smith had a difficult task, because the Amirs assumed a very haughty tone, being encouraged by the previous attitude of the English in suffering quietly the insult to Mr. Crow in 1800. But in the end they entered into a treaty, the first regular treaty with Sindh¹. It was a very brief agreement, consisting of only four articles. It began with the usual professions of eternal friendship and stipulated for the exclusion of the "tribe" of the French from Sindh, and the despatch of agents to each other's court.

This treaty was renewed in 1820 with the addition of some new Articles which excluded the Americans² also and purported to decide some border disputes on the side of Cutch, for the British frontier now touched on Sindh after the final defeat of the Mahratta confederacy in 1818. The Amirs engaged to restrain the Khosas and other predatory tribes from making inroads into Cutch. The Khosas, however, were not restrained till 1825, when the British assembled a force of demonstration in Cutch which had the desired effect. It may, however, be noted that this second treaty with the Amirs could only be enforced by a show of force.

Apart from this the interest of the British Government in Sindh Ranjit Singh and during the twenties was confined mainly to watching Sindh. ing and ascertaining the activities and views of Maharaja Ranjit Singh towards that valley. Ranjit Singh established his first regular connection with that country soon after his conquest of Multan in 1818³. In the beginning there were no regular *Vakils* of either at the other's courts, but there existed an annual interchange of presents and civilities between the Amirs and Ranjit Singh through specially deputed Envoys⁴. In 1823, the Maharaja marched down the Indus from Bakhar with a large force, a portion

1. For full treaty see appendix.

2. Why the Americans should also have been excluded is not quite clear. Two probable explanations occur to me (i) Between 1809—the date of the First treaty and 1820, there had been a war between England and America (1812-14), (ii) Many deserters from the British army in India were in the habit of calling themselves Americans in order to hide their identity. Perhaps it was intended to prevent this thing.

3. By 1820, Ranjit Singh had established his authority in the Punjab and had reached its geographical boundaries. Kashmir in the North, the Derajat and Multan in the west had been conquered. In the south-east he had crossed the Sutlej, which was made his boundary according to the Treaty of Amritsar in 1809. In the north-east the hill chiefs had been humbled and subjugated. Sindh was the only direction in which the territories of the ambitious Sikh monarch could possibly be extended.

4. Wade to Colebrook, August 11, 1828, Book 96, Letter 113 P.G.R. (Punjab Government Records).

of which he detached for collecting tribute from Tank and Bannu. He himself reached as far down as Sultan Shahr, from where he sent Allard and Ventura to Mithankote. The Amirs, alarmed at the progress of the Sikh warrior, sent envoys who accompanied the Maharaja to Lahore. Since that time it became a point of anxious consideration with the Amirs to cultivate the friendship of the Maharaja, and a regular communication ensued between Lahore and Sindh¹.

In the same year (1823), following an adverse decision of the British Government with regard to the Wadni case, Ranjit Singh began to make extensive military preparations and concentrated his forces around Lahore. It was suspected that he entertained hostile designs against the British Government, but Captain Wade, who had succeeded to the office of British Agent at Ludhiana in June of that year, was of opinion that his real object was the conquest of the upper provinces of Sindh and Shikarpur.

The Maharaja's military preparations continued during the year 1824 and 1825 under the guidance of his newly employed French officers. The object of the contemplated expedition was given out to be the punishment of the Billochees who had attacked the Sikh troops near Multan.² The Maharaja's troops marched towards the Chenab in 1825 with the design of seizing Shikarpur, but the occurrence of a scarcity in Sindh induced him to return to Lahore by the end of that year.³

1. 94/15 Wade to Elliott, 24th August, 1823, also 96/113 Wade to Colebrook, 11 August, 1828.

2. 94/11. Wade to Elliot, 7th August, 1823.

Apart from the idea of extending his territories, Ranjit Singh might have had in his mind some idea of gradually seeing his way to the sea coast. None of the writers on Ranjit Singh have mentioned it, but Captain Wade, who was, I think, a very accurate judge where Ranjit Singh is concerned, gives a similar possible explanation in one of his official letters. He wrote, "It is the Raja's design to extend his power to that part of India with a view (perhaps it is hardly chimerical to suppose) of attempting to secure a maritime intercourse in that direction" (94/18, Wade's letter, dated 11th September, 1823).

The Punjab of the nineteenth century was and (is to-day) like Russia before the days of Peter the Great, an inland state. She was shut up in the heart of Northern India as if in a prison. The genius, the craft and the audacity of Ranjit Singh had extended her frontiers in all directions except towards Sutlej, where it had been checked in 1809. It was one of his most cherished ambitions to stretch his frontiers towards Sindh, which would have ultimately led him to the sea, and made the Punjab a maritime power, little knowing that here too he would be checked by the same power.

3. Cunningham, History of the Sikhs.

All these movements were carefully watched without any definite idea of what policy the British Government itself was going to follow towards Sindh. The decade from 1820 to 1830 was, with one minor exception in 1825, marked by what may be called non-interference, coupled with keen watchfulness. From 1825, when Ranjit Singh's army was well organised, until the early years of Lord William Bentinck's period, when the British Government changed its policy of non-interference and developed further interest in Sind in the pursuit of peaceful commercial projects, Ranjit Singh could have attacked Sindh, and probably succeeded in amalgamating a good tract of that country with his own dominions without inviting British protest, let alone British interference. The British were not at this time "interested" in Sindh. Ranjit Singh in fact realised this and even made plans for attacking Sindh, but just at this time there appeared on the Peshawar frontier a formidable foe, the fanatic Syed Ahmad, who required the whole of his attention. Ranjit Singh had provided himself with an excuse in 1826, when he demanded from the envoys of the Amir at his court the tribute which the latter had been paying to the Afghan Government. His argument was that since the dismemberment of the Kingdom of Kabul he had acquired the greatest share of its authority and had succeeded to its rights. This claim is practically similar to that previously put forth by the British in the case of the Cis-Sutlej territory when they declared themselves the successors of the Marhattas.¹ But the envoys of Sindh Amirs disputed the claim of Ranjit Singh, who did not press it any further² because of the new danger in the direction of Peshawar.

Though the Syed was finally defeated and killed by Kanwar Sher Singh in 1831, he had indirectly saved Sindh from falling into the hands of the "infidels." In 1831 when his hands were free, the Maharaja found that a change had come over his English allies in their attitude towards Sindh. This, among other matters, led him to suspend his contemplated measures for a period of three or four years.

Let us therefore briefly examine the circumstances that were changing the policy of the British Government and making them desirous of interfering in the countries on and beyond the Indus.

1. See Metcalfe's correspondence; P.G.R., 5/35, dated 12-12-1808.

"By the issue of a war with the Marhattas, the British Government became possessed of the power and right formerly exercised by that nation in the North of Hindustan" (Metcalfe's note to Ranjit Singh).

2. 137/8, Wade to Prinsep.

The decay of Turkish power in the eighteenth century had laid Treaty of Tehran, Persia open to Russian attack. In the beginning 1812. of the nineteenth century the Persians had sought and obtained the alliance of the British Government in 1812 after having been disappointed by Napoleon who, in spite of the Treaty of Finkenstein (1807), by which he had guaranteed the integrity of Persia, had even refused to mediate for the Shah. In 1826 there was war between the Persians and Russians and the former, remembering that they had a treaty with the British, appealed for help. Canning, the then Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who was co-operating with the Russians in the Greek question in Europe, could not go to war with them in Persia and therefore got rid of the treaty obligations by paying the Shah a moderate subsidy. The Persians were defeated and had to make cessions of territory to the Russians. From this date (1828) they began to lean towards an alliance with Russia. Wishing to push still more eastwards, the Russians advised and encouraged the Persians to expand in that direction. Herein lay a great danger for the British. To counteract and check the influence of Russia through Persia in the countries to the east of the latter was considered essential for maintaining the stability of the British power in India. It was therefore decided to acquire some knowledge of the possibilities of military movements through these countries and to learn the geographical conditions of the continental approach to India. Though outwardly nothing definite had been said or done about the matter, yet there was a general belief among the people that the British Government was interested in the countries beyond the Indus. Lord Ellenborough, President of the Board of Control, decided in 1831 to send Alexander Burnes to explore the River Indus, ascertain its commercial possibilities and reach Lahore. From here he was again, in his private capacity, though with the full approval and financial assistance of Government, to proceed to Kabul and Bukhara. A pretext for going up the Indus was found in the fact that King William IV had sent some dray horses for Ranjit Singh and they had to be conveyed to Lahore by water¹. The real purpose was the

1. The presents consisted of one dray horse, four dray mares and a carriage, added to the presents at Bombay. Prinsep to Resident Delhi January 5, 1831, P.G.R., 115/111.

collection of political and geographical information¹.

The journey of Burnes aroused natural suspicions in the minds of the Amirs, who put every obstacle in his way. Burnes reached Mandavi, on the 18th January, 1831. From here the expedition finally sailed for the Indus, and got into Sindh in five days. Here he met with such uncivil treatment from the local authorities that he was obliged to come back³. He started a second time on February 10, but his fleet was dispersed by a violent gale, and two of his four boats receded to Mandavi. The Amirs had been earnestly requested by the Bombay Government and by the Resident in Bhoj to give Burnes and his party a safe escort through their territories, and it was not expected that "so moderate a request" would be refused, especially when they had been informed that there was not one armed man with the mission⁴. But the Amirs were very suspicious, and considered, in their ignorant way that the large cases with Burnes contained "some mysterious power which was to overturn all opposition and take the country by force whenever required⁵." They, however, put forth a very plausible excuse. They dilated upon the difficulty of the navigation and of the distracted state of the country between Sindh and Lahore. They therefore finally refused a passage. As a result, Col. Pottinger opened a correspondence with the Amirs on February 23, and tried to overcome their repugnance to Burnes' mission. The task was however not easy and by the first

1. "The authorities both in India and England contemplated that much information of a political and geographical nature could be acquired in such a journey." Burnes' Travels, p.1. Compare also Murray's report completed by Prinsep, p. 153. (Cal. 1834). Lt. Burnes was given his final instructions in a secret letter from the Chief Secretary at Bombay, in which he was informed that "the depth of water in the Indus, the direction and breadth of the stream, facilities for stream navigation, the supply of fuel on its banks, and the condition of the princes and people who possess the country bordering on it are all points of the highest interest to government" (Burnes Travels, p. 4).

2. Lt. A. Burnes was the Assistant to Col. Pottinger, who was in political charge of Kuchh and of the British relations with Sindh. He had been in the Quarter-Master General's Department and was thus eminently qualified for the purpose. He was accompanied by Ensign Lackie, who was to take charge in case of anything happening to Lt. Burnes. No troops were sent so as not to alarm the Amirs of Sindh. Prinsep, p. 154.

3. P. G. R., 115/106. (From Pottinger Resident in Bhoj to Prinsep, February 24, 1831.) See also Burnes' Travels, second edition, chapters I and II, where a detailed account of the obstacles is given. Compare also Prinsep pp. 155-7.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Postans, "Observations on Sindh," p. 298.

week of March nothing was decided¹. It was therefore suggested that the horses might be despatched next cold weather by land.

Captain Wade was asked to explain the delay to Ranjit Singh as best he could². When the Maharaja learnt it, he remonstrated with the envoys of the Amirs³, who in reply told him that the coming of Burnes was a mere pretext and that the carriage which he was bringing was full of gold *Mohurs* for the purpose of being given to Syed Ahmad, the Maharaja's enemy, and that the Amirs had decided to collect a lakh of men and dispute his passage⁴. This, however, failed to excite any suspicion in the Maharaja's mind. He ordered M. Ventura to make a demonstration from the frontier of Dera Ghazi Khan. It was chiefly due to this remonstrance that the Amirs were induced to allow Lt. Burnes to pass⁵ and the horses reached Lahore in the same year on 17th July. Ranjit Singh's action here seem to have been prompted by personal motives. The presents were meant for him, and it was as much his insult as that of the British Government if they were not allowed to reach him. Secondly, he probably feared that if the Amirs persisted in refusing a passage, the British might take offence, resulting in his being forestalled in Sindh by them. In fact he asked Jacquemont, the French traveller, who was at his court then: "It is said that the Sindhis have refused to allow Burnes to pass with the horses. If that is true, what will the British do?"⁶ Ranjit Singh was anxious to know what they would do and to avert a breach between the two powers so that the field be left clear for himself. As already remarked, his efforts were fruitful, as the Amirs, fearing to precipitate an invasion of their country by the Sikhs, allowed the mission to proceed up the river. Amir Murad Ali of Hyderabad explained to the Maharaja that he had stopped

1. Prinsep, p. 156.

2. Prinsep to Wade, 10th March, 1831. Also Wade's Narrative, p. 71.

3. The three principal Chiefs of Sindh, namely the Amirs of Hyderabad, Khyrpur, and Mirpur, all had one agent each attending the Court of Ranjit Singh 137/12 Wade to Prinsep, 23rd May, 1831.

4. P. G. R. 137/4, Wade to Prinsep enclosure No. 1, being a letter from Ranjit Singh to Lala Kishen Chand his Agent at Ludhiana.

5. Wade to Prinsep, 21st May, 1831, 137/10 P. G. R. Prinsep in "Ranjit Singh" suggests that it was a strong letter of Pottinger that induced them to allow Burnes to pass. Prinsep, p. 156. But I think it was the result of Ventura's demonstration. Nothing else can explain the sudden change in the attitude of the Amirs and the cordial reception of Burnes in the Durbar of Hyderabad. After this demonstration he was given all facilities, and met with absolutely no difficulties. See Burnes Travels, Wade's letter quoted above and Prinsep p. 160.

6. "Social and Political Hindustan," Part I, Section I, P. G. R. Office Publications, Monograph No. 18.

Burnes because in the treaty between his government and the British it had been stipulated that no European should enter the Sindhian territory and no Bilochi should enter the territory of the British; that Burnes came from Bhooj by sea without permission and was therefore stopped and that later, when it was learnt that he was the bearer of some letters and presents for the Maharaja, he was allowed to pass and all facilities were provided.¹ Burnes had no further difficulties and was very well received at Bahawalpur and other places in the territories of the Sikhs and the Nawab.²

Burnes thus reached Lahore and the Indus became known. But to quote Major William Napier, "it is remarkable that the strong natural sense of two ignorant men should have led them separately to predict the ultimate consequences.

"The mischief is done you have seen our country," cried a rude Bilochi soldier when Burnes first entered the river.

"Alas! Sindh is now gone, since the English have seen the river, which is the high road to its conquest!" was the prescient observation of a Syed near Tatta.³ Eleven years later the prophecy came true.

As already mentioned, Ranjit Singh was, just at this time, anxious to know the intentions of the British Government regarding Sindh, and Burnes' mission, in spite of its friendly character, could not have failed to arouse his suspicion. He had already asked Jacquemont regarding the views of the British Government towards that country and when Wade visited him at Adinanagar, the same year, he tried to elicit information from him also. While both drank together, the Maharaja recalled what he had asked Sir David Ochterlony, *viz.*, whether the Company was anxious to extend its territory and his reply "No, the Company is satiated." He inquired of Wade whether that was still the case?⁴

By the defeat and death of Syed Ahmad Ranjit Singh's hands were now free and it was expected that with a large and disposable army impatient of repose, it would not be long before he directed

1. P. G. R. B. 137, L. 12, being translation of a letter sent by Amir Murad Ali of Hyderabad to Darvesh Mohammad Khan, his agent with Ranjit Singh.

2. P. G. R. 115/85 Burnes to Resident, Delhi, 6th June, 1831. Reports the hospitable reception by the Nawab and writes, "His liberality has amounted to munificence and his hospitality quite exceeds all bounds."

3. Conquest of Sindh W. Napier, p. 38, 39. Compare also Burnes' Travels,

4. P. G. R. 137/13. Wade to Prinsep, May 25, 1831.

their operations to a new quarter¹. From Peshawar along the right bank of the Indus to the frontier of Sindh the country was already subjected to his power. Westward to that line of territory the poverty of the country and the hardy character of the people offered no temptation, and it was only in the direction of Shikarpur that he was likely to lead his troops². He had frankly confessed that he had no love for mere territory, if the acquisition of it did not bring him wealth. In 1830, he had said to Jacquemont, "What would be the good of my taking Tibet. It is rich countries that I want; could I not take Sindh? It is said to be very rich. But what would the British say?" After the defeat of Syed Ahmad, the subject was uppermost in his mind. Consequently in October, 1831, he seems to have made some proposal, or hinted at one, of a joint British and Sikh expedition against Sindh, for on the 19th of that month Captain Wade, the British Political Agent, who was escorting the Maharaja from Amritsar to Ropar, and in whom the Maharaja placed the utmost confidence, wrote to his Government from Amritsar that before any negotiations were started with Sindh, it would be desirable to secure the co-operation of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, who exercised great influence in the Courts of the Amirs and who was desirous of acting in concert with the British Government.³ Then again in the meeting at Ropar, the Maharaja definitely proposed that the British should join him in a common expedition against the Sindhians⁴ much in the same way that the Russian Czar proposed to England the partition of the Ottoman Empire nine years later. Failing this, he sought their neutrality in case he attacked the Amirs, who had detained Burnes. No definite answer was given to him, except that he could remonstrate with the Sindh Amirs, who were then present in his camp. No notice was taken by the Governor-General of the hints he gave of the riches, the weakness and insolence of the Amirs.⁵

1. 137/80, Wade to Prinsep.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Part I, Section I, Monograph No. 18. P. G. R. O. Publications.

4. 137/34, 19th October, 1831, Wade to Prinsep.

5. Hugel, *Travels in Kashmir and the Punjab*, p. 408.

6. *Ibid.* Compare also Murray's Ranjit Singh (Comp. Prinsep), p. 167:—

"He then made allusions to the Meers having sent back Lt. Burnes and to their general character for haughtiness. It appeared evident that the Maharaja had learned or at least suspected that the British Government had some further views in respect to Sindh; also that nothing would be more gratifying to him than to be invited to co-operate in an attack upon that state."

OPENING OF THE NAVIGATION OF THE INDUS AND THE SUTLEJ

Ranjit Singh's proposals to be allowed to extend his influence towards Sindh were naturally not received with indifference, for the British Government had views of its own in that direction; not that the British Government's immediate object was the conquest of Sindh; but as a consequence of the reports which Burnes drew up of the Indus and the surrounding countries, it was decided to open that river and the Sutlej to commercial navigation. It was considered that Indus, in the possession of the Amirs, offered every facility which could be desired for transporting the commerce coming from the sea as well as from the great land route to Shikarpur, which was then the great emporium of the Western trade, and through which also *via* Kandhar, one of the principal routes is to be found for an invasion of India.¹

That the motive of the British was not purely commercial is evident from the following extract from a letter of Government to Lt.-Col. Pottinger, resident in Cutch. This extract also shows that the fear of Russian influence did not originate altogether from Calcutta, but was partly inspired by London:—"The Secret Committee of the Court of Directors have expressed great anxiety to obtain the free navigation of the Indus with a view to the advantages that must result from *substituting our influence for that derived by Russia* through her commercial intercourse with Bokhara and the countries lying between Hindustan and the Caspian Sea, as well as because of the great facilities afforded by this river for the disposal of the produce (and) manufacture of the British Dominions both in Europe and in India²".

One of the motives was, therefore, clearly that of "substituting our influence for that derived by Russia." Ranjit Singh, however, was not to be told about this, and a little later Captain Wade was directed by the Governor-General to remove from the Maharaja's mind "any suspicion that the British Government under the cloak of commercial objects was desirous of extending its influence³".

1. P. G. R., 98/181.

2. P. G. R., 98/181, Government to Pottinger.

3. Compare also Prinsep's Ranjit Singh, p. 168:—

"It was not thought advisable to make any communication yet to the ruler of Lahore; for it was conceived that, if made aware of the intentions of the British Government, he might, with every profession of a desire to forward them, continue by intrigue and secret working to counteract the negotiations."

It is a significant fact that the above letter to Pottinger, ordering him to open negotiations with the Sindh Amirs, was written from Ropar, where the Maharaja was going to meet the Governor-General and to make a proposal for a joint expeditions against that country. The Maharaja was evidently too late; for during the period that he was occupied with Syed Ahmad, the views of the British Government had changed, and they were now "interested" in Sindh. It was recognised by the Governor-General that this scheme would be viewed with disfavour by Ranjit Singh "inasmuch as he may think that it will connect our interests and power with those of Sindh and thus create an obstacle to his designs of future aggression upon the Amirs, a design which he frankly acknowledged to Lt. Burnes."¹ At the same time, it is probable that Ranjit Singh's own anxiety with regard to Sindh might have precipitated the decision to negotiate with the Amirs for opening up the navigation of the Indus.

The Government's argument in their letter to Lt.-Col. Pottinger may be summed up as follows :

"Lt. Burnes finds the Indus very much suitable for commercial navigation. The causes of the departure of commerce from the Indus and its tributaries are therefore political. These obstacles can be removed through the mediation of the British Government. The Indus from the ocean to its point of junction with the united stream of the Punjab rivers runs exclusively within the territories of (1) Amir Murad Ali Khan having his capital at Hyderabad and (2) Rustum Ali Khan, the second in rank and having his capital at Khyrpur (north of Hyderabad) possessing both banks from Shwan to the northern extremity of Sindh. The Indus north of this point, together with the rivers of the Punjab excepting the Sutlej, was, with the intervention of a small tract, in the possession of the Daoodputras (of Bahawalpur) and governed by Bahawal Khan under the dominion of Ranjit Singh. Of the Sutlej Ranjit Singh held the right bank, and the left was occupied by the British, the Nawab of Bahawalpur and the Protected Sikh States. No difficulty was expected either from Ranjit Singh or Bahawal Khan or the Protected States with regard to the Indus and the Sutlej running through their respective territories. The greatest difficulty was with regard to Sindh. And here too, the difficulty lay only with one of the Amirs, namely with Amir Murad Ali of Hyderabad. The Amir

of Khyrpur was, according to Burnes, very friendly and was expected to agree at once. The Mir of Mirpur (lying towards Kachh whose territory however did not border on the Indus) had also expressed a desire to place himself under the British protection. Both these Amirs were afraid of Ranjit's encroachments and wished to be protected by the British Government¹. Lord William Bentinck, however, refused the protection². But the Amir of Hyderabad who controlled the mouths of the Indus was rather difficult. He was at this time negotiating for the marriage of his son with a Princess of Persia and felt rather proud. It was felt by the British Indian Government that this matrimonial alliance may have been suggested by Russia with a view to a future political alliance and to the establishment of an immediate relationship through Persia with an Indian State, by means of which, whether for intrigue or for actual attack, a ready access would be afforded to our Indian Empire³. But Mr. Campbell, the British Envoy at Tehran, did not agree with this view, for he felt the Shah of Persia would never "under any pretext or consideration lend himself to further the designs of that power (*i.e.*, Russia) for whom he entertains a just and deeply rooted hatred⁴".

The Prince Royal of Persia, who was then overrunning Khurasan and whose movements were causing alarm to the Government of India, was no doubt doing so under the guidance of Russia; but his real object was, first, to get rid of the payment of the last instalment of one crore of the indemnity by manifesting a compliance with the desire of the Autocrat, who had promised to write off that sum if the Prince Royal acted as desired by Russia; second, to establish his own (Prince Royal's) authority over Khurasan as soon as the first object was gained, rather than to allow Russia to extend its influence⁵.

Mr. Campbell was, however, quite convinced that it is to the interests of British Government to avert an alliance between Persia and Sindh, "since the Amir can by such an alliance only seek to protect himself against us, and may at some future period solicit the

1. At this time Ventura resumed every place west of the Indus hitherto farmed by Bahawal Khan from Ranjit Singh, thus bringing the Maharaja's direct authority in immediate contact with the territory of Mir Rustum Khan of Khyrpur and making him still more desirous of forming an alliance with the British Government (P. G. R. 137/32 Wade to Prinsep). Compare also Murray's Ranjit Singh, p. 157. The Amir sent a letter to the G. G. through Burnes.

2. See Wade's narrative p. 35. The request was conveyed through Capt. Burnes.

3. Governor-General to Pottinger. P. G. R. 98/181.

4. The Envoy in Persia to Government of India 4th December P. G. R. 116/13 Macnaghten to Wade.

5. *Ibid.*

interference of Persia is any measure that unforeseen events may compel us to adopt in regard to Sindh¹".

The negotiation entrusted to Pottinger was therefore virtually confined to the Amir of Hyderabad, who was supposed to consider his security as better effected by the exclusion of all foreigners from his territory and was therefore expected to reject the proposition for navigation of the Indus. The question then would arise (in the words of the despatch to Pottinger) "whether he or any other state possessing only a portion of a stream has a right, either by prohibition or what is tantamount to it, by the imposition of excessive duties, or by a connivance at a system of plunder by his subjects on the trader, to deprive all other people and states of an advantage which nature has given to all." And again, "Has this Chief alone the right to seal hermetically its (Indus) mouths, to arrogate the sole and exclusive dominion of its navigation and to deny the right of an innocent use and passage of this great natural channel of commercial intercourse". In this respect the principles of International Law must be explained to the Amir. The following passage taken from Vattel (p. 120, § 292) upon the right to passage through straits connecting two seas was quoted in the letter for the Resident's guidance :

"It must be remembered with regard to the straits that when they serve for a communication between two seas, the navigation of which is common to all or to many nations, he who possesses the strait cannot refuse others a passage through it, provided that passage be innocent and attended with no danger to the state. Such a refusal without just reason would deprive these nations of an advantage granted them by nature; and indeed the right of passage is a reminder of the primitive liberty enjoyed in common. Nothing but the care of his own safety can authorise the master of the strait to make use of certain precautions and to require the formalities commonly established by the custom of nations. He has a right to levy small duties on vessels that pass, on account of the inconvenience they give him by obliging him to be on his guard, by the security provided them in protecting them from enemies and keeping pirates at a distance, and the expense he is at in maintaining light houses, sea marks and other things necessary to the safety of the mariners . . ." In addition to the principles and practice of international law, Pottinger was instructed to explain to the Amir, the benefits he

1. *Ibid.*

would derive by an increase of trade in his country. If all these representations and arguments fell on deaf ears, Pottinger was authorised to declare "strongly and decidedly" the right possessed by the British Government and by all other states situated and bordering upon the many streams which concentrated in the Indus. But "nothing like menace" was to accompany this declaration.

If, instead of accepting the just demand the Amir puts some conditions for its acceptance, *e. g.*, the acknowledgment of Hyderabad as an independent state, or a defensive alliance against Ranjit Singh and the Afghans, or perhaps an annual pecuniary payment, he should be told that "when there exists a natural right and the power to enforce it, both justice and reason reject all title to concession or compensation in return."

There is no doubt that a natural right existed and in 1831, no one would have denied the justice of the British Government's claims. But the Amirs had always been suspicious, and with that faculty of instinct which characterises animals and human beings in the lower grade of civilisation, they had foreseen that the independence of their country was gone since the English had seen the river. The English were now demanding use of the Indus for commercial purposes. Who knows when they may begin to use it for military purposes? Two hundred years back they had come to India as mere traders with absolutely no intention of conquering lands, but they were now masters from Fort William to the banks of Jumna. Nearer home they were touching the Sindh frontier on more than one side. The approach of the inevitable John Bull was already casting its shadow on Northern India, and they feared that Sindh might fall under his sway any moment.

THE AMIRS ALARMED

Pottinger went to Sindh and started his negotiations. The Amirs, who were suspicious that he had ulterior designs, began to invite Shah Shuja, who was then at Ludhiana negotiating with Ranjit Singh, for help to recover his long lost kingdom. They also sent letters to the Barakzai brothers of Kabul intimating their willingness to pay all arrears of tribute, if they would only avert the threatened invasion of the English.¹

The Maharaja came back from the Ropar meeting quite satisfied in other respects, but disappointed in the matter of Sindh. Soon

1. Mackeson to Wade, 105.

afterwards Capt. Wade was ordered to go to Lahore and to explain the objects which the Governor-General had in view in deputing Pottinger to Sindh. He was to "remove from the Maharaja's mind any suspicions that the British Government under the cloak of commercial objects is desirous of extending its influence and prosecuting views different from those stated in the letter of the Governor-General to His Highness' address.¹ The letter to Ranjit Singh gave the following objects for the new scheme.²

1. A desire on the part of the Governor-General to promote the interests of the Maharaja by an improvement of the means of intercourse between His Highness' territories and those of the British Government by the route of the Indus.

2. They make the rivers Indus and Sutlej a channel for commerce thus making the Punjab as accessible to the merchants, and travellers of Southern India and other countries as if it were situated on the seashore."

Ranjit Singh was not satisfied. He felt that if an active commercial intercourse was established on the Indus, he might be required to give up his designs towards Shikarpur. He maintained that according to the relations subsisting between the two powers (based on the Treaty of Amritsar, 1809) he could only be checked on the left bank of the Sutlej, and that river according to him, ended at the place where it merged into the Indus. Therefore Shikarpur, or any other portion of Sindh for the matter of that, was not comprehended by the terms of the treaty. Early in 1832, he therefore wrote back in answer to the Governor-General's letters that he was willing to co-operate in the opening of the navigation of the Indus, but he hoped that nothing would be done to disturb the treaty.³ He clearly seems to have meant that he should not be required to enter into any fresh stipulation tending to take away from him the right which he had under the treaty of 1809, to do as he pleased in territories other than those situated on the left bank of the Sutlej. But Captain Wade, who was sent to reassure him, was able to set his doubt at rest and after some further negotiations, wherein he showed some anxiety to be assured of the advantages which the Lahore State

1. 115/102 Prinsep to Wade, 19th December, 1831.

2. Enclosure to 115/102.

3. 138/4 Undated being translation of a letter from Ranjit Singh to the Governor-General.

would derive from an opening of the rivers to navigation,¹ he entered into what is termed the "Indus Navigation Treaty of 1832."

The Nawab of Bahawalpur, whom also Wade had been sent to approach personally, agreed to the opening of the navigation of the Sutlej and wished the matter to be settled by a treaty². After some further negotiations a treaty was concluded with the Nawab of Bahawalpur also³. In Sindh Lt.-Col. Pottinger met with success. He sent intimation to the Amirs that he had been commissioned by the Governor-General to negotiate with them on important matters and asked for permission to proceed to Hyderabad for the purpose. This having been granted, he arrived at that place in February, 1832. He immediately opened negotiations and declared his purpose. Protracted negotiations followed, but ultimately separate treaties were concluded with the Amirs of Hyderabad and Khyrpur in April, 1832. The treaties consisted of seven and four articles, respectively, in which the Amirs agreed to allow the use of the Indus and the roads of Sindh to the merchants of Hindustan. The most important article of these treaties was Article three of the Treaty with Hyderabad (which also applied to Khyrpur) in which were set down the three conditions on which the Amirs agreed to allow the use of the river and roads of their country. This, it may be remembered, was the article which Lord Auckland ignored in 1838. The three conditions agreed upon were:—

- (i) That no person shall bring any description of military stores by the above river or roads ;
- (ii) That no armed vessel or boats shall come by the said river and
- (iii) That no English merchant shall settle in Sindh.

The arrangements as finally settled were these :—

The lower part of the Indus and the whole of the Sutlej were thrown open to commercial navigation. A British Agent to watch over the trade of these two rivers was stationed at Mithankote on account of its nearness to that spot at which the territories of the powers, Sindh, Punjab and Bahawalpur met each other, and the united rivers of the Punjab joined the Indus. The idea of a tariff on goods was given up and a fixed toll of so much per boat, what-

1. 138/32, 23rd July 1832, Wade to Macnaughten.

2. 138/37, Wade to Macnaughten August, 1832. Also 116/28, Macnaughten to Wade 19th September, 1832.

3. See 105/17, July 14th, 1833, Mackeson to Government, dated 25th February, 1833.

ever the nature of its cargo, was decided upon. From the Himalayas, or more strictly from Ropar to the sea the toll was fixed at Rs. 570 per boat.

The toll was calculated at Rs. 19 per Kharrar and all the boats were to be considered of 30 Kharrar each, thus doing away with all disputes regarding their size, etc.¹ The share of the various states was fixed as follows :—

1. The Sindh Amirs :		
(a) Mir of Hyderabad	... Rs. 160-0-0	} Rs. 240-0
(b) Mir of Khayrpur	... Rs. 80-0-0	
2. The Lahore State :		
(a) For territories on the right bank of the Sutlej	Rs. 154-4-0	
(b) For territories on the Left Bank of the Sutlej	Rs. 39-5-1	
		193-9-1
3. The British Government and Bahawal Khan	... 136-6-11	
	Total ...	570-0-0

The toll was to be levied only at the following three places : —

- (i) Mouth of the Indus.
- (ii) Mithankote (near the junction of the Punjab rivers with Indus)
- (iii) Harike (near Ferozepore)

At each of these three places, a British Agent, though not a European, except at Mithankote, was stationed to watch over the trade². Arrangements were made to suppress the predatory habits of the tribes living on the banks of the Sutlej, especially near Pakpattan ;³ and the right of searching boats on intermediate *ghats* was not allowed, though the Nawab of Bahawalpur was keen on it for some time⁴. The inland duties on cargo that was unloaded on any intermediate *ghats* was left to the discretion of the authorities of the state to which the cargo went for sale. The trade on the Indus and Sutlej was thus started, though it was never very flourishing.

Under these circumstances Ranjit Singh gave up for the time being, his project to seize Shikarpur as it would disturb the trade and annoy the British ; but he did not conceal from Captain Wade the opinion that the commercial measures of the English had really abridged his political power.

P. N. KHERA.

1. 105/42, Mr. Pottinger to Trevelyan, 14th May, 1934, P. G. R.
 2. At Mithankote Lt. Mackeson was stationed. The Court of Directors approved of these arrangements. See Ct. of Drs. to G. G., 20th September, 1837.
 3. Book 99, Letter 12, P. G. R.
 4. Mackeson to Wade 105/17, P. G. R. 14th July, 1833.

THE PANJAB AND THE RECAPTURE OF DELHI, 1857.

Delhi was the political pivot of the crisis of 1857. Centrally situated, it had been through centuries the imperial capital of Hindustan. During the crisis the presence there of the last Moghul Emperor had afforded the rebels a rallying-point. A mysterious halo had been woven round the occupation of the city—as a symbol of military and political supremacy—in the minds of many people. So long as it remained in the hands of the mutineers the last flicker of the phantom Empire would provoke further disturbances in the country. The strategical, fortified position of the city, with its vast commercial wealth, large stores of arms and ammunition in the magazine and the growing swarm of rebels pouring into it, would render its recapture more difficult in proportion to the delay in its assault.

In the words of Sir John Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of the Panjab, “the prestige of the Empire had come to devolve on Delhi,” and a speedy and crushing assault on the seat of rebellion alone “would determine the issue.” This fundamental fact appears to have dominated his mind from the moment that the news of the outbreak had been received in the Panjab. In almost every despatch he untiringly urged upon the Governor-General at Calcutta and the Commander-in-Chief at Ambala the supreme necessity of an early assault on Delhi.*

In asking time and again for prompt and vigorous action in that direction the Chief Commissioner laboured under no hallucination, nor did he suffer from the generally attributed excessive Imperial zeal. He appeared to have clearly realised that under the circumstances the abstract discrimination between the Imperial and provincial issues involved in the crisis was injudicious. Instead of cherishing the vain solace that the “part” had been preserved even at the expense of the whole, he made the wise choice to use the “part,” inasmuch as its own safety had been fairly assured, to save the whole. The caution advised by some of his eminent subordinates was inconceivable to Sir John Lawrence. Isolation, however he might hold his own in the province for the

* In almost all the successive official communiqués of narrative of events in the province the Chief Commissioner sought to bring home the urgency of the fall of Delhi. Particularly Nos. 55—60 ring with this note.

time being, would only have exposed him to greater dangers. From the practical point of view the Panjab policy of Sir John Lawrence, in short, appears to be wise and expedient.

Wild infection rampant at the very door of the province was spreading unchecked. Judging from the nature of the disaffection, which had its origin in native sentiments and susceptibilities, there was little to speculate about the fate of the Panjab. Every day of delay in the recapture of Delhi was seriously undermining the chances of the recovery of the British cause in India. The continued holding of the city by the mutineers had prompted risings on a still larger scale in various parts of the country. In the Panjab the provocation offered by the manifest weakness of the Company at the very centre of its Indian dominions—Delhi—would have been irresistible to the tribes on the frontier. Even the nomadic races of Hazara and Derajats, with their innate proclivities, would have utilised the rare opportunity for pillage and plunder. Delhi served as the political index for the people at large. If Delhi had been allowed to be held any longer by the rebels, as already it had been held too long, the situation would have passed beyond control. In the Panjab a general rising might have been expected and the Chief Commissioner would have had all the odds against him. Symptoms of daily increasing contamination were not wanting. An earnest bid for power and prestige at Delhi would alone cure the malady at its heart. All else was anodyne. This epitomised the lucid views of the Chief Commissioner on the inextricable problem of the Panjab and Delhi. The dominant note ran throughout his voluminous official correspondence during the four months the crisis lasted until Delhi ultimately fell on 21st September, 1857.

First in initiative, Sir John Lawrence was foremost in organising the assault on the Imperial city. He was prepared to set it on foot alone,* in case the Calcutta authorities regretted their inability to undertake it until reinforcements had arrived from abroad. The Commander-in-Chief, too, apparently under similar considerations appeared to procrastinate. The Chief Commissioner had persistently

* Reinforcement for Delhi appears to be, throughout the superhuman exertions, his one and the only idea and concern. The numbers quoted bear ample testimony to the fact.

No. 339, July 18, 1857; and the answer to the same of July 22, 1857.

No. 340, July 17, 1857.

No. 346, July 22, 1857; *Treasure for Delhi*.

urged on the Central Government to expedite the step. Every despatch to the Commander-in-Chief emphasised the necessity and called for the earliest action. For removing the only stumbling block, providing adequate resources in men and money against the overwhelming odds gathered in the city, the "Panjab Chief" stood guarantee by himself, rather than brook any further delay.*

To most superficial observers, as to some of his own eminent subordinates, the Chief Commissioner appeared in an affair not essentially his own more concerned indeed than the authorities on the spot themselves. This view, in its bearing on the Peshawar Valley controversy, found vigorous expression in Edwardes and others at Peshawar. "Anchor Hardy, anchor, Delhi is not India. Do not be sucked to death by inches." This was a sufficiently strong warning against Sir John Lawrence's supposed recklessness.

Admittedly he had, in his zeal for the recovery of Delhi, strained his resources to the utmost. But to Sir John Lawrence the sacrifice of Delhi was far more than the loss of a single insignificant station. The stake involved in prestige and power, vital for the preservation of the Empire, could hardly be measured in abstract arguments. However imperative the safety of the province committed to his charge, it was inconceivable to the mind of Sir John Lawrence as an end in itself. When the initial need of keeping a strong hold on affairs and of meeting emergencies as they arose—had been reasonably satisfied, all resources were to be utilised to serve the greater end—the safety of the Empire. The recapture of Delhi, amply justified by his breadth and acuteness of perception, was achieved by his vitality of action.

The task of organising an assault exclusively from the Panjab resources presented formidable difficulties. The overwhelming numbers of mutineers shut up in the fortified city were equipped with vast wealth and materials of war. But once determined on the point, Sir John Lawrence would not see it suffer on account of inaction or lack of resources. Writing to H. Greathead he said:

* No. 141, August 27, 1857. Jammu contingent for Delhi.

No. 72, September 13, 1857. Jhind contingent.

No. 121, September 17, 1857. Despatch of officers to Delhi.

Thus the continuous Panjab stream poured on till Delhi fell and the supreme object, the pivot of the enterprise, was ultimately achieved on September 21, 1857.

"To my mind more danger will arise from delay than from assaulting*." To the Commander-in-Chief, still reticent on the issue, he wrote on the 21st June: "On to Delhi before the rebels had time to strengthen its defences or add greatly to their numbers." Immediate relief of Meerut was advised, to render those men available for service before Delhi¹. The Chief Commissioner promised General Wilson "to support him in the assault with every man that could be safely spared²." Sir John Lawrence's own intimate knowledge of the city, district and people of Delhi, communicated to the authorities on the "Ridge" from time to time, helped much to expedite the operations³.

Early in June an effective Field Force was stationed on the "Ridge" before Delhi. While reinforcements were coming from the Panjab and Meerut, this limited force, despite the critical danger of being enveloped, would serve as a check against the pouring of more mutineers into the citadel and at the same time would oppose the spread of the insurrection from Delhi as a centre.

By the 9th of the same month (June) the Guides joined the Delhi Force. Once the nucleus of the British Force had been placed at the strategic point, Sir John Lawrence was all vigour and energy to provide it with the requisite reinforcements.

The general optimism about the immediate fall of Delhi, on the appearance of the British force before it, faded away after the first contested engagements with the enemy. The inadequate Delhi force had to deal with the trained native soldiery of the same stock as they had on their own side. The mutineers, placed in a fortified position, for the time being rich in resources, were decidedly superior in numbers as well. In the opinion of sound authorities on military craft the thin British force before it, exposed to severe weather conditions (June and July) and decimated by disease, were the besieged rather than the besiegers. Unless it was substantially

* R. Bosworth Smith. *Life of Lord Lawrence*, Vol. II, p. 203-204.

1. The views have been eminently elaborated in a lengthy demi-official letter to General Anson, May 21, 1857. (Green Book No. VII, Vol. I, pp. 54-57).

2. "Panjab Mutiny Report," *op. cit.* p. 142.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 115.

No. 98, June 6, 1857, Sir John Lawrence to H. Bernard, Headquarters, Delhi.

August 10, 1857, Chief Commissioner to John Nicholson giving him a rough sketch of the strategic positions to be occupied in case able to break into the city.

reinforced at the earliest, retreat, with the most disastrous consequences, would not have been a distant prospect. The Panjab alone was the source of succour. The Chief Commissioner kept his word.

A long stream of baggage train, arms and ammunition was poured down the Grand Trunk Road. The line of over 300 miles of road through the territory occupied by the enemy was valiantly guarded by the troops of Maharaja of Patiala. In the first week of July about 3,250 men in all were despatched to Delhi.* Hardly twenty days afterwards 1,700 more had been sent the same way. As many as 2,000 more troops were further promised. In order to achieve this, Lawrence had dangerously reduced his resources in the Panjab. At a time when danger was to be apprehended from every quarter in the province itself, no more than 2,400 Infantry were retained. About 9,000 Europeans and natives besides some 30 guns were locked up in Peshawar and Kohat. But with his "unalterable resolution" Sir John Lawrence was determined more than ever to sustain and reinforce the Delhi Force with the last resources of the province, if the occasion for such a sacrifice would arise.

Still further requisitions for levies and materials for war¹ and the gloomy prospects of the English attack failed to unnerve the Chief Commissioner or to impair his confidence of ultimate success. The acuteness of the distress only added an extra fillip to his unabated courage and resourcefulness. The last throw of the dice was cast. Literally to the last man, all that was best, strong and reliable was spared and the scanty holdings of the province were squeezed to the utmost. The Panjab itself, although the outward crust of peace and loyalty was preserved, had developed into a powder magazine. The spark before Delhi, if once things went against the English, was to decide the issue. The Chief Commissioner had not mistaken the

* June 17, 1857, Chief Commissioner to Hervey Greathead, Delhi.

Description:—7 Companies of H.M.'s 8th	...	600
5 " " 61st	...	450
European Artillerymen	...	200
1st Panjab Rifles (Cokes)	...	800
4th Sikhs (Battrey's)	...	800
Panjab Cavalry	...	400

3,250

1. No. 390, July 25, 1857. Brigadier Wilson to Sir John Lawrence, "Mutiny Papers," *op. cit.*

growing symptoms of the malady and had delicately timed the concentration on Delhi¹.

Under Nicholson, the Hercules of the Panjab, foremost among those who held rebellion in leash on the Frontier during the crisis, it was proposed to drain the Panjab cup to its dregs². The famous warden of the Frontier, who with his movable column had flashed like lightning wherever mutiny raised its head, was despatched to Delhi at the head of the same column, so vital to the peace and tranquillity of the province itself³. Besides reinforcements and the certainty of the collapse of resistance, if only they could break into the city, General Wilson, responsible for the execution of the task, appeared to be too stolid to be roused to bold and vigorous action, which alone would carry the day. Lawrence continued, nevertheless, to stimulate him, as when he wrote: "Every day's delay is fraught with serious danger. Every day disaffection and mutiny spread. Every day adds to the native princes taking part against us. Peshawar is the political volcano which may explode any day. The coming rains would render all military operations impossible. There was little hope of being reinforced from below³." Nothing could better express the eagerness of his urgent solicitations than the concluding remarks: "Pray act. Don't revoke. Remember the adage, when in doubt play trumps. India will be saved by the maxim⁴."

Finding it difficult to rouse the Commander-in-Chief from his lethargy, Sir John Lawrence thought it expedient to spur on some of the other more energetic spirits on the scene—Chamberlain, Norman and Nicholson — whom he hoped to infuse with his own spirit and of whose potentialities and peculiarities he was well aware. The Chief Commissioner never meant to side-track the authority of General Wilson. He was impelled by anxiety for the earliest achievement of the task, which, as his earlier untiring endeavours had shown, depended in his mind upon the maxim, "Now or never."

1. No. 63, September 11, 1857. Official communiqué of events No. 52 clearly depicts the state of affairs in the Panjab.

2. September 6, 1857. Sir John Lawrence to the Governor-General, Calcutta.

3. No. 133, September 18, 1857. Chief Commissioner to the Secretary to Government of India. Official communiqué of the progress of affairs before Delhi, "Munity Papers", *op. cit.*

4. August 20, 1857. Sir John Lawrence to General Wilson before Delhi.

Still the final assault was delayed till the second week of September. The Siege Train arrived at Delhi on the 4th and Wilde's regiment and the Jammu troops followed close behind. About a week more was required to elaborate the plans. Nicholson's impatience with the dilatory proceedings was indicated by the fact that, in his extreme resentment, he dated his letters written in September a month earlier, in August.

At last on the 7th the ground was broken and the first battery attack was opened under Alexander Taylor. The besieged numbered more than 40,000 strong and had about 300 guns. By the 13th the work had been pretty well done. Breaches were reported, "difficult but practicable." The assault was ordered at 3 next morning. After another thunder the breaches were attempted. Nicholson, first in dignity, was the first in danger. Soon the whole line facing the Ridge was occupied and the British flag was run up upon the Kabul gate. The results of the five days to follow were awaited with breathless anticipation. At last on the 20th the tidings of the fall of Delhi were flashed to all parts of the Empire.

What followed the fall of Delhi is however beyond the purview of the restricted narrative. The instantaneous turn which affairs took in the Panjab illustrates the soundness of the policy of the hero of the Panjab. The long looked for "fall" had come just not too late in this province. What might have been involved in the delay in the recapture of the citadel is manifest from the serious outbreaks of disaffection which almost synchronised with the news of the victory before Delhi. The premonitory symptoms which had developed under the surface, yet not unforeseen by the Chief Commissioner, burst out in two widely distant points and among the very sections which had benefited most by English rule. The risings in Hazara and Googaira arose from no immediate grievances or special causes. They merely sprang from the belief, gathering conviction with the native population in general, that the British power was mortally stricken. An express indication of this decline was provided for them by the transient Moghul Empire re-established at Delhi --- the historical capital of India. An earlier outburst of the same spirit at Murree and the later risings amply proved how difficult the control of affairs had become in the Panjab.

Once Delhi had fallen the fate of the mutineer all over India

was determined. A death blow had been dealt to the insurrection. The Hydra had been crushed at its head and the extremity of the peril passed away. British prestige was resuscitated and once more enshrined in the public mind, whose confidence was quickly restored. Once English arms had triumphed against the only and the most formidable stronghold of the mutineers, endowed with the historic glamour of the last of the effete Moghul dynasty among them, no other station could stand the onslaught.

After the recapture of Delhi the struggle had indeed to be extended over many a month to come. But on the part of the mutineers it was no longer a struggle for Empire, but for bare existence. Their suppression in that case was to be only a matter of time.

VIDYA SAGAR SURI.

STUDIES IN INDO-MUSLIM HISTORY
A CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON ELLIOT AND DOWSON'S
HISTORY OF INDIA

AS TOLD BY ITS OWN HISTORIANS.

By *Shāhpūrshāh Hormasji Hodivāla*, Bombay, 1939.

Mr. Hodivala, as we all know, is a prominent figure in the field of historical inquiry and research. His extensive knowledge and infallible judgment entitle him to a position which is well-nigh unique. He writes not for the ordinary reader, but for the historian and the scholar. To the student of Indian history he is probably unknown; to the historian his books are "acts of amendment." He is the historians' historian, the benefactors' benefactor. The circle of his readers, therefore, as we can well understand, is necessarily small and select.

The close and patient examination to which he has subjected the sources of Indo-Islamic history has so far no parallel. His findings on points once properly treated have a sort of finality which seems to make further research in our present state of knowledge a futility. Indeed, we have implicit confidence in his suggestions and hypotheses, discoveries and results. Mr. Hodivala has the miraculous power of laying all ghosts of trembling doubts which have haunted authors and historians in their dreams and waking hours.

Many people know his *Historical Studies in Mughal Numismatics* as a monument of industry and patient labour, not to speak of his articles on vexed historical questions, which have appeared in journals from time to time; but few probably know his "Notes on *Hobson-Jobson*," which appeared serially in the *Indian Antiquary*. Only those who know that great repertory of curious knowledge can realize what it is to improve on a book of that kind, or can have an idea of the immense amount of research involved.

Mr. Hodivala's latest book, *Studies in Indo-Muslim History: A Critical Commentary on Elliot and Dowson's HISTORY OF INDIA AS TOLD BY ITS OWN HISTORIANS*, is a gigantic venture of a still more ambitious character. This book of seven hundred odd pages maintains and enhances the author's reputation for research and sober criticism. On every page there is evidence of infinite knowledge, ripe scholarship, and a delicately balanced judgment. Names of persons and places, and dates and events are uniformly treated with a fulness of detail

and a wealth of illustration that seem to leave no room for further inquiry. Textual readings and translations have been thoroughly examined and corrected in the light of better texts and wider knowledge now available.

Where everything is so good and sound it seems most unfair to offer criticism; but the reviewer has, by immemorial custom, the privilege to appreciate as well as to criticise. In fact a reviewer who only eulogizes is not considered to do all that is expected of him. In any case some criticism is called for, even if only by way of savoury after sweets. I know that a writer who presumes to find fault with Mr. Hodivala's work, must be a bold man indeed. Nevertheless, to salve my reviewer's conscience, I make the following suggestions, which, if approved by the author, may be incorporated in the next edition of this valuable work.

Just a little bit of criticism first :—

In the course of E. and D.'s introduction to Abū'l-Faḡl's *Akbar Nāma* (VI, 1-9) the following sentence occurs: "He [Abū'l-Faḡl] presented a Commentary on a *Sūrat* of the Qurān, which he called *Āvatu-l-Kursī*' (p. 5). Mr. Hodivala has a note on it (on p. 567 of his book), where he says, 'the *Āvatu-l-Kursī* is the name of the *sūrat* or *verse* of the Qurān which was the subject of the Commentary and not the title given by Abū'l-Faḡl to that Commentary or his own lucubration.' The correction made is of course sound, but he himself is mixing up the *sūrat* and the verse in this criticism. From his remark lower down in the note that the *Āvatu-l-Kursī* is the 256th verse of the second chapter of the Holy Book—which is perfectly correct—it is obvious that he knows that a *sūrat* is a chapter, and an *āvat* is a verse; but at the end of the comment Mr. Hodivala again speaks of 'a Commentary on another verse of the Qurān, the *Fātiḥa*'. The *Fātiḥa*, it need hardly be remarked, is not a verse but the first *sūrat* or chapter of the *Qur'ān*, and consists of seven *āyats* or verses.

(2) *Jajhār Singh*

E. and D. spell the name thus everywhere (VII, pp. 6, 7, 47, 48, 49, etc.); and Mr. Hodivala seems to accept the pronunciation (*Studies in Indo-Muslim History*, p. 633 top and 712 middle). I think the name should be written and pronounced Jujhār Singh, since *jujhār* means a fighter or warrior, and *singh* is a lion (*Platts' Dictionary of Urdū, Classical Hindī, and English*); so that Jujhār Singh would be a 'soldier as brave as a lion.'

(3) Another very slight slip on p. 680 may be just noted : *Note on Sujān Rai*.—Batala is not nineteen, but twenty-four, miles north-east of Amritsar both by road and rail. The present reviewer, it so happens, belongs to Batala.

(4) On p. 690 the author corrects Imānābād to Emīnābād. He has identified the place correctly of course. But I doubt if the place was ever called or written Amīnābād (امین آباد). It is true that both the Railway Station and the Post Office are called Eminabad, and it is very easy to change Eminabad into Emīnābād, and thus make it consistent with the derivation of the name from Muḥammad Amīn Khān, as given in the *Imperial Gazetteer of India*. But the actual pronunciation of the name does not lend itself easily to such manipulation. I have been to Eminabad, and have recently asked people belonging to the place. The correct pronunciation can be better indicated as Aimanābād (ایمان آباد), which cannot be turned into Amīnābād (امین آباد) except for some very good reason. The *Ain* has Am(a)nābād (امنا باد) in two places¹; in *Ma'āsiru'l-Umarā* (III, 594 top) we have the same spelling of the name; and in *Khāfī Khān's Muntakhabu'l-Lubāb* (II, 871) we have the modern form Aimanābād (ایمان آباد). So apparently Am(a)nābād (in Akbar's time) grew into Aimanābād (in Muḥammad Shāh's reign). Amīnābād (from Muḥammad Amīn Khān) seems quite unlikely. The name may mean simply "a place of security"—the meaning given in Steingass.

The following entries are suggested for inclusion in Mr. Hodivala's *Commentary*, which is silent about them :—

(1) ELLIOT AND DOWSON, VI, 438.—*Shāh Jahān sent a farmān to Yamūnu-d-daula Āsaf Khān, to the effect that it would be well if Dāwar Bakhsh the son, and (Shahriyār) the useless brother, of Khusrū, and the sons of Prince Dāniyāl, were all sent out of the world.*

This is translation of a passage on p. 303 of *Iqbal Nama-i-Jahāngīrī*, where a *و* has been unhappily omitted by the printer. The portion where the printer's error occurs reads as follows in the Bibl. Ind. edition :—

دوار بخش پسر خسرو و برادر او و ناشدنی و پسران شاهزاده دانیال

It should read :

دوار بخش پسر خسرو و برادر او و ناشدنی و پسران شاهزاده دانیال

1. *Ā'in*, Lucknow edition, II, 156 and III, 29 (B. I. edition is not available at this moment).

Correct translation of the whole passage would be as follows : An autograph order was issued to the following effect : " At this time, when heaven and earth are full of tumult and unrest, it will be advisable if Dāwar Bakhsh, son of Khusrāu, and his brother [i.e. Garshāsp], Nāshudanī [i.e. Shāhryār], and the sons of Prince Dāniyāl [viz., Tahmūraş and Hoshang] are made to wander in the desert of non-existence, and the minds of well-wishers of the Empire set at rest."

'Nāshudanī' was the nickname of Prince Shāhryār. The names of the princes are given again, more clearly, lower down on the same page. In the corresponding passage in *Tuzuk-i-Jahāngīrī* (p. 425) we have the names recounted in two places likewise. There is thus no doubt that execution of five princes was ordered. E. & D.'s translation under discussion makes out only four princes, which is a material mistake. What is more surprising, however, is that Mr. (now Dr.) Beni Prasad, in his *History of Jahangir* (p. 437), instead of relying on the authentic text of the *Tuzuk*, contents himself with copying out E. & D.'s translation at this point, although three lines lower he has to recount the names of the princes a second time, and (saving misspelling of one name) gives all the five names correctly enough, forgetting that his translators in the earlier passage have named only four princes. This, we may remark incidentally, comes of following the translations, where original texts are available.

(2) E. & D., VI, 438, L. 21-23. *The new Emperor now celebrated his thirty-eighth birthday (solar reckoning).*

The solar birthday which was celebrated here was the 37th, and not the 38th. As *Badshāh Nāma* puts it more definitely, it was the end of the 36th, and the beginning of the 37th, solar year (I, i, 80) ; and this is supported by 'Amal-i-Şalih' (I, 220) and *Tuzuk* (426). *Iqbāl Nāma-i-Jahāngīrī* has " 38th ", it is true ; but the authorities I have cited are in keeping with the chronology of Shāh Jahān's reign. So سوم is clearly a transcriber's mistake for چهارم in *Iqbāl Nāma-i-Jahāngīrī*—a common error enough. Now E. & D. may have some justification for following the faulty printed text of *Iqbāl Nāma*, since they are translating that work, not writing an independent narrative ; but Dr. Beni Prasad,¹ who chooses to follow *Iqbāl Nāma* in preference to all the other authorities and to the easily verifiable facts of the case, can hardly plead an excuse.

1. *Jahangir*, 438.

In dealing with passages from *Khazā'inu'l-Futūḥ* of Amīr Khusrāu (E. & D., III), Mr. Hodivala has had to refer to the recent Aligarh Edition (text edited by Prof. Mu'īnu'l-Haq, tr. by Prof. Muḥammad Ḥabīb) in his *Studies in Indo-Muslim History* (pp. 246-57). I should have liked to see some reference to Prof. Shairani's elaborate *Tabṣara* on that edition, which appeared serially in the *Oriental College Magazine* (Lahore), and is virtually a recension of the work. It is a scathing criticism of both text and translation, and a salutary deterrent, it may be added, to those who undertake lightly a task for which they are not fully qualified. Prof. Shairani claims that not a page of the Text¹ nor a line of the Translation² is free from blunders. We have all great respect for Prof. Shairani as scholar and critic. Is it then safe to refer to such an edition or make it the basis of discussion or criticism? It is an awful pity that the *Tabṣara* is in Urdu; no wonder that Mr. Hodivala takes no notice of it. Attention is here drawn to Prof. Shairani's review in the interests of Urdu-reading scholars, who read the *Khazā'in* in E. & D. with the help of Mr. Hodivala's *Commentary*.

Among other amendments I would suggest that places where E. & D.'s extracts from a new book begin should be clearly indicated in the *Commentary*. As it is, we cannot find out, without reference to the E. & D. text, where one book ends and another begins. Head-notes on tops of pages are not sufficiently helpful in this respect. As an example I may refer to pp. 499-503, where each page has a new title on top. Other examples are pp. 244-46 and pp. 365-67. In the long run of pp. 676-87 one would like very much to have lines of demarcation.


Paper, printing and binding, we may remark in conclusion, are not worthy of the book, which deserves a better dress. Here and there one stumbles against "literals." All corrections have not been made in the *Errata*.

These shortcomings do not detract from the value of the work to any material extent, nor do they affect our profound respect for the author's insight and erudition. They only prove that no human achievement, however great, can be perfect.

ABDUL AZIZ

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1. P. 9 of the first instalment.
 2. P. 15 of the last instalment.







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